Jenő Varga and economic policy of the Hungarian Soviet Republic by Mommen, André
André Mommen
JENÔ VARGA AND THE ECONOMIC POLICY 
OF THE HUNGARIAN SOVIET REPUBLIC
1. The making of a Hungarian Marxist
Kinek mondjam el vétkeimet
És a megbocsátást kitõl kérjem?
Kinek mondjam el vétkeimet, istenem?1
Jenô Varga was born in 1879 as Jenô Weisz in Nagytétény, a village si-
tuated at the banks of the Danube some 20 km to the south of Budapest. 
Only scarce documents are informing us on his family. His father, Sza-
mu el Armin Weisz, had established in 1868 a timber trade in Jenô’s na-
tive village. Eight children were born to Szamuel Weisz and his wife Julia 
Singer. In 1884 Jenô lost his mother, a tuberculosis patient. At the age of 
thirteen Jenô Weisz left school for his father’s timber business and other 
small jobs he could fi nd. He spent some years working as an assistant 
bookkeeper at a large estate in the Somogy komitat (county). In 1899 he 
returned to Budapest, where he took evening classes as an “external stu-
dent” preparing for his gymnasium exams. In 1903, he broke with his 
father’s faith and had his name changed into Varga. In 1904 he entered 
university.2
At the University of Budapest, Jenô Varga obtained his credits for Hun-
 garian language and literature, history, Greek philosophy, geography and 
astronomy, history of religion, and logic. In February 1909, he passed 
his exams for philosophy, pedagogy and geography. He wrote a PhD 
dis sertation on ‘Leibniz and Kant and the phenomenological critique of 
  1 Words by Szilveszter Jenei, performed by Friderika Bayer on Emi Quint P 1994 
QUI 906057.
  2 All the time, he was supported fi nancially by his elder brother Emil Varga with 
whom he would be close all the time.
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the transcendental method’.3 Soon he would adhere to the Marxist the-
ory of history and economic development contained in the preface to 
the fi rst volume of Capital in which Marx had pointed out that ‘… the 
evolution of the economic formation of society is viewed as a process of 
natural history…’4 His knowledge of Marxist economic and social theo-
ry was, however, limited to a small number of German social-democratic 
publications signed by Friedrich Engels and Karl Kautsky. 
As far as we know, Varga joined the Magyarországi Szociáldemokrata Párt 
(MSZDP, Hungarian Social Democratic Party) in 1906. Nothing is known 
about the circumstances having pushed Varga into that direction. The 
MSZDP was, at that moment, a typical working-class party formed by 
trade unions defending the interests of urban skilled workers5 infl uenc-
ed by the teachings of Ferdinand Lassalle. At its Tenth Party Congress in 
April 1903, the MSZDP adapted its program to the fast changing social 
and economic conditions. The MSZDP had become meanwhile a Marx-
ist6 party organizing the urban workers on the base of Kautsky’s Erfurt 
Program.7 In 1906, labor leader Ernô Garami who had spent some years 
in Germany, launched Szocializmus, a theoretical journal propagating 
Kautsky’s eschatological Marxism and Darwinism. As a responsible edi-
tor of the economic pages of Népszava,8 Varga got acquainted with actual 
economic and social problems. As a member of the so-called “reform 
generation”, Varga was also collaborating to several Hungarian journals 
and he commented on Hungarian politics in Kautsky’s Die Neue Zeit . In 
the mean time, he published many articles and book reviews in Szocial-
  3 Jenô Varga, A transzcendentális módszer phaenomenológiai kritikája, Budapest: Vilá-
gosság, 1909, 31 pages. 
  4 Karl Marx, Capital, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, vol. 1, 1954, 
p. 10.
  5 At the second trade-union congress in December 1901, only craft unions had shown 
up representing 8,222 members. Protokoll des II. Kongresses der Ungarländischen Fach- 
und Bildungs-Vereine, angehalten am 25., 26. und 27. Dezember 1901 in Budapest im 
grossen Sitzungssaale des hauptstädtischen Magistrats, ausgegeben vom Executiv-Comité 
des ungarländischen Gewerkschaftsrathes (1902) Budapest: Druck von Fried & Kra-
kauer.
  6 Ernô Garami, introduction in Szocializmus, 1906–07, Vol. 1, p. 2. 
  7 Karl Kautsky, Das Erfurter Programm, Stuttgart and Berlin 1922 (10th ed.).
  8 His fi rst signed article was published in Népszava on 27 April 1907, pp. 9-10.
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izmus, Huszadik Század, Közgazdasági Szemle and other less-known jour-
nals. Being an honorable family9 man, Varga occupied a fashionable apart-
ment at the Gutenberg Otthon at walking distance of the Polgári és Kereskedel-
mi Középiskola, a girl’s school where he was teaching history and German 
language. 
Varga’s public life must have started in 1905. In January 1905, the rul-
ing “liberal” landed and fi nancial aristocracy lost the parliamentary 
elections to a loosely organized “nationalist” coalition led by the opposi-
tional Independence Party. In the midst of the ensuing constitutional cri-
sis, when working-class rallies in Budapest increased pressure on the gov-
ernment, the MSZDP called twice for a general strike in the case demo-
cratic electoral reforms would be delayed. Finally, in 1908 universal 
suff rage was introduced, but in a travesty form with provisions for liter-
acy in Magyar and for open voting combined with a weighted electoral 
system giving two or three additional votes to the educated and proper-
tied citizens (the Belgian multiple vote system). 
Timid reforms, not revolutionary changes, would typify these years of 
Hungarian history as the venue for political struggle shifted from the 
streets of Budapest to the halls of parliament and the backrooms where 
political deals could be made. The MSZDP evolved with the times. The 
party’s reformist wing was pressing for social welfare legislation, price 
controls (food and rents) and better city services for the workers, but, in 
the mean time, a revolutionary syndicalist tendency contesting the Par-
ty’s parliamentary strategy could gain a foothold in some unions. Ervin 
Szabó’s teachings denouncing the party’s statutes for their built-in safe-
guards designed to perpetuate the hegemony of a small trade-union ol-
igarchy, got some appeal to radicalized young intellectuals and opposi-
tional trade-union leaders. In these years, Varga moved closer to Gyula 
Alpári who led a radical Marxist tendency. Varga marked, however, his 
distances as Alpári wanted to split the party. In a letter written in March 
or April 1911 to Kautsky, Varga criticized Alpári’s project for a new so-
cial-democratic party as unrealistic. In turn, Alpári did not appreciate 
Varga’s ‘cowardice’ or the latter’s ‘rosy reports’ on the Hungarian labor 
  9 In 1908 he met Sári Grün at café Meteor. They would marry in 1910 and have a 
son András (Bandi) in 1912.
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movement published in Die Neue Zeit.10 Varga remained, nonetheless, 
very critical to the party leaders supervizing the party press and exclud-
ing any free debate.11 In this period, he defi ned himself as ‘not a mili-
tant by nature’, but as a person ‘more inclined to abstract studies’.12At 
the very end, Varga preferred staying in the party for ‘the sake of his 
e ducational activities’.13 
Varga’s “orthodox” Marxism was tainted by eclecticism. Max and Al-
fred Weber and Werner Sombart were his main sources of sociological 
inspiration. As a member of the “reform generation”,14 Varga belonged 
also to Oszkár Jászi’s review Huszadik Század and the freethinkers’ soci-
ety Galileo Kör (Galilei Society) publishing the infl uential propagandistic 
journal, Szabadgondolat (Free Thought) and organizing lectures at the 
Free School of the Social Sciences.15 Together with his professor Bernát Alex-
ander, Varga would, nonetheless, join the competing Bembe Kör (Bembe 
Society). There he became, together with Sándor Varjas, Andor Fenyô16 
and Gyula Polgár, its ‘leading spirit’.17 When in March 1906, Oszkár Já-
szi entered into the lodge Demokrácia, Zsigmond Kunfi , editor of Szo-
cializmus, Jenô Varga, József Pogány, Zoltán Rónai, and Ernô Czóbel, all 
staff members of Népszava, accompanied him. In May 1908, when con-
servative resistance obliged Jászi to leave Demokrácia for a new lodge, 
Martinovics, he was accompanied by Pál Szende, Ede Harkányi, Endre 
Ady, Zsigmond Kunfi  and Jenö Varga. In 1913, Sándor Ferenczi – also a 
10 Letter from Alpári to Kautsky, 15 May 1911 in Georges Haupt, János Lemnitz, 
and Leo Van Rossum (eds), Karl Kautsky und die Sozialdemokratie Südeuropas. Korre-
spondenz 1883–1938, Frankfurt and New York: Campus Verlag, 1986, pp. 508-509.
11 Ibidem, pp. 506-507.
12 Ibidem, p. 506.
13 Ibidem, p. 507.
14 Zoltán Horváth, Magyar századforduló. A második reformnemzedék története (1896–
1914), Budapest: Gondolat, 1974, pp. 305-324.
15 ‘Freie Schule der Sozialwissenschaften’, in Volksstimme, 15 October 1909, pp. 6-7.
16 Andor or Endre Fenyô would become Varga’s friend. There exists a photograph 
taken at Varga’s dacha near Moscow at the end of the 1950s. Party Archives, Bu-
dapest, Varga fi les, 783.f.24.ô.e.
17 Árpád Kadarkay, Georg Lukács. Life, Thought, and Politics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1991, p. 61.
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member of Bembe Kör – founded the Budapest Psichoanalytic Society.18 Fer-
enczi had catched the attention of intellectuals like György Lukács, Sán-
dor Radó, Mihaly Bálint or Jenö Varga. Later on, as an irregular visitor 
of Georg Lukács’s sophisticated Sunday Circle, Varga kept in touch with 
self-consuming intellectuals having adhered to Bergson’s metaphysics as 
well.19 
2. Debating on economic and political issues
The MSZDP leaders refused to take part in intellectual and theoreti-
cal debates they considered as being highly detrimental to party uni ty. 
Hence, Marxist theory was merely reduced to the recognition that some 
“useful laws” determining social and economic progress existed. When 
in 1907 the MSZDP founded a Party School under direction of József 
Diner-Dénes, Zoltán Rónai and Zsigmond Kunfi , its curriculum was a 
true copy of the Free School’s and Galileo’s teachings program.20 As a 
consequence, intellectual life was concentrated outside party structures 
and largely guided by Jászi and the liberals of the “reform generation” 
debating on actual political, social and economic problems. Meanwhile, 
Varga specialized in problems such as the concentration of capital, infl a-
tion, agrarian reformism and imperialism. 
2.1 The Varga-Bauer debate
Protectionism, cartels and the existing agrarian monopolies were cited 
as the major causes of increasing food prices and rents, while growing 
migratory movements from poor agrarian regions to the cities and the 
New World were considered as its consequence.21 When discussing these 
problems,22 Otto Bauer linked the infl ation phenomenon to the inter-
national capitalist business cycle with its increased demand of raw mate-
18 According to historian Pál Harmat, Varga was a member of this society. Pál Harmat, 
Freud, Ferenczi és a magyarországi pszichoanalízis – A budapesti mélylélektani iskola történe-
te, 1908–1893, Bern: Az Európai Protestáns Magyar Szabadegyetem, 1988, p. 47.
19 Éva Karádi and Erzsébet Vezér (eds), Georg Lukács, Karl Mannheim und der Sonn-
tagskreis, Frankfurt am Main: Sendler Verlag, 1985.
20 A magyarországi szociálisztikus munkásmozgalmak az 1907. évben, Budapest: Radó Izor 
Nyomdai Mûvintézete, 1908, pp. 479-485.
21 ‘Die Theuerung’, in Volksstimme, 15.9.1904, p. 1; ‘Kartell-Gesetz’, in ibidem, p. 1.
22 Otto Bauer, ‘Krise und Teuerung’, in Der Kampf, 1908, pp. 116-123.
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rials and foodstuffs.23 In several articles published in the party press24 
and in academic journals,25 Varga opposed Bauer’s analysis by linking 
rising domestic prices to recently established monopolies, cartels and im-
port duties. In his widely acclaimed essays A drágaság (infl ation)26 and 
A magyar kartellek,27 Varga argued that mo no polies and cartels were caus-
ing continuous price rises. Finally, he offered a critique of Bauer’s infl a-
tion theory in Kautsky’s jour nal Die Neue Zeit28.
Varga’s analysis departed from a lengthy footnote remark by Fried-
rich Engels in Marx’s Capital volume III in which changes in the method 
of the production of gold were affecting prices chan ges. The ensuing de-
bate now centered around Varga’s claim that, in contradiction to Otto 
Bauer’s theory,29 technological progress in the process of gold pro duc-
tion could have no effect on the level of prices since it only could gener-
ate differential rents within the gold-mining branch of production. This 
23 Later, Otto Bauer developed this thesis more thoroughly a book in which he argued 
that increased gold production and labor productivity in the mining sector could 
have contributed to additional price rises. Otto Bauer, Die Teuerung. Eine Einfüh-
rung in die Wirtschaftspolitik der Sozialdemokratie, Vienna: Verlag der Wiener Volksbuch-
handlung Ignaz Brand, 1910, pp. 37-4; Otto Bauer, ‘Goldproduktion und Teue-
rung, in Die Neue Zeit, 1911–1912, Vol. 30, II, pp. 4-14; pp. 49-53; pp. 246-247.
24 Varga, ‘A drágaság’, in Népszava, 25.12.1910, pp. 33-34; ‘A kartellár alakulása’, in 
Szocializmus, 1912–1913, Vol. 7, pp. 12-19; ‘A kartellek és a munkásság gazdasági 
harcai’, in Szocializmus, 1911–1912, Vol. 6, pp. 412-421.
25 Varga, ‘A világpiaci drágulás nagysága és oka’, in Közgazdasági Szemle, 1911, pp. 
487-504; idem, ‘Az aranytermelés és a drágaság’, in ibidem, 1911, pp. 588-601. Both 
articles were republished as a chapter of a book volume containing all articles on 
infl ation previously issued in Közgazdasági Szemle. Other contributors to this vol-
ume were István Bernát, János Bud, Henrik Gärtner, Farkas Heller, Frigyes Herz-
feld, Béla Jankovich, Sándor Katona, Sándor Tonelli, József Vágó, István Varró, 
and Vilmos Wolff. See Varga ‘A drágaság’, in Sándor Tonelli (ed.), A drágaság, Bu-
dapest: Pesti Könyvnyomda Részvénytársaság, 1912, pp. 216-262.
26 Jenô Varga, A drágaság, Budapest: Népszava, 1912. 
27 Jenô Varga, A magyar kartellek, Honnan származnak a milliók? Budapest: Népszava, 
1912.
28 Eugen Varga, ‘Goldproduktion und Teuerung’, in Die Neue Zeit, 1912–1913, Vol. 
31, I, pp. 212-220.
29 Already in 1910, Varga had rejected Bauer’s argument in a review of the latter’s 
book Die Teuerung published in Huszadik Század, 1910, Vol. 21, pp. 580-582.
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debate, in which J. Karski [Julian Marchlewski], Varga,30 Jacob van Gel-
de ren,31 Mi ron I. Nakhimson,32 Bauer and Kautsky33 participated, was 
the fi rst one in which the infl ation phenomenon was discussed at length. 
In opposition to Otto Bauer, Varga declared the system of banking, 
and not the production costs in gold-mining, to be the reason why chang-
es in the production of gold and silver would not automatically operate 
to produce changes in the value of gold. Because the central banks cor-
nered all the gold coming to the world market, he argued, no lowering 
of the value of gold could take place. It would appear from this as if the 
problem were a different one under the modern capitalistic system than 
under a system in which goods are simply produced. In reality the banks 
played no part in the economic role of gold in connection with this ques-
tion, and the capitalistic method of employing money took no change in 
the immeasurability of the tendency to accumulate. In addition, there 
was no limit to the hoarding of gold and silver respectively, because gold 
is a commodity, and the only commodity of which one can never have 
30 Varga responded to Bauer with his article ‘Goldproduktion und Teuerung’, in Die 
Neue Zeit, 1912–1913, Vol. 31, I, pp. 557-563.
31 Jacob van Gelderen (1891–1940) (ps. J. Fedder), a Dutch economist, was a pioneer 
of the long waves theory. Van Gelderen referred to ‘logical mistakes’ Varga had 
made when arguing that the gold price was mainly depending on the ‘richness’ of 
the mines’ gold layers and, subsequently, not on their production costs. However, 
it was obvious that actual infl ation was infl uenced by fl uctuations in gold production. 
In Van Gelderen’s view gold production played only a secondary role in enhancing 
the investment cycle once it had got under way doe to other factors. Under a gold 
standard regime, a low price level during the depression gives extra incentives to 
produce gold. On the other hand, an increase in gold production favors credit ex-
pan sion and rising prices, thereby giving disincentives for further gold exploration. 
Van Gelderen emphasizes the importance of the gold booms in attracting people 
to the new countries. J.v.G. [Jacob van Gelderen], ‘Goldproduktion und Preisbewe-
gung’, in Die Neue Zeit, 1911–1912, Vol. 30, I, pp. 660-664.
32 Spectator admitted that Varga was right, but it would be completely false pre ten-
ding that gold demand was always exceeding gold production and that the emis-
sion banks were unable to meet gold hunger. Spectator [Miron I. Nakhimson], 
‘Zur Frage der Goldproduktion und Teuerung’, in Die Neue Zeit, 1911–1912, Vol. 
30, II, pp. 550-553.
33 Karl Kautsky, ‘Gold, Papier und Ware’, in Die Neue Zeit, 1911–1912, Vol. 30, I, pp. 
837-847 and pp. 886-893.
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enough.34 In its very notion, money seems to be a commodity different 
from all other commodities, in that it can be used in every case and un-
der all circumstances. ‘Thus the money-commodity becomes money’, Var-
 ga concluded.35 
Kautsky paid much attention to the Bauer-Varga debate in the columns 
of Die Neue Zeit. He contested Varga’s theory of infl ation by setting forth 
the theory that changes in the production of gold were not accountable 
for the present price increases, and, furthermore, that such changes would 
never cause a fall in the value of gold, but only a rise of ground rents in 
mining.36 On January 24, 1914, Kautsky published a special issue37 on 
the relation between gold production and infl ation. Kautsky: ‘If Var-
ga concludes […] that changes in the method of producing gold cannot 
make changes in the prices of commodities, he proves too much, since 
such changes have been of frequent occurrence in history, and conspicu-
ously so in the sixteenth century, after the discovery of America.’38 
In the wake of this debate, the Second International had to pay some 
attention to the infl ation problem. Its Bureau programmed a debate ses-
sion on this issue at the 1914 Vienna Congress that never would meet be-
cause of the outbreak of the war. Kautsky and Bauer were invited to give 
a report on the question.39 In his report, Bauer defended the thesis that 
the value of gold had decreased since society needed less labor for its ex-
traction and that the subsequent decrease of the value of gold refl ected 
itself into the increase of the goods prices. He admitted that the cost of 
gold extraction was not the only – not even the main – reason for the 
high cost of living. But, side by side with the other reasons, ‘it must be 
admitted that the decrease of the value of gold is also a cause of the high 
34 ‘With the possibility of holding and storing up exchange-value in the shape of 
a particular commodity, arises also the greed for gold’, Marx wrote in Capital I. 
Marx, Capital I, o.c., 1954, p. 131.
35 Varga, Goldproduktion, o.c., pp. 212-220.
36 Kautsky, The High Cost of Living. [http://www.marxists.org]
37 Karl Kautsky, ‘Die Wandlungen der Goldproduktion und der wechslende Charak-
ter der Teuerung’, in Die Neue Zeit, 1912–1913, Vol. 31, I, pp. 1-47.
38 Karl Kautsky, High Cost of Living, o.c.
39 Though Varga’s reputation was growing, he was not selected as a director for the 
workshop on infl ation.
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cost of living. The possibility to extract gold at a low production price, 
has had for effect a considerable increase in the gold pro duc tion.’40
According Ernest Mandel’s study on Late Capitalism, the arguments ad-
vanced on both sides of this discussion were false from the point of view of 
rigorous application of the labor theory of value. Mandel argued that ‘Var-
ga’s thesis that, by fi xing the gold price, the central banks could prevent 
gold production from increasing prices is indefensible and was convinc-
ingly refuted by Kautsky and Bauer. Kautsky insisted on the peculiarity of 
gold for the purposes of demonstrating that an increase in the produc-
tion of gold represents an additional overall demand – in other words, an 
extension of the market for capitalist commodity production. The produc-
tion of gold is the production of the ‘universal equivalent’ which, as an in-
dividual commodity, not only possesses a particular use-value (for jewel-
ers and others), but in addition has the very special use value of being ex-
changeable for all commodities. As such, gold can never become unsal-
able in capitalism.’41
2.2 The agrarian question
In this pre-war period, Hungary’s export opportunities for agricultural 
products could expand because of growing demands coming from the 
industrializing Austrian and Czech provinces within a unitary Empire-
wide market. However, the combination of late and weak industriali-
zation fi nanced by foreign capital and liberal agrarian reforms brought 
enormous social costs for the Hungarian agrarian laborer. It left him in 
a situation without any historical exit.42 As the agrarian crisis worsened, 
widespread unrest among the landless masses increased. When dissatis-
faction of the small and medium-sized farmers took concrete form, the 
desire for breaking up large estates into small parcels was carried by 
agrarian populism. In some cases this also generated a theoretically and 
40 Otto Bauer, The High Cost of Living. Report. International Socialist Bureau 1914. In ter-
national Socialist Congress of Vienna (August 23-29, 1914). Documents, 2nd Commis-
sion, Brussels, s.d.
41 Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism, London: NLB, 1975, pp. 425-426; also in Ernest 
Man del, Der Spätkapitalismus. Versuch einer marxistischen Erklärung, Frankfurt: Suhr-
kamp, 1973, pp. 389-390.
42 The landless poor, including dependents, were estimated to number 6 million 
pers ons, that is, about one third of the total population of the country.
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socially distinct ideology when agrarian “populist” parties saw the day-
light as defensive social movements.43 Later on, the peasantry turned to 
the reform wing of the Independence Party led by Gyula Justh.
Although not really interested in these rural problems, the MSZDP44 
discussed these issues at its 1896 party congress45 when advocating the 
joint socialization and large-scale operation of all industrial and agri-
cultural resources. The MSZDP congress could, however, not agree on 
an appropriate agrarian reform program taking protection of the small 
farmers into account.46 The agrarian question would engender from now 
on a profound malaise within the party and some adjacent intellectual 
circles. People debating on land reform – whether in the direction of so-
cialization or of parceling large estates –, were the sociologists of the Ga-
lilei Kör or the Sociological Society.47 Sociologist Róbert Braun48, a Geor-
43 Luis Enrique Alonso, ‘Agrarianism, populism and the international division of la-
bor’, in Aad Blok, Keith Hitchins, Raymond Makrey and Birger Simonson (eds), 
Urban Radicals, Rural Allies. Social Democracy and the Agrarian Issue 1870–1914, Bern, 
etc.: Peter Lang, 2002, p. 82.
44 They missed an elaborated plan for a land reform; but, in fi rm adherence to Marx’s 
teachings and, unlike the 1875 Gotha program of German Social-Democracy, the 
party program included the thesis that landed property and all means of pro duc-
tion should be placed under public ownership.
45 Sándor Csizmadia held a referee on the agrarian question. The main topic was 
the living and working conditions of the agrarian proletariat. Hans Georg Leh-
mann, Die Agrarfrage in der Theorie und Praxis der deutschen und internationalen Sozi-
al demokratie. Vom Marxismus zum Revisionismus und Bolschewismus, Tübingen: J.C.B. 
Morh (Paul Siebeck), 1970, p. 232.
46 Sándor Farkas, ‘Marx Károly tanításainak elterjedése magyarországon 1867–1919’, 
in A Marx Károly Közgazdaságtudományi Egyetem Évkönyve 1958, Budapest: Közgaz-
dasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1959, p. 19.
47 Georgist Dr. Franz Oppenheimer (1864–1943) from Berlin lectured in October 1909 
at the Sociological Society (they met at the Karoly Körut 14 in the buildings of the 
University between 6 and 8 p.m.) on latifunda and the social question. See report 
in Volksstimme, 15.10.1909, pp. 6-7. Varga knew Oppenheimer’s writings on Ri-
cardo. See his review in Huszadik Század, 1910, Vol. 21, pp. 478-481.
48 Braun had brought out Magyar versions of Henry George’s books Protection or Free 
Trade and Progress and Poverty, which was criticized by Varga in Huszadik Század, 1909, 
Vol. 20, pp. 98-100. Braun also established contacts with the Bodenreform movement 
in Germany. Success of Georgism in Hungary was almost wholly due to the drive of 
the statistician, Dr. Gyula (Julius) J. Pikler, who had learned about the doctrine 
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gist propagandist of gradual land nationalization with the help of a land 
value tax, dominated the debates in which some socialists adhering to 
Georgism and others championing the cause of private property based 
on small farm holdings, par ti ci pated. 
Meanwhile, the MSZDP had become deeply divided between “re for-
mist” and “proletarian” currents. The “reformist” current represented 
by Kálmán Jóscák49 stressed the importance of the agrarian cooperative 
move ment, and the “proletarian” current represented by Sándor Csiz-
madia50 paid much more attention to social legislation for the ag ri cul tu ral 
workers and their heir. Meanwhile, Péter Ágoston tried to reconcile both 
tendencies.51 At its 1908 party congress,52 the MSZDP could not ag ree 
on a draft text submitted by Sándor Csizmadia demanding a ra di cal ex-
p ro priation of all big estates.53 A study commission of three men was ap-
pointed to rewrite Csizmadia’s draft text. In 1912, no agreement on an 
agrarian program was reached at the 19th MSZDP Party Congress that 
appointed a new study commission!54 
through Braun shortly before World War I. As a deputy director of the Budapest 
Public Statistics Offi ce, he conducted a virtual one-man campaign for the idea of 
the land-value tax. He made no effort to found a movement or or ganization. The 
Freemason Pikler held his fi rst speech about a land value tax in his lodge Demokrá-
cia. He wrote for the great liberal daily founded by the Masons, Világ, and for the 
offi cial periodical of the capital, Városi Szemle. Michael Silagi, ‘Henry George and 
Europe: Hungary began a promising venture in Georgist tax re form but re vo lu tio-
na ry turmoil and infl ation ended it’, in American Journal of Eco nomics & Sociology, 
1994, Vol. 53, No. 1, pp. 111-128. 
49 In the Party Executive he represented the district of Zombor.
50 In that period, Sándor Csizmadia kept in touch with Ervin Szabó and Count Bat-
thyány in order to create a revolutionary anarcho-syndicalist movement. András 
Bozóki and Miklós Sükösd, Anarchism in Hungary: Theory, History, Legacies, New 
Jer sey: Center for Hungarian Studies and Publications, Inc., 2006, p. 123.
51 Eugen Varga, ‘Das Agrarprogramm’, in Volksstimme, 7. 4. 1911, pp. 1-2, and 14. 4. 
1911, p. 4.
52 Farkas, o.c., p. 19.
53 Though pleading for expropriation of all latifundistas, the draft resolution was ra-
ther reformist demanding expropriation only after a long transition period and 
taking into account local conditions. Volksstimme, 10.4.1908, pp. 5-6.
54 A magyarországi szociáldemokrata párt 1912. évi április 7., 8. és napjain Budapesten meg-
tartott XIX. pártgyûlésének jegyzôkönyve [1912], Budapest: Világosság könyvnyomda. 
Probably, Varga had been co-opted into this commission.
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Varga defended “orthodox Marxist”55 views on the agrarian question. 
Theoretically, he was siding with the “orthodox Marxists” against the “Da-
vid reformists” defending the interests of the smallholders. In a com men-
tary to the 1912 draft versions of the agrarian program, Varga in di cated 
that the “natural situation” in agriculture differed from that in industry. 
Referring to Karl Marx56 and Karl Kautsky,57 he simply stated that the 
55 See for instance his article against Róbert Braun, ‘Az ortodox szocializmus vádja’ 
(‘the accusation of orthodox Marxism’), in Huszadik Század, 1917, Vol. 36, pp. 
274-275.
56 ‘The peasant, expropriated and cast adrift, must buy their value [of their former 
means of nourishment] in the form of wages, from his new master, the industrial 
capitalist. That which holds good of the means of subsistence holds with the raw 
materials of industry dependent upon home agriculture. They were transformed 
into an element of constant capital. […] In fact, the events that transformed the 
small peasants into wage-laborers, and their means of subsistence and of labor 
into material elements of capital, created, at the same time, a home-market for 
the latter. Formerly, the peasant family produced the means of subsistence and 
the raw materials, which they themselves, for the most part, consumed. These raw 
materials and means of subsistence have now become commodities; the large far-
mer sells them, he fi nds his market in manufactures. […] Modern industry alone, 
and fi nally, supplies, in machinery, the lasting basis of capitalistic agriculture, ex-
propriates radically the enormous majority of the agricultural population, and 
comp letes the separation between agriculture and rural domestic industry, whose 
roots – spinning and weaving – it tears up. It therefore also, for the fi rst time, con-
quers for industrial capital the entire home market. Marx, Capital I, o.c., 1954, 
pp. 745-747.
57 Kautsky, La question agraire. Étude sur les tendances de l’agriculture monderne, Paris: V. 
Giard & E. Brière, 1900, pp. 138-196. Die Agrarfrage (1899), Kautsky’s major work 
on capitalist development in agriculture was not translated into Hungarian. Kauts-
ky had been one of the men behind the rejection of the agricultural program pro-
posals at the SPD Congress of 1895 in Breslau. In his study, Kautsky explained 
why social democracy had to manage without the support of the farmers, because 
farmers and workers had different interests. The farmers wanted high prices on 
the same agricultural products that wage-workers wanted to buy as cheaply as pos-
sible. His agricultural program was simply to leave the farmers in peace. Large-
scale production was needed in agriculture, as in industry. Social democracy should 
not interfere with the capitalist or cooperative development of concentration. 
Eduard David’s Socialismus und Landwirtschaft, Berlin: Socialistische Monatshefte, 
1903, circulated since 1909 in Hungary in translation by Dr. Sándor Szabados as 
Szocializmus és mezôgazdaság. This Hungarian translation was not published by the 
Party’s Népszava, but by publishing house Károly Grill in Budapest. This book re-
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big lan d ow ners were producing more effi ciently than the small hol ders, 
but as long as the latifundistas were not interested in competing with the 
peasants on price, many of the latter could earn a marginal income by 
working day and night for a low return on investment. He ar gued that 
the peasantry was not forming a homogeneous class. It would thus not 
be easy to draft an agrarian program ha ving an appeal to all categories 
of peasants.58 In the mean time, Var ga commented in the party press on 
some aspects of the ag ra rian question. The phenomenon of the parce-
ling-out process was – at least from a Marxist point of view – diffi cult to 
explain in the light of the law of the concentration of capital. He knew 
that this point had played an important role in the German reformism 
debate between Eduard Bernstein and Karl Kautsky.59 Siding with Kaut-
sky, Varga argued that high grain prices incited many peasants to acquire 
additional small plots from the big landowners. Thus the latter contrib-
uted much to farmer’s survival and the fragmentation process in agricul-
ture. In addition, Hungarians abroad and agrarian banks fi nanced the 
multiplying number of free-holdings in several parts of the country.60 
These simple facts indicated that the big agrarian enterprise was not su-
perior to the traditional family farm and that the latter could easily sur-
vive under the latifundista regime.
Though Varga did not embrace Eduard David’s reformist thesis that 
small farms were superior to the big estates,61 he had, nonetheless, discov-
ered the virtues of agrarian cooperation, which could reconcile the op-
posing party tendencies around a reform program being not fundamen-
jec ted the effectiveness of large-scale farming. David argued that it was emperically 
prov en that Marx’s theory of concentration was not applicable to agriculture. 
58 ‘Das Agrarprogramm’, in Volksstimme, 7.4.1911, p. 2; 14.4.1911, p. 4.
59 Bo Gustafsson, Marxismus und Revisionismus. Eduard Bernsteins Kritik des Marxismus 
und ihre ideengeschichtlichen Voraussetzungen, Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Ver-
lagsanstalt, 1972.
60 Varga, ‘Bodenfragen’, in Volksstimme-Kalender, 1912, pp. 73-77.
61 According to David social democracy ought to transform big farms into small ones. 
By removing tariffs on corn and by demanding better living conditions for the 
agricultural workers, the big farms would not survive. Such a program should 
also be the cornerstone in an alliance between social democracy and the farmers, 
since without the latter, David argued, German social democracy would not gain 
power under the present conditions.
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tally in contradiction with Marxist principles. Varga advised the creation 
of different types of credit and purchase cooperatives in order to elimi-
nate intermediaries and vendors. Fearing the rise of agrarian monopolies 
setting high food prices for the urban consumers, he hailed the start up 
in Italy of associations of agricultural workers. There, ‘in a spirit of soli-
darity’62, the workers were making a united front against the latifundistas. 
Varga remained optimistic about the evolution in agriculture and the rise 
of agrarian cooperatives uniting the peasants. Agrarian cooperatives were 
self-consuming producers par excellence, he argued, which were certainly 
not at all completely subjected to market fl uctuations or particularly sensi-
tive to economic crises as long as they did not accumulate food stocks.63 
With regard to the agrarian question, Varga’s position had remained 
rather ambiguous and disappointingly reformist to his leftist comrades. 
In his memoirs József Lengyel would bitterly recall that Varga defended, 
at the occasion of a debate on the agrarian question at the Galileo Kör, 
the break-up of the big estates, while Károly Vantus of the Korvin Group 
had defended the opposite view.64 In an article reporting on the 19th Par-
ty Congress65, Varga stressed the importance of social reforms for the 
agrarian proletariat in combination with a more dynamic industrial pol-
icy as well. Emigration had to be halted by implementing faster indus-
trial development, which, in return, would create more jobs for the un-
skilled agrarian workers. In another polemic with Otto Bauer, Varga66 
referred to the necessity of increasing the rate of capital accumulation in 
order to absorb agricultural labor surplus.67 According to Varga, the case 
62 Varga, ‘Landwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaften’, in Volksstimme-Kalen-
der, Budapest, 1913, p. 88.
63 Ibidem, p. 89.
64 József Lengyel, Visegráder Strasse. Mit einem Vorwort von Béla Kun, Berlin: Dietz Ver-
lag, 1959, pp. 142-143.
65 MSZDP, A magyarországi szociáldemokrata párt 1912, évi április 7., 8. és 9. napjain Bu-
dapesten megtartott XIX. pártgyûlésének jegyzôköyve, Budapest: Világosság Könyve, 
1912.
66 Varga, ‘Wanderungen der Arbeiter und des Kapitals’, in Der Kampf, 1914, Vol. 7, 
pp. 408-411.
67 He used Alfred Weber’s geographical allocation theory when explaining dif fe ren-
ces in accumulation rate between countries and regions. Alfred Weber’s work would 
have a longlasting infl uence on Varga’s perception of economic development. 
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of the United States clearly demonstrated that a country combining immig-
ration with capital import could obtain higher economic growth rates.68 
The MSZDP could only play an important role in Hungarian political 
life if the Party would be able to establish an alliance with the agrarian 
masses against the landowners. Hence, Varga warned his comrades for 
revolutionary passivity: ‘We are not – and in the near future we will not 
be – in the lucky situation of our comrades of Western Europe. There-
fore we cannot wait for the moment the agrarian workers be transformed 
into industrial workers and then be organized and integrated into the 
Party! We have to fi nd our way to the fi elds! How? That will be a serious 
question for the Hungarian Party. It is a matter of to be or not to be!’69 
Summing up, Varga had lost himself in ambiguities and he si ta tions 
when suggesting a solution to the agrarian problem from a socialist point of 
view.70 In December 1918, when the MSZDP had to arrest an agrarian re-
form program, Varga signed together with Zsigmond Kunfi  for its con tent.71 
68 Otto Bauer reacted slightly irritated to Varga’s attacks. Otto Bauer, ‘Kapitalsver-
mehrung und Bevölkerungswachstum’, in Der Kampf, 1914, Vol. 7, p. 411.
69 Varga, ‘Die kapitalistische Entwicklung Ungarns und ihre Hemmungen’, in Die 
Neue Zeit, 1914–1915, Vol. 33, II, p. 177.
70 When commenting in Die Neue Zeit on strategic issues debated at the 18th MSZDP 
Congress in 1911, he could agree on the issue of an alliance with the Justh Party 
for universal suffrage, but, at the same time, he pleaded for ‘a mass movement in 
order to strengthen the fi ghting minority in Parliament and to help them gaining 
a new victory.’ Varga’s gradualism inspired him to express an optimistic conclusion 
on the MSZDP strategy: ‘…though slowly, the cause of the proletariat is prog res-
sing; that was the impression every attentive observer got from this year’s cong-
ress.’ Varga, ‘Kongreß der Ungarländischen Sozialdemokratischen Partei’, in Die 
Neue Zeit, 1910–1911, Vol. 29, II, pp. 170. Though there existed a leftist opposition 
in the Hungarian Party, Varga remained optimistic all the time about the strategy 
followed by the MSZDP. When commenting on the 20th Party Congress of October 
1913, he defended the alliance with the Justh Party for universal suffrage with the 
argument that only mass mobilization, i.e. ‘pressure coming from the revolting 
masses’, could lead to results. But his Luxemburgism was rather mitigated by his 
Kautskyist appeal to the ‘organizational power of the masses.’ Varga, ‘Kongreß der 
ungarländischen sozialdemokrtatischen Partei’, in Die Neue Zeit, 1913–1914, Vol. 
32, I, p. 194. 
71 Tibor Hajdú, ‘A KMP taktikájának néhány vonása a proletár forradalom elôkeszí-
tésének hónapjaiban’, in Párttörténeti Közlemények, 1968, Vol. 13, No. 3, p. 386.
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Again, Varga elucidated the problem of agrarian reform in a book let pub-
lished in January 1919 in which he argued for agrarian reforms in combi-
nation with a revision of the anti-labor laws of 1898 and 1907 repressing 
agrarian syndicalism.72
2.3 On imperialism
Two broad Marxist schools of imperialism were formed in the beginning 
of the 20th century. The fi rst one was based on Rudolf Hilferding’s Fi-
nance Capital;73 the second one on Rosa Luxemburg’s Accumulation of Ca-
pital.74 Despite their divergent methods and different conclusions, both 
shared a common central problem75: the relationship between the con-
tinuing accumulation, concentration and centralization of capital in the 
capitalist center on the one hand,76 and the imperialist expansion of ca-
pi tal on the other hand.77 
72 Jenô Varga, Földosztás és földreform Magyarországon, Budapest: Népszava–Könyvke-
reskedés Kiadása, 1919. His views were criticized by Georgists like Gyula J. Pikler 
and Arnold Dániel. See review of Varga’s book by Géza Farkas in Huszadik Század, 
1919, Vol. 40, pp. 294-296.
73 Rudolf Hilferding, Das Finanzkapital. Eine Studie über die jüngste Entwicklung des Ka-
pitalismus, Vienna, Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1910 (Marx-Studien, vol. III).
74 In opposition to Hilferding’s thesis, Luxemburg argued that inadequate markets 
created a chronic realization problem and incited many capitalists to export their 
surplus commodities to the colonies.
75 Marx’s Capital had inspired both theories of imperialism. Capitalism had two ways 
of surmounting the problem: on the one hand by enforced destruction of pro-
ductive forces and on the other hand by the conquest of new markets and by the 
more thorough exploitation of the old ones. In Capital III Marx suggested that 
the industrial cycle, thus the cycle of boom and bust, periodically reproduced it-
self, once the fi rst impulse had been given. According to Marx no escape was pos-
sible so long as capitalism prevailed. The real barrier of capitalist production, was 
capital itself, because of restricted consumption of the masses as compared to the 
tendency of capitalist production to develop the productive forces in such a way 
that only the absolute power of consumption of the entire society would be their 
li mit. Karl Marx, Capital III, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publisher, 1959, pp. 183-
4, 239-40, 251-252.
76 James E. Becker, Marxian Political Economy. An Outline, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977, pp. 213-219.
77 In this period Varga was won over for Hilferding’s accumultation theory. Varga 
preferred focusing on the role of newly founded cartels and monopolies and their 
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Rudolf Hilferding’s Finance Capital attempted to grasp scientifi cally 
the economic phenomena of recent capitalist development. These new 
phenomena were the abolition of free competition through the forma-
tion of cartels and trusts together with the ever-closer relationship be-
tween bank and industrial capital. He argued that the new institutions 
of capitalism were rooted in the business cycle and that cyclical varia-
tions in the rate of profi t enhanced the trend towards trustifi cation and 
cartelization. Organized capital attempted artifi cially to raise the profi ts 
of cartel members by siphoning off a share of the surplus value created 
in enterprises that normally bought their products. The only defensive 
action open to unorganized businesses was to form cartels of their own. 
Hilferding argued that accumulation had become more and more de-
pendent on the banks. Because of the rising organic composition of cap-
ital and, hence, the lengthening of the turnover period of capital, banks 
were playing an ever increasing role in fi nancing industry. As a result an 
ever-larger part of capital in industry did not belong to the industrialists 
actually using it. Hence, capital had become ‘fi nance capital’. From the 
very beginning on, Varga would adhere to Hilferding ś analysis he had 
acclaimed as a major work explaining the rise of the big corporation.78 
In his review article he had remarked that the concentration of capital 
into the hands of a small capitalist oligarchy would lead ‘to the bank-
ruptcy of big capital’79 and, fi nally, to a proletarian uprising.
Luxemburg associated imperialism with all the features of developed 
capitalism: capital export in the form of international loans, protective 
ta riffs, increasing armaments expenditures, militarism and annexations 
of colonies by the major imperialist states. ‘Though imperialism is the 
historical method for prolonging the career of capitalism, it is also a sure 
means of bringing it to a swift conclusion. It is not so that capitalist de-
velopment must be actually driven to this extreme: the mere tendency 
impact on price increases instead of on capital export to the colonies. Price in crea-
ses were not caused by increased gold production, but by tariff walls and high 
prices fi xed by cartels and trusts.
78 Varga reviewed Hilferding’s Finance Capital and Rosa Luxemburg’s Accumulation 
in Oszkár Jászi’s journal Huszadik Század, not in Szocializmus. 
79 ‘…a harc csak a nagytôkések bukásával végzôdhetik’. Varga’s review of Hilferding’s 
Das Finanzkapital, Vienna 1910, in Huszadik Század, 1911, Vol. 24, p. 222.
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towards imperialism of itself takes forms making the fi nal phase of cap-
italism a period of catastrophe’.80 Luxemburg violently rejected any illu-
sion about the future of free trade in Europe. European free trade had 
been superseded by protective tariffs as the foundation and supplement 
of an imperialist system with a strong bias toward naval power. Accord-
ing to Luxemburg ‘bourgeois liberal theory takes into account only […] 
the realm of ‘peaceful competition’, the marvels of technology and pure 
commodity exchange; it separates it strictly from the other aspect: the 
realm of capital’s blustering violence which is regarded as more or less 
incidental to foreign policy and quite independent of the economic sphere 
of capital.’81
Luxemburg’s work received many and unusually harsh critics from 
party members and others. Anton Pannekoek and Gustav Eckstein wrote 
that the realization problem could easily be solved: in principle, all goods 
could be sold to the workers and the capitalists.82 Otto Bauer criticized 
in Die Neue Zeit Rosa Luxemburg’s Accumulation of Capital showing that 
production and sales do correspond. But he also linked accumulation 
to population growth and technical progress.83 When reviewing Luxem-
burg’s major work in Huszadik Század,84 Varga rejected her imperialism 
theory as ‘absolutely false and untenable’.85 In line with Bauer and Eck-
stein, he argued that Luxemburg’s realization problems did not push ex-
pansion to the non-capitalist periphery. Hence, this book should only be 
advised to readers ‘introduced into the immanent Marxist problems or 
the economic dogmas’.86 Varga’s criticism was also in line with his previ-
ously published favorable review of Hilferding’s Finance Capital.87
80 Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital, London and New York: Routledge, 
2003, pp. 426-427.
81 Ibidem, pp. 432-433.
82 Anton Pannekoek, in Bremer Bürgerzeitung, 29.1.1913 and 30.1.1913; Gustav Eck-
stein, in Vorwärts, 16.2.1913.
83 Otto Bauer, ‘Die Akkumulation des Kapitals’, in Die Neue Zeit, 1912–1913, Vol. 31, 
I, pp. 831-838 and pp. 862-874.
84 Jenô Varga’s review in Huszadik Század, 1913, Vol. 27, pp. 521-524. 
85 ‘… abszolút helytelen és tarthatatlan!’. Ibidem, p. 524.
86 Ibidem. 
87 J. Varga, review in Huszadik Század, 1911, Vol. 24, pp. 211-222.
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3. Preparing for a coming revolution? 
3.1 Varga’s war years
During the fi rst war years Varga participated in an academic debate on 
the origins of the Great War and its economic and political consequenc-
es.88 According to Varga mighty lobbies and warmongers had organized 
this armed confl ict.89 He rejected Luxemburg’s thesis that capital export 
had caused this war.90 In February 1916, he repeated this assertion in a 
lecture given at the Sociological Society in Budapest.91 With Szabó92, he 
blamed private interest groups, arms producers, the fi nancial oligarchy, 
the landed aristocracy, and the bureaucracy for having deliberately pro-
voked the outbreak of the Great War. 
During the war years93 Varga started studying the infl uence of foreign 
capital on Hungary and the country’s increasing dependency on Ger man 
fi nance capital and investment.94 His preferred research topics remained 
88 Articles of Szabó, Géza Farkas, Varga, Béla (Adalbert) Halasi, Artur Székely, Zol-
tán Mandel, Gyula J. Pikler, Mihály Vajda, Geiza Farkas, Oszkár Jázy, Jenô Nyári, 
József Vágó, Mihály Somogyi, Zoltán Rónai, Jakab Weltner were published in Hu-
szadik Század, 1914, Vol. 30, No. 7-9. 
89 Jenô Varga, Népszava, 1.5.1915. László Tikos, E. Vargas Tätigkeit als Wirtschatsanaly ti-
ker und Publizist in der ungarischen Sozialdemokratie, in der Komintern, in der Akademie 
der Wissenschaften der UdSSR, Tübingen and Cologne: Böhlau-Verlag, 1965, p. 17.
90 Eugen Varga, ‘Die Überschätzung der wirtschaftlichen Bedeutung des Kapitalex-
ports und des Imperialismus’, in Die Neue Zeit, 1915–1916, Vol. 34, I, p. 517. In a 
footnote was announced that this article was a part of a larger manuscript Varga 
had sent to Die Neue Zeit. 
91 ‘Az imperializmus gazdásagi birálata’, in Huszadik Század, 1916, Vol. 33, pp. 81-104.
92 Ervin Szabó, ‘Krieg und Wirtschaftsverfassung’, in Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und 
Sozialpolitik, 1915, Vol. 40, pp. 643-688. Original Szabó, ‘Gazdasági szervezet és 
háboru’, in Huszadik Század, 1915, Vol. 31, pp. 1-37.
93 Varga fell ill (tuberculosis) obliging him to suspend his teachings from 18 Februa-
ry 1916 on until the summer of 1917, when he voluntarily joined the Budapest 
food-supply administration.
94 Varga criticized German expansion by using the works of Sartorius von Walters-
hausen, Das Auslandskapital während des Weltkriegs, Stuttgart: F. Enke, 1915; Alfred 
Weber, Gedanken zur deutschen Sendung, Berlin: S. Fischer, 1915; Friedrich Nau-
mann, Mitteleuropa, and Franz Köhler, Der neue Dreibund. Ein politisches Arbeitspro-
gramm für das gesamte deutsche Volk und seine Freund, Munich: Lehmann, 1915. Jenô 
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nonetheless infl ation and currency problems caused by war policies.95 
The problem of how to combat the consequences of the money overhang 
after the war96 inspired him to start the writing of ‘an important work’ 
of some 500 pages on the history of capitalism, including a section on 
the war economy.97 Publication of the complete manuscript was, howev-
er, delayed and, fi nally, cancelled.98 Then he published a booklet writ-
ten in a popularizing style on money (A pénz).99 In its preface, Varga ex-
plained that the fi rst part of this book contained a manuscript he had 
submitted to the publisher just before the outbreak of the war, but, at 
that moment, its publication had been postponed. Later on, he had cor-
rected some mistakes100 and chapters added on recent monetary prob-
Varga, ‘Német tôke Magyarországon’, in Munkásügyi Szemle, 1915, Vol. 6, No. 9-10, 
25.12.1915, pp. 529-533.
95 Jenô Varga, ‘A Magyar állam pénzügyi politikája a háború után (Készüliség na-
gyobb tanulmány vázlata), in Szocializmus, Vol. 8, pp. 465-472; idem, ‘Az ipari ter-
melés a háború alatt’, in Huszadik Század, 1913–1914, Vol. 30, pp. 185-189; idem, 
‘Pénz és hitel a háborúban’, in Huszadik Század, 1914, Vol. 30, pp. 196-200. 
96 Jenô Varga, ‘A magyar állam pénzügyi politikája a háború után’, in Szocializmus, 
1913–1914, No. 8, pp. 465-472; idem, ‘Geld und Kapital in der Kriegswirtschaft’, 
in Die Neue Zeit, 1915–1916, Vol. 34, I, pp. 814-824.
97 Varga gives an outline of his book project in a letter to Kautsky of 20 October 1916. 
He asked his mentor in Berlin about the chances of a German translation. Haupt, 
Jemnitz and Van Rossum, o.c., pp. 528-529. The Varga fi les at the Party Archives 
in Budapest contain a manuscript of 237 pages based on Marx’s Capital. Party Ar-
chives Budapest, 783. f. 7. ô e.
98 Eugen Varga, ‘Die Überschätzung der wirtschaftlichen Bedeutung des Kapitalex-
ports und des Imperialismus’, in Die Neue Zeit, 1915–1916, Vol. 34, I, pp. 512-
517.
99 A pénz uralma a békében, bukása a háborúban (Budapest: Népszava, 1918) deals with 
the problem of infl ation in wartime without providing any policy advice. Varga 
gives a full bibliography of all the works and journals consulted on the money 
question. Kautsky, Marx and Hilferding are listed together with Adam Smith, 
Irving Fisher, David Ricardo, Robert Liefmann, Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, Werner 
Sombart, and a host of today almost forgotten German and Hungarian authors. 
Apart from an issue of The Economist, 8 September 1917, no English language 
publication is listed. A synthesis of A pénz was published in Huszadik Század, 1916, 
Vol. 34, pp. 431-438. 
100 Varga used a recently published book of Bálint Hóman in order to improve his 
text. Bálint Hóman, Magyar pénztörténet, Budapest: Akadémiai, 1916.
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lems.101 In Varga’s revolution theory revolutions never occurred at the 
peak of prosperity, but in periods of economic crisis and fi nancial chaos, 
however, the situation could fundamentally change. As the people had 
no other choice than to undergo the hardships of infl ation, they could 
also go through the birth pangs of socialism.102
Varga’s treatise on money was largely based on Hilferding’s Finance 
Capital103 and on his own previous writings and readings on infl ation, 
gold and wages in Szocializmus, Huszadik Század and the party press.104 
Varga argued in his treatise that during the war production costs were 
playing a minor role and that output was falling because of shortages. 
Subsequently, prices were rising. In the mean time, shops were emptied 
as everybody wanted to exchange paper money for goods, real estate or 
gold. All central banks interrupted their gold transactions. From now 
on, governments were fi nancing war expenditures by selling state bonds 
to the central bank and by printing large amounts of banknotes. This 
mass of additional paper money in circulation had meanwhile lost its real 
purchasing power as fi ctive money not looking for investment in real eco-
nomic operations. Though Varga paid much attention to the monetary 
overhang, he did not analyze structural changes caused by the particu-
larities of a war economy. Varga refrained from attacking Hilferding’s 
rejection105 of the “pure paper circulation” theory and the latter’s insist-
101 Varga, A pénz, pp. 3-4.
102 Tibor Hajdú, The Hungarian Soviet Republic, Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó (Studia 
Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, No. 131), 1979, pp. 47-48.
103 Huszadik Század, 1911, Vol. 24, pp. 626-629.
104 In the last year of the war, Varga analyzed in an article written for the very offi cial 
Munkásügyi Szemle (edited by Adolf Kis, Dr. Fülöp Stein and Dr. Dezsô Hahn) the 
effects of price increases on wages. See Varga, ‘Árszínvonal és munkabér’, in Mun-
kásügyi Szemle, 1918, pp. 345-352. The editors had, apparently, no problem with 
Varga’s Marxist affi liation. Previously, they had published Varga’s article portray-
ing Marx as a social politician. Varga, ‘Marx mint szociálpolitikus’, in ibidem, 1918, 
pp. 209-211.
105 Hilferding writes in Finance Capital: ‘This type of currency can never succeed in 
practice for the simple reason that there is no possible guarantee that the state 
will not increase the issue of paper money. Finally, money with an intrinsic value 
– such as gold – is always needed as a means of storing wealth in a form in which 
it is always available for use.’ Quoted from Tom Bottomore (ed.), Rudolf Hilferd-
JENO VARGA AND THE ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE HUNGARIAN SOVIET REPUBLIC • 67
ence upon the need for gold in international transaction or the under-
estimation of the role of consumer credit.106 
An important feature in Varga’s book on money is its digression on 
the ‘end of money hegemony’. During the war the Hungarian popula-
tion had lost confi dence in the magic value of money. Goods were not 
exchanged for money, but for other goods, reducing money to the role 
of a mere money of account. Varga thought that money should be banned 
out of the coming socialist society and replaced by a simple accounting 
system for all transactions. He referred to Marx who had insisted on the 
role the law of value would play in a socialist economy and that ‘…after 
the abolition of the capitalist mode of production, but still retaining so-
cial production, the determination of value continues to prevail in the 
sense that the regulation of labor-time and the distribution of social la-
bor among the various production groups, ultimately the book-keeping 
encompassing all this, become more essential than ever.’107 Varga’s uto-
ing: Finance Capital. A Study of the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development, London, 
Boston and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981, p. 58. Hilferding: ‘Thus our 
hypothesis of a pure paper currency which exists without a gold complement has 
merely demonstrated once again that it is impossible for commodities to act as 
direct expressions of each other’s value.’ Bottomore [Hilferding] 1981, p. 59. Var-
ga’s thesis that gold was not causing price increases now that most of all interna-
tional transactions were carried out by using banknotes or credit bills, not gold 
payments, can be fi nd in Hilferding’s Finance Capital. Hilderding: ‘[…] these bank 
notes, thanks to legal regulation, enjoy an intermediate position between state 
paper money and credit money. In the event that such a policy is not followed, 
money (bullion paper and credit money) acquires a premium, as gold and green-
backs did in the recent American crisis. In order to perform its task properly cre-
dit money requires special institutions where obligations can be cancelled out and 
the residual balances settled; and as such institutions develop so is a greater eco-
nomy achieved in the use of cash. […] In the course of capitalist development 
there has been a rapid increase in the total volume of commodities in circulation. 
Along with this, the importance of the place occupied by legal tender state paper 
money has increased. […] State paper money and credit money together bring 
about a great reduction in the use of metallic money in relation to the volume of 
circulation and payments.’ Bottomore [Hilferding] 1981, p. 66.
106 Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, London and New York: Rout-
ledge, 1997, p. 881.
107 In Marx’s Capital III, Moscow: Foreign Language Publishers, 1959, p. 830.
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pia – or his so-called dream of a better world108 – was also based on En-
gels’ Anti-Dühring and, of course, on Karl Kautsky’s Erfurt Program (1891), 
both qualifying the liquidation of commodity production as a task of 
equal rank with the changing of ownership relations. 
Kautsky, still infl uencing Varga’s analysis of the lasting monetary cri-
sis, had, however, warned for utopian ideas about the role of money in 
the future. Already in 1902, Kautsky wrote in his Social Revolution that 
‘it is impossible that social revolution should immediately discard mo-
ney’, and that money had been ‘hitherto best-known simplest means of 
permitting the turnover of products and their allocation to the individ-
ual members of society to take place in as complicated machinery as is 
– with its infi nitely developed division of labor – the modern mode of 
production.’ Money is the means of enabling everybody to satisfy his needs 
‘according to his individual inclination’. Money as a means of turnover 
‘will be indispensable as long as no better one is found’. Metallic coins 
can be replaced by ‘any kind of money token’.109 
Varga’s utopia of a society “without money” was, however, inspired by 
Marx’s theory of money as the source of all evils (the Mammon110) and 
108 ‘Die Einzelheiten der Errichtung der kommunistische Gesellschaft sind ein Ge-
heimnis der Zukunft. Wir können jedoch mit Bestimmtheit sagen, daß mit der 
Beseitigung der warenproduzierenden kapitalistischen Gesellschaftsordnung, die 
auf Ausbeutung beruht, auch deren Produkt, nämlich das allmächtige Geld ver-
schwindet. In einer glücklichen kommunistischen Zukunft werden die Menschen 
kaum verstehen, wie es möglich war, dass so eine ‘verrückte’ Gesellschaft bestand, 
in der der Wohlstand und die Autorität, die Gesundheit und das Glück der Men-
schen davon abhingen, wieviel Gold- oder Silbermünzen sie besaßen.’ Quoted 
from Eugen Varga,’Das Geld: Seine Herrschaft in Friedenszeiten und sein Zu-
sammenbruch während des Krieges’, in Ausgewählte Schriften 1918–1964, Berlin: 
Akademie-Verlag, Vol. 1, 1979, p. 69.
109 www.marxists.org/archive/kautsky/1902/socrev/index.htm – 4k -
110 From Late Latin mammon, from Greek , from Aramaic mmon, riches, pro-
bably from Mishnaic Hebrew  (mamon). John Wycliff used the word for ‘riches-
ness’. For Thomas Carlyle, the ‘Gospel of Mammonism’ became simply a me ta-
phoric personifi cation for the materialist spirit of the nineteenth century. In Var-
ga’s words it does not sound that different: ‘Geld! Gibt es irgend etwas anderes 
in der Welt von heute, von dem die Menschen mehr träumen, das sie mehr ver-
fl uchen Würden! […] Geld zu besitzen bedeutet, sich vom Proletariat absuheben, 
auf die Sonnenseite zu gelangen. Geld bedeutet, gesund zu sein und der Kultur teil-
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infl uenced by popular wisdom concerning alleged Jewish war profi teer-
ing. During the war years, people were in crea singly suffering from short-
ages and infl ation. War profi teering was widely perceived as a “typical” 
Jewish activity.111 This problem bothered the progressive Jewish intelli-
gentsia in Budapest as well. A debate on the “Jewish question” could not 
be avoided when in 1916 Péter Ágoston112 argued in a book publication 
that there exis ted a “Jewish question”! In this essay A zsidók útja,113 Ágos-
ton indicated that the Jews had remained emphatically “different” and 
that an investigation on the role Jews were playing in economy and soci-
ety should be carried out. He advised the Jews that opting for total as-
similation could offer a solution to their “problem”. Obviously, Ágoston’s 
views were strongly infl uenced by Werner Sombart’s controversial book 
The Jews and Modern Capitalism114 in which the author accepted that a 
group’s religious beliefs could have far-reaching infl uences on a nations 
economic life.115
Oszkár Jászi intervened on behalf of Huszadik Század. A set of ques-
tions was sent out to some 150 politicians, scholars, publicists and other 
fi gures in public life, asking them about the existence of a so-called “Jew-
ish question” in Hungary. The affi rmative results were published with 
editorial comments in Huszadik Század. Later on, they were separately 
printed in a book publication. According to Jászi, the essence of the “Je-
haf tig zu werden. […] Wegen des Geldes werden menschen heute zu Raubmördern, 
Falschspielern, Betrügern und Streichbrecher!’ Varga, o.c., 1979, Vol. 1, p. 7.
111 For instance, János Teleszky, the architect of Hungary’s war economy and Minis-
ter of Finance between 1911 and 1917, was the son of a poor Jewish lawyer from 
Nagy várad, and Samuel Kohn, now Baron Hazai, who was Minister of War from 
1910 until 1917, was the son of a poor Jewish teacher. William O. McCagg, Jr., 
‘Jews in revolutions. The Hungarian experience’, in Journal of Social History, 1972–
73, Vol. 6, pp. 78-105.
112 Péter Ágoston, minister and commissar in the successive revolutionary go vern-
ments, was not Jewish, but a Magyarized Swabian.
113 Péter Ágoston, A zsidók útja, Budapest – Nagyvárad, 1916-17.
114 Werner Sombart, Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben, Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 
1911. 
115 Weber’s treatment of Protestantism had inspired Sombart to refl ect further on 
the question of the role of the Jews in the history of western economic develop-
ment. Jack Barbalet, Weber, Passion and Profi ts. ‘The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Ca-
pitalism’ in Context, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 183-213.
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wish question” was a set of group antagonisms, complicated by religious, 
ideological and racial frictions and by the fact that certain occupations 
and interests were conspicuously associated with one particular “race”. 
He rejected the idea that the “Jewish question” in Hungary might ever 
take on the tension of being a question of “Jewish nationality”.116 Varga, 
who had studied the history of Hungarian capitalism and the position of 
Jews in society, reacted in Népszava,117 but he wisely refrained from in-
tervening in this debate.118 
Prolonged war deprivations infl icted on the population obliged the 
MSZDP leadership to adjust its tactics. Kunfi  criticized chauvinism in the 
party press. Népszava published a pacifi st article of Angelica Balabanova 
after war declaration of Italy.119 Szocializmus edited in May 1915, side by 
side, two lengthy articles stating the party leadership’s opinion (by Ernô 
Garami) against the pa ci fi st views (by Zoltán Rónai). Meanwhile, Ger-
many’s increased eco nomic infl uence on the Austrian-Hungarian Em-
116 On the position of Jászi, see György Litván, A Twentieth-Century Prophet: Oscar Já-
szi 1875–1957, Budapest: Central European University Press, 2006, pp. 115-118.
117 Varga, ‘A zsidáság szerepe Magyarország közgazdaságában’, Népszava, 12. 8. 1917.
118 Most of the people reacting were liberals. This list includes the names of Dr. Ber-
nát Alexander, Dr. Ede Alföldy, Dr. Marcell Benedek, Ármin Beregi, Dr. István Ber-
nát, Lajos Biró, Samu Bettelheim, Dr. Lajos Balu, Dr. Lázló Boross, Dr. Zoltán Bos-
 nyák, Gyôrgy Bölöni, Dr. Róbert Braun, Barna Buday, Dr. Dezsô Buday, Dr. Jenô 
Cholnoky, Dr. Gyôzô Concha, Dr. Géza Czirbusz, Dr. Geyza Farkas, Sándor Fleis-
sig, Dr. Sándor Giesswein, Henrik Guttmann, Endre György, Dr. Miklós Hajdu, 
Imre Halász, Lajos Hatvany, Benô Haypál, Ignotus, Dr. Oszkár Jászi, Aladár Kö-
rösfôi-Kriesch, László Lakatos, Dr. Géza Lenez, Anna Lesznai, Dr. Pál Liebermann, 
Dr. Léo Lukács, Károly Máray-Horváth, Dr. Ferenc Mezey, Dr. Mór Mezei, Andor 
Miklós, Dr. Ernô Molnár, Dr. Ernô Emil Moravcsik, Gábor Oláh, Dr. József Patai, 
Dr. Illés Pollák, Dr. Elemér Radisics, Sándor Raffay, Dr. László Ravasz, Dr. Mihály 
Réz, Dr. Frigyes Riedl, Dr. Mózes Richtmann, Dr. Emma Ritoók, Antal Stefa nek, 
Lajos Szabolcsi, Dr. Ervin Szabó, Dr. Ferenc Székely, Dr. Ferenc Tangl, Miklós 
Tor ma, Béla Túri, János Vanczák, Lajos Venetianer, Dr. Jenô Zoványi. Huszadik 
Század, 1917, Vol. 36, No. 1-2, pp. 1-34. In the wake of this debate, Hendrik Gutt-
mann pub lished a booklet on the “Jewish question”. Hendrik Guttmann, A hal-
dokló falu (Zsidó problémak, 1.), Budapest: Popitzer, 55 pages.
119 Tibor Hajdu, ‘Revolution and counter-revolution in Hungary and the schism 
in Hungarian Socialist Movement (1918–1921)’, in Annali Feltrinelli, 1983–1984, 
Vol. 23, p. 374. 
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pire en gen de red heated discussions on the necessity of establishing a 
common market in Central Europe. Already by 1912 it had become clear 
to wide sections of the German industrial bourgeoisie that the govern-
ment’s naval policy, forcing the other imperialist powers to make con-
cessions, had failed. This was the background to a pro po sal Walther Ra-
thenau, the leading fi gure in the Berlin AEG electrical and engineering 
combine, had made in December 1913 in favor of the formation of a Cent-
ral European economic bloc dominated by German capital. In 1915, Fried-
rich Naumann’s120 book on the constitution of a Mitteleuropa (Central 
Eu rope)121 under German leadership captured the attention of Karl Ka-
uts ky,122 Rudolf Hilferding123 and Karl Renner124. Hilferding saw in this 
project a major danger for the entire ‘European humanity’, while Ren-
ner thought that Socialists should opt for an empire serving the interests 
of the proletariat. 
120 Friedrich Naumann (1860–1919) was a Lutheran theologian, a liberal publicist 
and a politician. His project for a Mitteleuropa, including Austria–Hungary and 
countries like Belgium, had been worked out by several other authors. See Her-
mann Losch, Der mitteleuropäische Wirtschaftsblock und das Schicksal Belgiens, Leip-
zig: Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1914; Eugen von Philippovich, Ein Wirtschafts- und Zoll-
verband zwischen Deutschland und Österreich–Ungarn, Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel, 
1915. The Naumann circle shared the Pan-German view that Germany was en-
circ led by the Entente powers. During the Morocco crisis in 1911, Naumann took 
an extreme, chauvinistic position. His social liberalism desired above all to mo-
de rate the class struggle. In July 1919, he became president of the German De-
moc ratic Party (Deutsche Demokratische Partei – DDP). Bruce B. Frey, Liberal Demo-
crats in the Weimar Republic. The History of the German Democratic Party and the Ger-
man State Party, Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press; 
Bruce B. Frey, Liberal Democrats in the Weimar Republic. The History of the German 
Democratic Party and the German State Party, Carbondale and Edwardsville: South-
ern Illinois University Press, pp. 13-14.
121 Friedrich Naumann, Mitteleuropa, Berlin: Reimer, 1915. An English translation 
by Christabel M. Meredith and introduced by W. J. Ashley of the University of 
Birmingham was published in 1916 by P. King & Son in London. 
122 Karl Kautsky, Die Vereinigten Staaten Mitteleuropas, Stuttgart: J. H. W. Dietz, 1916. 
123 Rudolf Hilferding, ‘Europäer, nicht Mitteleuropäer’, in Der Kampf, 1915, Vol. 8, 
No. 6, Nov.-Dec., pp. 358-365.
124 Karl Renner, ‘Wirklichkeit oder Wahnidee?’, in Der Kampf, 1916, Vol. 9, No. 1, 
pp. 15-25; Rudolf Hilferding, ‘Phantasie oder Gelehrsamkeit? (Auch eine mitte-
leuropäische Frage), in Der Kampf, 1916, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 54-63.
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Naumann’s highly controversial proposals caused some com mo tion in 
Hungarian political and intellectual circles.125 Between February 22nd 
and April 2nd, 1916, the Sociological Society organized nine debate ses-
sions on this topic. All sessions were chaired by Er vin Szabó – a defender 
of a customs union with Germany.126 When Naumann visited Budapest, 
he was invited to debate on his project at the Sociological Society.127 On 
March 7, 1916, Zsigmond Kun fi , Sándor Giesswein, Oszkár Já szi, Pál Szen-
de, Ignotus (Hugó Veigelsberg), Sándor Katona, Ede Pályi, József Vágó, 
Péter Ágoston, Jenô Vámos, Zoltán Rónai and Arnold Dániel participat-
ed in the Naumann debate.128 Zsigmond Kunfi , Zoltán Ró nai, Jakab Welt-
ner, Manó Buchinger, Péter Ágoston, Jenô Varga, Samu Jászai, and ma ny 
other socialists came out against the Naumann Plan, whereas Ervin Sza-
bó, Sándor Garbai of the building workers union, the locksmith Ferenc 
Bárdos and János Vanczák of the metalworkers union, Jászi, Ignotus and 
most of the Radicals – except for Endre Ady, Pál Szende and Róbert Bra-
un – were in favor of Naumann’s project.129 
In this debate, Varga made his position clear. In a long article pub-
lished in three parts in Népszava in February 1916, he criticized – with-
out referring to Naumann’s book – from a working-class point of view 
125 Frigyes Naumann, Középeurópa, translated by Andorné Kricz, Budapest: Politzer, 
1916.
126 Until the end of his life in 1918, Szabó would campaign for a customs union. He 
even lectured on that subject at the Sociological Society in Graz (Austria). Erwin 
Szabó, Freihandel und Imperialismus. Vortrag, gehalten in der Soziologischen Gesellschaft 
in Graz am 13. Dezember 1917 von Dr. Erwin Szabó, Direktor der Stadtbibliothek und 
Vizepräsident der Soziologischen Gesellschaft in Budapest, Graz and Leipzig: Verlag 
Leuschner & Lubensky, k.k. Universitäts-Buchhandlung (Zeitfragen aus dem Ge-
biete der Soziologie. Vorträge und Abhandlungen herausgegeben von der Sozi-
ologischen Gesellschaft in Graz) 1918.
127 Litván, o.c., 2006, pp. 103-104; Rózsa Köves and Tibor Erényi, Kunfi  Zsigmond 
életútja, Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1974, pp. 77-78.
128 Huszadik Század, 1916, Vol. 33, pp. 409-533.
129 Jenô Varga, ‘Közép-Európa?’ in Szocializmus, 1916, No. 1, pp. 76-79; Eugen Var-
ga, ‘Ungarische Sozialdemokraten und Radikale über Mitteleuropa’, in Die Neue 
Zeit, 1914–1915, Vol. 33, I, pp. 661-667; idem, ‘Der Plan eines deutsch–österrei-
chischen Zollverbandes’, in Die Neue Zeit, 1914–1915, Vol. 33, II, pp. 241-248.
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the advocated customs union.130 Not surprisingly, Var ga’s ‘proletarian cus- 
 toms policy’ combined industrial pro tec tionism with free imports of food-
stuffs and raw materials. Heavy taxes on imported luxury goods131 com-
pleted his taxation scheme protecting infant industries.132 Obviously, his 
taxation model was not “revolutionary” or “socialist”, but merely “mer-
cen talist”.133 
In a lengthy study published in the very academic Közgazdasági Szem-
le134 – of which he also published a shortened draft in Die Neue Zeit135 – 
Varga developed all his views on macro-economic problems having been 
caused by the war. First of all, he predicted a general decrease of labor 
productivity, the impossibility of further capital accumulation, the growth 
of so-called “fi ctive capital” and, fi nally, severe monetary problems due 
to a growing monetary overhang. He pointed to the increased role of 
the state in macro-economic management and to growing income ine-
qualities. Finally, he concluded that only peace could bring a viable eco-
nomic solution for the proletariat. ‘The longer the war will last, the shar-
per the basic characteristics of the war economy will come to the fore, 
the sharper the negative economic consequences for all states par ti ci pa-
130 Varga, ‘A munkásság vámpolitikája’, in Népszava, 23, 24, and 25 February 1916. 
In a very polemical review of Eduard Pályi’s book Deutschland und Ungarn [pub-
lished in the series Zwischen Krieg und Frieden, Heft 19], Varga rejected the idea 
of a customs union between Germany and Hungary. Varga, ‘Der Plan’, o.c., in Die 
Neue Zeit, 1914–1915,Vol. 33, II, p. 656.
131 He criticized the fact that import taxes on caviar were 3 percent, while herring 
was taxed at a rate of 25 percent. Népszava, 23 February 1918, p. 23.
132 Népszava, 25 February 1916, p. 2.
133 Varga was in line with Friedrich List (1789–1848) and his successful champion-
ship of the custom union of the German States (Zollverein). Schumpeter, o.c., 1997, 
pp. 504-505.
134 Jenô Varga, ‘Háború és közgazdaság’, in Közgazdasági Szemle, 1915, pp. 152-160 
and 257-271. (Gyula Mandelló’s Közgazdasági Szemle was published by the Hun-
garian Scientifi c Academy of National Economics in Budapest.) As a sign of the 
changing times, this article ended with a call for putting an end to the war and 
for a return to a peace economy, words he also used in his draft written for Kaut-
sky’s Die Neue Zeit. 
135 Eugen Varga, ‘Probleme der Kriegswirtschaft’, in Die Neue Zeit, 1914–1915, Vol. 
33, I, pp. 449-461.
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ting in the war will be. For the proletariat the only solution will be a very 
soon peace agreement, a very soon departure from the war economy for 
a normal economic life.’136 
Limiting his commentaries to current macro-economic, fi  nan cial and 
monetary problems,137 Varga avoided ventilating radical political opi ni-
ons. As Hungary’s war costs attained almost three times the country’s 
Gross National Product (GNP)138 and misery invaded an exhausted co-
unt ry, hundreds of local strikes for better wages and better working con-
ditions multiplied and, as a con sequence, undermined the MSZDP’s cre-
dibility.139 In January 1918, the Viennese general strike for bread and 
peace spread to Budapest. Pacifi st party leader Kunfi 140 gave support and 
money to the movement, but the worried party leaders made im me dia t-
ely an end to the general strike after having accepted the go vern ment’s 
vague promises concerning the introduction of universal suff rage in the 
near future.141 Meanwhile, Varga radicalized. Defending the idea of a 
general strike for universal suffrage142, he started criticizing the party’s 
timid struggle for peace and democratic reforms. ‘Political democracy 
and national oppression are contradictory’143, Varga argued when blam-
ing the bureaucrats for being the real enemies of the na tio nalities in 
Hun gary. In the Government’s assimilation policies he saw the outcome 
of gentry and petty bourgeois interests holding positions within the bu-
reaucracy. 
136 Ibidem, p. 461. 
137 Népszava commented with sympathy on the Zimmerwald Conference of the pac-
ifi st Left.
138 István Deák, ‘The decline and fall of Habsburg Hungary, 1914–1918’, in Iván Völ-
gyes, Hungary in Revolution, 1918–19. Nine Essays, Lincoln: University of Nebras-
ka Press, 1971, pp. 17-20.
139 By a motion of the metalworker Ferenc Bárdos, the extraordinary party congress 
meeting on February 10, 1918, forbade for members of the MSZDP to be mem-
ber of any freemason’s lodge. Hajdu, o.c., 1983–1984, p. 375.
140 Kunfi ’s brother-in-law Zoltán Rónai served on the illegal strike committee.
141 Hajdu, o.c, 1983–1984, p. 375.
142 Varga, ‘Der neueste Sieg der Reaktion in Ungarn’, in Der Kampf, 1918, Vol. 11, 
No. 9, pp. 483.
143 Eugen Varga, ‘Die politische Lage Ungarns’, in Die Neue Zeit, 1908–1909, Vol. 27, 
II, p. 881.
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3.2 The bourgeois revolution 
In October 1918 an unexpected opportunity for a national and social 
revolution144 arose when the Habsburg Monarchy broke down. On Oc-
tober 13,1918, an extra-ordinary party congress met in order to discuss 
the revolutionary situation. Principal speakers were party leader Zsigmond 
Kunfi , Jenô Landler and József Pogány145. Kunfi  defended the idea of a 
democratic republic led by a coalition government of social democrats 
and bourgeois democrats that would establish a federal state respecting 
the rights of the minorities and carrying out political and agrarian re-
forms. A federation with Austria should not be excluded at beforehand. 
Kunfi  looked also to the west when determining his foreign policy strat-
egy, which was in accordance with Mihály Károlyi’s and Oszkár Jászi’s 
views. Landler, representing the party left, was less impressed by Kunfi ’s 
Wilsonian grand strategy. He wanted social reforms right now. Talking 
about a ‘revolutionary situation’, Pogány pressed for a ‘workers’ govern-
ment’ and ‘workers’ councils’. The conference ended with the singing of 
the Marseillaise, not the International.146 
On November 16, 1918, the founding of the Republic was proclaimed. 
The proclamation of the Republic had been the logical outcome of a 
long process in which the “reform generation” had played an important 
role. Count Mihály Károlyi became Prime Minister of a government 
formed by leading members (Marton Lovászy, Tivadar Batthyány, Barna 
Buza, Ferenc Nagy) of his own Függetlenségi Párt (Independence Party), 
supplemented by two leading social democrats (Zsigmund Kunfi  and 
Ernô Garami) and their close allies (Béla Linder and József Diner-Dé-
nes) and some members of the Polgári Radikális Párt (Radical Citizens 
Party). Radical Jászi became minister for the nationalities, but without 
portfolio, while Pál Szende became under-secretary of state for fi nancial 
affairs. 
144 Otto Bauer, 12. November. Die Sozialisierungsaktion im ersten Jahre der Republik, Vi-
enna: Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung Ignaz Brand, 1919.
145 Pogány (1886–1937) was president of the Budapest soldiers council. In 1917 he 
had published a pamphlet against the collusion of big capital and the ruling Co-
unt Tisza’s Munkapárt. József Pogányi, A Munkáspárt bûnei, Budapest: A Népsza-
va-Könyvkereskedés Kiadása, 1917.
146 Minutes of the MSZDP Congress, Party Archives, Budapest, 658.f.21, 43 pages.
76 • ANDRÉ MOMMEN
For many intellectuals of the “reform generation” obtaining a chair at 
the University of Budapest was an important issue. The appointment of 
young and progressive professors at the profoundly conservative Buda-
pest Law Faculty was discussed in November and December 1918 at the 
behest of Minister of Education Márton Lovászy. In the mean time, the 
Law Faculty did not overtly oppose to new appointments as such, but 
took exception to the planned international reforms and the appoint-
ment of persons as Jenô Varga (economic policy) and Zoltán Rónai (po-
litical science). When in mid-January 1919, Zsigmund Kunfi  took over 
the education portfolio, he informed the Faculty of Law that he was in-
tending to appoint seven new professors: Dr. Péter Ágoston to the chair 
of civil law, Dr. Geyza Farkas to the chair of agricultural policy, Dr. Osz-
kár Jászi to the chair of sociology, Dr. Gábor Kovács to the chair of so-
cial economy, Dr. Zoltán Rónai to the chair of political science, Dr. Jenô 
Varga to the chair of economic policy, and Dr. Rusztem Vámbéry to the 
chair of criminology.147 The faculty professors protested against this fl a-
grant infringement of the university’s autonomy. Impressed by this re-
volt, the university’s governing body rejected the seven appointments, 
qualifying them as illegal. Kunfi  acted with fi rmness and speed by in-
forming the university council that its functions had been suspended and 
that Oszkár Jászi was appointed to the function of government commis-
sioner bringing the University of Budapest under his ministerial con-
trol. All candidate professors were immediately appointed at the Faculty 
of Law.148 
147 György Litván, ‘A forradalmi kormány és a budapesti tudományetem erôpróbája 
1918–1919 fordulóján’, in Történelmi Szemle, 1968, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 401-427. La-
ter on, many left-wing intellectuals were appointed on a university chair. Among 
them were Mihály Babits, Marcell Benedek, József Turóczi-Trostler, Arnold Haus-
er, Elemér Vadász, György Hevesy, Elek Bolgár, Jenô Pólya, and Sándor Ferenczi. 
See László Szögi, A Short History of Loránd Eötvös University of Budapest, Budapest: 
ELTE, 1985, p. 46.
148 The historian György Litván concluded that ‘it was perfectly clear, however, that 
the conservative professors, in defending the status quo, had no whish under any 
circumstances to admit their old adversaries, the radicals and socialists grouped 
around Huszadik Század and the Sociological Society, Litván, o.c., 2006, p. 171.
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Asking Oszkár Jászi, György Lukács and Jenô Varga to contribute, ed-
itor Karl Polányi devoted the entire December 1918 issue of the Galileo 
Kör’s journal Szabadgondolat to the Bolshevik phenomenon and the Rus-
sian Revolution.149 In his contribution Jászi remained a self-declared op-
ponent of any kind of dictatorship.150 Lukács said no to Lenin’s experi-
ment, but when his essay appeared, he had already changed his mind. 
Varga, for whom the dictatorship of the proletariat had become a reality, 
called the Russian Revolution the realization of a “utopia”, but, in addi-
tion, he pointed to the ‘fundamental question of combining class disci-
pline with production discipline and how this discipline could be creat-
ed without coercion from above, and only by voluntary discipline from 
below.’151 Nonetheless, the Russian Revolution had proven that a conscious 
minority could take over political power. In Varga’s view, the worsening 
economic situation in Russia had been caused by the failure of voluntary 
discipline based on class discipline and by a lack of understanding be-
tween the working class and the intelligentsia. Finally, Varga appealed 
to the ‘Hungarian students, Hungarian intellectuals, and Hungarian em-
ployees’152 to support the Hungarian Revolution. Surprisingly, Varga made 
no link with the agrarian question in Hungary153 at a moment the land-
hungry peasantry was ready to imitate the Russian peasants by parce-
ling out the big estates.154
149 Jászi, ‘Proletárdiktatúra’; Varga, ‘A bolseviki jövô kilátásai’; Lukács, ‘A bolseviz-
mus mint erkölcsi problema’, in Szabadgondolat, 1918, Vol. 8, 10 (December). Re-
prints in György Litván and László Szûcs (eds), A szociológia elsô magyar mûhelye. A 
Huszadik Század köre, Budapest: Gondolat, 2 Vols., 1973.
150 Litván, o.c., 2006, p. 164.
151 Ibidem, p. 227.
152 Ibidem, p. 228.
153 Some 4,000 families owned one-third of all agricultural land. Approximately 1.7 
million smallholders owned about one-seventh, while millions of landless peas-
ants were working as agricultural workers. The Catholic Church was with more 
than 20 percent of arable land the biggest landowner. 
154 A veritable peasant revolt raged throughout the country during the fi rst half of 
November 1918. Tibor Hajdu and Zsuzsa L. Nagy, ‘Revolution, counterrevolu-
tion, consolidation’, in Peter F. Sugar, Péter Hanák, and Tibor Frank (eds), o.c., 
London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1990, p. 302.
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Varga’s way of putting the question of the role of the intellectuals, re-
sembled, however, to the arguments Kautsky155 had used in his pamphlet 
on The Dictatorship of the Proletariat 156:
‘Alongside the classes of hand workers grows a section of intellectuals, 
which tends to become more numerous and increasingly necessary for 
the productive system. Their vocation calls for the acquisition of knowl-
edge and the exercise and development of intelligence. This section oc-
cupies a middle place between the proletariat and the capitalist class. It 
is not directly interested in capitalism, but is nevertheless mistrustful of 
the proletariat, so long as it does not consider the latter to be capable of 
taking its fate into its own hands. Even such members of the cultured 
classes as most warmly espouse the cause of the freedom of the prole-
tariat stand aloof from the Labor movement in the early stages of the 
class struggle. They only change their attitude when the proletariat shows 
increasing capacity in its struggles.’157 
According to Kautsky, there was no reason why the proletariat should 
establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. He used signifi cant parts of 
his Road to Power (1909), a book that had been qualifi ed as his most rev-
olutionary work, in order to prove that he had not lost his faith in the 
revolution. Kautsky’s confi dence was, however, bred by the conviction that 
155 On this problem, see György Péteri, Effects of World War I: War Communism in Hun-
gary, New York: Brooklyn College Press and Columbia University Press, 1984, pp. 
40-41; idem, A Magyar Tanácsköztársaság iparirányítási rendszere, Budapest: Közgaz-
dasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1979, pp. 65-66; see also Péteri’s PhD, ‘A vállalat-
irányitási forma változásai az 1918–1919 évi magyarországi forradalmak idôsza-
kában; 2. rész: iparpolitika, iparirányitási rendszer és az ipari gazdálkodás ré te-
gei a magyarországi Tanácsköztársaság idôszakában’. [1975] Birálat: Berend T. 
Iván; Herédi István, PhD Budapest Karl Marx University, 233 + 81 pp.
156 Karl Kautsky, Die Diktatur des Proletariats, Vienna: Ignaz Brand, 1918, 63 pp. This 
booklet was immediately translated by Dezsô Schöner: Kautsky, A proletárság dik-
tatúrája, Budapest: Népszava, 1919. Also Lenin, Levél taktikáró, and Bukharin, 
A bolsevikiek programja (translation by Endre Rudnyánsky), were published in 
translation by publishing house A Kommunisták Magyarországi Pártja. Review of 
these three pamphlets by Kornél Lukács in Huszadik Század, 1919, Vol. 40, pp. 
151-153 and pp. 165-169.
157 http://www.marxists.org/archive/kautsky/1918/dictprole/ch05.htm
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the proletariat had to acquire the strength and capacity to free itself.158 
‘Socialism without democracy is unthinkable’, he exclaimed. Obviously, 
Kautsky took the proletariat’s fi ght for freedom very seriously, but in the 
mean time he argued that, without the help of the intellectuals, socialist 
production would not be instituted. Winning over the intellectuals for 
socialism was crucial, he argued. In circumstances where the majority of 
the intellectuals mistrusts the proletarian party, or stands aloof from it, 
this attitude could be disastrous. A victorious proletarian party not show-
ing great intellectual superiority would succomb to the attacks of the class 
enemy. 
3.3 The agrarian question revisited
At that moment, none of the three coalition parties possessed a detailed 
program of land reform.159 Instead of encouraging the peasant movement, 
the government tried to slow it down and to distribute land through bureau-
cratic procedures. Though its manifesto of October 8, 1919, had promised 
‘profound and radical agrarian reforms,’ the MSZDP did not take a clear 
decision. In reality, the party leaders feared a considerable drop in agrar-
ian production with an ensuing starvation of the townspeople. In the au-
tumn of 1918, crops laid still unharvested in the fi elds.160 The so-called 
Georgists (Gyula J. Pikler, Henrik Braun) inside the Radical Party did not 
oppose land distribution, though they believed that the key to the land 
issue was the expropriation of land rent. They proposed that a land value 
cadastre be compiled on the basis of which land value tax would be ap-
portioned which in turn could serve as a basis for expropriation. Landed 
property, levied with land value tax or annuity property would spur the 
owners to cultivate their land intensively. Through the land value tax 
non-agrarians would also benefi t from the achievements of the land re-
form. A staggering Varga was inclined to accept this idea. Others, like 
Rezsô Ladányi, signed for the views of the German reformist Eduard Da-
vid who defended the idea of forming a class of small agrarian property 
158 See John H. Kautsky on his grandfather in Karl Kautsky. Marxism, Revolution & 
Democracy, New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1994, p. 216.
159 András Siklós, Revolution in Hungary and the Dissolution of the Multinational State 
1918, Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1988, p. 86.
160 Siklós, o.c., 1988, p. 91.
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owners. But leading agrarian specialist Csizmadia still defended the or-
thodox Marxist view that through the parceling out of the big estates into 
small plots, a class of reactionary peasantry would be formed. 
The orthodox Marxist point of view, i.e. the rejection of the notion of 
private property of the small peasantry, and the approval of socialist ag-
riculture as a matter of large enterprises, prevailed in the MSZDP. At an 
agrarian conference held at the Ministry of Agriculture on November 
20-29, 1918, several leading Socialists – Sándor Csizmadia, Zsigmond Kun-
fi , and Jenô Varga – took a stand against the redistribution of land.161 In 
the mean time, the tiny Radical Party favored the extension of agricul-
tural cooperatives and marketing associations in combination with pri-
vate property. Károlyi’s party was divided between “leftists” supporting 
the cooperative movement, and “rightists” advocating slow reforms. The 
representatives of the landed interests suggested the expropriation of on ly 
the estates over 1,000 cadastral yokes over a period of 20 to 80 years. 
Somebody proposed that distributed land should serve to supplement 
existing dwarf farms. Finally, no agreement on a serious agrarian reform 
could be reached. 
On December 8, 1918, the Government discussed expropriations. Ká-
ro lyi argued that parceling out effi ciently operating large estates would 
be wrong. Hence, he suggested turning them into cooperatives with the 
landowners and the state as their principle shareholders, but with work-
ers’ participation. He wanted to have this model extended to industry as 
well. Kunfi  spoke against distributing land at any price and he opposed 
the idea of giving a constant exchange value for large estates expropri-
ated by the Government. Jászi, fi nding the 1,000 yoke limit too high, pro-
posed a lowering to 500 yokes for lay estates and to 200 yokes for the 
Church estates. As no consensus could be reached, the debate was closed.
In the MSZDP, the support to land distribution remained lukewarm 
at best.162 At the national agrarian conference held in December 1918, 
Csizmadia discarded the idea of collective farming, at least for the time 
being. On December 20, 1918, the Workers’ Council of Budapest accept-
161 Siklós, o.c., 1988, p. 88.
162 Gábor Vermes, ‘The October Revolution in Hungary: from Károlyi to Kun’, in Iván 
Völgyes (ed.), Hungary in Revolution, 1918–19. Nine Essays, Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1971, p. 46.
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ed, however, a joined proposal worked out by the MSZDP and the Na-
tional Conference of Agricultural Workers and Smallholders (Földmun-
ká sok és Kisbirtokosok Országos Szövetsége, FÉKOSZ) – Kunfi  and Varga had 
been its authors163 – acknowledging private land property. Endorsed by 
the FÉKOSZ on December 26, 1918, this motion demanded a single sub-
stantial wealth tax; private estates up to 500 yokes and Church estates 
up to 200 yokes; land transferred to the state either through a wealth tax 
or by expropriation; land was to be distributed in the form of a redeem-
able permanent tenure; applicants may be allocated land up to between half 
and twelve yokes, but with priority going to the cooperatives of pick and 
shovel men; a new land tax or ground value tax had to be drafted and the 
state was to pay a price corresponding to the estimated value of land for 
property expropriated in the form of registered unmarketable annuity 
bonds. This agrarian program defended by Kunfi  at the Workers’ Coun-
cil and by Csizmadia at the FÉKOSZ, was a compromise reached between 
the different tendencies within the MSZDP and its Georgist tone (wealth 
tax, perpetual tenure, land value tax) had married Kautsky’s large-scale 
farming standpoint without dismissing David’s small farms arguments.
When the extraordinary National Council’s fi nancial committee met 
in Budapest on January 4, 1919, a host of appeals and temporary meas-
ures dealing with the land reform had to be dealt with. The Ministry of 
Agriculture pressed the landowners to cede parts of their land voluntar-
ily and assured them that compensation would be paid not only for the 
land, but also for equipment and seeds. After several months of negotia-
tions, the Land Reform Bill was passed in February 1919. The law ex-
empted from expropriation the large estates of the landed gentry up to 
500 cadastral yoke (287.7 hectares) and those of the Catholic Church up 
to 200 cadastral yoke (115 hectares). The law made it possible to exempt 
a larger proportion or entire large estates, and ordered that the land be 
given fi rst of all to the farmhands and agricultural workers in the form 
of either a long lease or as property with compensation paid to the large 
landowners.164 The great majority of the agricultural laborers and poor 
peasants were not satisfi ed by the arrangements contained in this law.
163 Hajdu, o.c., 1968, p. 386.
164 Ferenc Donáth, Reform and Revolution. Transformation of Hungary’s Agriculture 1945–
1970, Budapest: Corvina Kiadó, 1980, p. 37.
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3.4 Varga and the Communist challenge
A drastic income tax reform planned by Pál Szende165 met furious re-
sistance of the propertied classes and their apologists. Two laws repress-
ing tax evasion were toned down or never implemented. Socialization of 
banks, fi nancial groups and big industry that stood on the program of 
the MSDZP, received insuffi cient backing from the other parties in gov-
ernment. As the handling of the agrarian question showed, the MSZDP 
did not have a comprehensive plan for government. Its right wing tried 
to alleviate the situation by introducing improvised measures and to push 
social legislation instead of nationalization. 
Under Socialist pressure, the Károlyi government resigned on Janu-
ary 8, 1919. The Executive Committee of the Workers’ Council of Buda-
pest endorsed, after a violent debate on the necessity of a purely Socialist 
government, further Socialist participation in a coalition government. 
Speaking in name of the MSZDP right-wingers, Garami argued that the 
Party lacked trained cadres and disciplined members to rule alone or to 
exercise a signifi cant share of power. He urged that the Socialists with-
draw from all levels of government. With the Communists infi ltrating 
the Party, he saw educating the infl ated but untutored rank and fi le as 
the MSZDP’s primary task. According to Alexander Garbai, the Social-
ists would not be able to control the new military establishment; the old 
bureaucracy would continue in power; and the socialization of the econ-
omy would be indefi nitely postponed. He was confi dent that a Social De-
mocratic government could contain the Bolsheviks, should the latter de-
cide to act. Böhm sided with Garbai. Only an all-Socialist government 
supported by working-class organizations as by the army could be in a 
position to keep in check the Communists or, at least, maintain order 
until the election of a National Assembly. Kunfi  maintained that with-
drawal from the government would benefi t the counterrevolutionary forc-
es. A proletarian dictatorship could not be viable because the provinces 
would cut off the food supplies to the cities. Then, the surrounding for-
eign intervention armies would march on Budapest. As a third alterna-
tive, Kunfi  favored an increased infl uence of the MSZDP in the present 
165 In the past, the Radical Pál Szende had devoted a whole series of articles and stu-
dies to the injustices of the taxation system and the interconnections between taxa-
tion and class stratifi cation, tax burden and class oppression. Siklós, o.c., 1988, p. 82.
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coalition government. Weltner, at that time the editor in chief of Népsza-
va, endorsed Kunfi ’s proposal. By a vote of 169 to 100 the Workers’ Coun-
cil supported Garbai’s motion for an all-Socialist government. But given 
that sizable minority, Garbai promptly withdrew his motion. The next 
vote went 147 against 83 in favor of Kunfi ’s proposition. In response to 
Böhm’s intervention, 78 of the opponents, all of the metal workers, changed 
their vote, thereby isolating fi ve Communists. 
On January 18, 1919, Károlyi became President of the Hungarian Re-
public. He appointed his party member Dénes Berinkey as the new Prime 
Minister. In order to broaden the base of the cabinet, István Szabó Nagy-
atádi, the leader of the Peasants’ Party, was invited to join it. In addition 
to Garami and Kunfi , who kept their posts, Böhm took over the Defense 
Ministry, and Gyula Peidl became Minister of Labour and Welfare. These 
appointments demonstrated that the balance in the cabinet was shifting 
to the left.166
Differing from Garami’s reformist views, Varga called for expanded 
state intervention conform to the resolutions voted at the MSZDP Party 
Congress of October 1918.167 Already in December 1918 he had published 
a plea for a comprehensive socialization program to be completed with 
an appropriated taxation policy and a strong social policy. ‘It would be a 
mistake, he argued, to imagine that for the Social Democrats that plank 
[socialization of production] in their program is an end in itself. Social 
democracy’s real, ultimate aim is to eliminate unearned income and, con-
currently, to raise productivity to the highest level.’168 The new govern-
ment remained, nonetheless, deeply divided on several important issues 
related to foreign trade and the dismantling of the war economy. At that 
time, the government stood on a platform of free trade, which was com-
pletely in line with the liberal program defended by the Radical Szende 
and the Socialist Garami.169
At a conference held at the Ministry of Commerce on March 14, 1919, 
the representatives of industry and commerce lobby pleaded for the ab-
166 Arno J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking. Containment and Counterrevo-
lution at Versailles 1918–1919, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967, p. 531.
167 Péteri, o.c., 1984, pp. 36-37.
168 Népszava, 1.12.1918, quoted in Péteri, o.c., 1984, pp. 37-38.
169 Siklós, o.c., 1988, p. 81.
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olition of the war-time coordination centers, whilst the Radicals and the 
Socialists (Szende, Erdélyi and Varga) advocated the setting up of democ-
ratized coordination centers. No compromise could be reached. At the 
suggestion of Garami, a commission was installed to re-examine the prob-
lem. Opposing the idea of total nationalization of production, Garami 
pleaded for ‘symbolic actions’ and socialization of all large companies 
where the workers were “red” (like at the Manfréd Weisz company in Cse-
pel)170. Meanwhile, radicalized industrial workers were spontaneously 
“so cializing” their plants by removing all managers from their command-
ing posts. The position of the MSZDP was further weakened by the foun-
dation of the Kommunisták Magyarországi Pártja (Communist Party of 
Hun gary, MKP) on November 20, 1918, in part by returning former pris-
oners of war, and partly by leftist Socialists and syndicalists. MKP leader 
Béla Kun belonged to the former group. The party drew its rising infl u-
ence from demobilized soldiers, war veterans and the unemployed. La-
ter, Franz Borkenau remarked that at fi rst ‘the organized trade-union-
ists withstood the onslaught of the communist agitation; but with increas-
ing diffi culties, and with food getting short (…) the workers began to go 
over to the communists. The rapid growth of the new party naturally 
bred disagreement among the social democrats. One wing wanted to 
compete with the communists in popularity, another one wanted to keep 
the masses back sharply; some were for military action against Kun and 
his following, others relied on conviction.’171
When Communist propaganda spread with calls for the dictatorship 
of the proletariat and the socialization of industry, land and housing,172 
the MSZDP failed in its determination to execute its reform program. 
Its radical wing started meanwhile attuning its point of view to that of 
170 Péteri, o. c., 1984, p. 38.
171 Franz Borkenau, The Communist International, London: Faber and Faber Limited, 
1938, p. 117.
172 Bukharin’s Programme of the Communists (Bolsheviks) printed in May 1918, trans-
lated and published in many languages had already acquired an offi cial status. 
In Moscow, Endre Rudnyánszky signed for a translation. Nyikolaj Buharin, A kom-
munisták (bolsevikiek) programja, Budapest: A Kommunisták Magyarorsszági Párt ja, 
1918. Review article signed by Kornél Lukács in Huszadik Század, Vol. 40, 1919, 
pp. 165-168.
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the Communists,173 while the right wing was clanging more than before 
to far-reaching social reforms.174 Hardly any of these proposals were re-
alized during the fi ve months of the revolution’s democratic phase. This 
incited many leading centrists to break openly with the politics of refor-
mism. Finally, their spokesman Kunfi  pleaded for a full-fl edged socialist 
system based on a nationalized sector. In an interview, Kunfi  confessed 
that ‘as a socialist’ he appreciated the aims of Bolshevism, but that he 
disapproved Bolshevism’s ‘terroristic, antidemocratic methods’.175 
Left-wingers like Varga began to waver in their opposition to Com-
munism as well. However, when pleading for nationalizations and plan-
ning in order to eliminate the bourgeoisie and the leisure class, Varga 
was also concerned by growing working class radicalism and the workers 
councils’ incompatibility with a centralized planned economy. He was 
173 Socialist radicalism, however, should not be measured primarily by the relation-
ship to the Communists. Landler, Pogány, Varga, Hamburger and others differed 
from right-wingers not ‘because they wished to collaborate with the Communists, 
but rather by the fact that they urged a showdown with the counter-revolutionar-
ies, the replacement of right-wing county high-sheriffs, controls on big capital’. 
György Borsányi, The Life of a Communist Revolutionary, Béla Kun, Boulder, Colo-
rado and High Lakes, New Jersey: Social Science Monographs and Atlantic Re-
search and Publications, 1993, p. 126.
174 Kunfi  was appointed Minister of Labor and Social Welfare. He planned to estab-
lish social security in agriculture hitherto excluded from the provisions in the acts 
of 1898 and 1907. Other reforms were programmed: the raising of the minimum 
age for child work, increased protection for minors and women, a switch to the 
eight-hour working day, labor safety laws, a new mining law replacing the 1854 
mining act, social security based on the autonomy of workers and extended to 
artisans, public servants, housemaids, a raising of sick pay, a legal status for civil 
servants, a national regulation for war disabled, widows and orphans, the nation-
alization of public welfare and a decentralization of the care administration. Sik-
lós, o.c., 1988, pp. 83-84. This social policy did not differ that much from reforms 
realized in other capitalist countries at the end of the First World War. Especially 
the social insurance system of the Weimar Republic could be seen as a major rea-
lization of social-democratic reforms. Werner Abelshauser (ed.), Die Weimarer Re-
 publik als Wohlfahrtsstaat. Zum Verhältnis von Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik in der In-
dustriegesellschaft, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1987; Peter Lewek, Arbeitslosig-
keit und Arbeitslosenversicherung in der Weimarer Republik 1918–1927, Stuttgart: Franz 
Steiner Verlag, 1992. 
175 In Pesti Hírlap, 6 December 1918, quoted by Vermes, o.c., 1971, p. 50.
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afraid that these workers’ bastions could be transformed into centers de-
fending categorical working-class interests. According to Varga, there 
was a clash between workers’ control and the systematically and central-
ly executed expropriation of capital. Varga concluded from the lessons 
of the recent confl icts having occurred at the Schlick factory at the end 
of January 1919, that within the capitalist social system, single compa-
nies could not be subjected to special treatments, or the socialist project 
would fail. Varga: ‘Socialization can only be instituted systematically, by 
the state or the cities, and simultaneously, even the big factories repre-
senting whole sectors of industry can only be socialized once a huge state 
bank has been funded to provide an immediate replacement for the pre-
vious bankers to the factories being socialized and to fund the factories 
with the sums necessary for production continuation.’176 
Varga started criticizing his left-wing comrades sympathizing with Bol-
 shevism as well. In a speech delivered at the Budapest Workers’ and Sol-
diers’ Council of 24 and 25 February 1919, Varga pleaded, again, for an 
immediate implementation of thoroughgoing socialist reforms. ‘We must 
be able to show progress in a clearly socialist direction, otherwise Bol-
shevism would gain too much infl uence’, he argued.177 Varga’s program 
was “quasi identical” to that of the Hungarian Communists. His draft res-
olution accepted by the Workers’ Council demanded: 
– That a property tax be levied; 
– That a socialization committee be commissioned; 
– That a start be made to evaluate and inventory property for land 
rents; 
– That the state launch through the trade unions various kinds of 
public works excluding the participation of private capital; 
– That a large state bank be established to collect all state income and 
run credit operations ‘so that the banks cannot hold a pistol to the 
government’s head’;178 and
– That a central offi ce for registering and distributing materials be 
established to take command of the country’s factories and raw ma-
terials.
176 Varga, ‘Tanulságok a Schlick-gyári események kapcsán’, Népszava, 26.1.1919.
177 Péteri, o.c., 1984, p. 41.
178 Ibidem.
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In an article published on March 2, 1919, in Népszava, Varga candidly 
declared that capitalism was ‘dying’ and that a swift progress toward col-
lectivization was requested. Varga: ‘Only by reorganizing production 
quite independently of the private interests of individual private capital-
ists, by concentrating production in a few well-equipped and well-situat-
ed plants, by so reorganizing society that people will do productive works 
on a greater scale than before, by centrally utilizing available means and 
materials for production resolutely and purposefully, and by making 
clear to all working people that they are working for themselves and 
their fellow workers and not for the greater profi t of the hated capital-
ists, can a renewal of production be hoped for; a radical policy is required 
in order to move the economy speedily toward collective production and 
to effect a rapid transformation of capitalist production relations.’179
A week later, on March 8 and 9, 1919, he opined that a centrally 
planned economy could generate ‘an important production surplus’ be-
cause of concentration and rationalization of production organized un-
der ‘scientifi c’ management.180 He pleaded for a ’planned reorganiza-
tion’ of production, including concentration, specialization, normaliza-
tion, and type determination, and, generally speaking, ‘scientifi c’ fac tory 
organization, including administration of the labor force. In an unsigned 
article on ‘free commerce or organized production’ published in Nép-
szava, March 16, 1919, which was probably written by Varga, the ques-
tion was raised how to organize production with the best results attain-
able. ‘That cannot all be left to freedom of trade, because freedom of 
trade will not direct things to where they should go from the point of 
view of economy, it will direct them to where they fetch the best price.’181 
Because coordination was still lacking between the activities of the exist-
ing coordination bodies for coal, iron, timber, housing, and food in or-
179 Ibidem.
180 Péteri, 1984, p. 42. Varga was impressed by Frederick W. Taylor’s book, Shop Ma-
nagement. New York: Harper (1903), 1911: Die Betriebsleitung, insbesondere der Werk-
stätten. Berlin: Springer, 1909. He carefully studied it after its publication in Ger-
man translation. See also Varga’s remarks on increased labour intensity and Tay-
lorism. Eugen Varga, ‘Wanderungen der Arbeiter und des Kapitals’, in Der Kampf, 
1914, Vol. 7, No. 10, p. 408.
181 Péteri, o.c., 1984, pp. 42-43.
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der to bring about a purposeful unity of production development, Varga 
pleaded for the immediate installation of a supreme production council.
Varga’s proposals resembled to these ventilated by the MKP or in Bu-
kha rin’s Communist Program (1918) in which was stressed that ‘the whole 
production is carried out in accordance with a strictly calculated and de-
liberate plan that takes into account every piece of machinery, every tool, 
all the raw materials, and all the labor in society. Annual social consump-
tion is calculated with equal exactitude.’182 In the light of Russia’s back-
wardness, Bukharin urged for an immediate nationalization of large-
scale conglomerates, particularly the industrial and fi nancial syndicates. 
These economic fortresses would serve as the basic economic nerve of the 
new economic system. Only the modern and central ly organized compo-
nents of the Russian economy should be trans formed into a state or so-
cialist sector. Bukharin’s arguments sounded extremely radical. Using 
slogans such as that a revolution expropriates capital, or ‘through the 
socialization of production toward socialism’,183 he envisaged something 
like state control over key sectors of the economy. Bukharin excluded, 
nonetheless, small enterprises and subsidiary industries from nationali-
zation when pointing to the fact that the less important factories would 
dependent on the nationalized trusts. 
Though Bukharin reputedly belonged to the Left Opposition, his at-
titudes toward workers’ control, labor discipline, and managerial autho-
rities were, however, not entirely conform to those of the Left. In addi-
tion, Bukharin and Lenin had ‘different understandings of modern ca-
pi talism’.184 Lenin used the term “state capitalism” as a synonym for state 
regulation of private capital and modern economic management. He saw 
no contradiction in the proposition that a proletarian state might pre-
side over a state-capitalist economy. For Bukharin, state capitalism was 
182 Buharin, o.c., 1918, p. 14. This section was reprinted in The ABC of Communism, 
a book Bukharin wrote together with E. Probrazhensky in 1920. See N. Bukharin 
and E. Probrazhensky, The ABC of Communism, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969, 
pp. 114-115. 
183 Stephen F. Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution. A Political Biography 1888–
1938, New York: Vintage Books, 1975, p. 74; see also Peter Knirsch, Die ökonomi schen 
Anschauungen Nikolai I. Bucharins, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1959, pp. 146-147.
184 Cohen, o.c., 1975, p. 75.
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modern capitalism. In Bukharin’s mind, the term was outrageous when 
applied to Soviet Russia. He regarded socialism as the antithesis of state 
capitalism. However, civil war and military intervention had discarded 
Lenin’s moderate policies favoring a radically new policy choice known 
as “war communism”.185 In Russia, a vast and cumbersome bureaucracy 
was, however, mushrooming into being.186 The Supreme Economic Coun-
cil, now responsible for virtually all industrial production, created a mul-
titude of state agencies. 
As the MKP saw in the collapse of the capitalist economy a conditio 
sine qua non for a take-over, the Communists tried to place insurmount-
able obstacles in the path of the governmental coalition of bourgeois ra-
dicals and socialists in order to reveal its anti-proletarian course. Work-
ers’ control was one of their preferred tactical slogans. The Communists 
wanted, completely in line with Varga’s views, full nationalization of in-
dustry and transport and economic centralization under the aegis of the 
government. They rejected, however, plans bearing any relation to state 
capitalism. At a January 20, 1919, meeting of trade union presidents and 
secretaries, Communist Béla Szántó criticized Varga’s views of which he 
said that they were all based on state capitalism. Szántó: ‘The dictatorship 
of the proletariat will organize production and consumption through wor-
kers’ direction and not through state capitalism’.187 
Gyula Hevesi188 produced a detailed outline of a program that in ge-
ne ral terms contained both Varga’s and Bukharin’s ideas excluding the 
profi t aspect from production as well. He pleaded for expropriation and 
185 Maurice Dobb, Soviet Economic Development Since 1917, New York: International 
Publishers, 1948, pp. 97-124; Lars T. Lih, Bread and Authorities in Russia 1914–
1921, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.
186 Gustav Gratz, A forradalmak kora. Magyarország története 1918–1920, Budapest: Ma-
gyar Szemle Társaság, 1935, pp. 107-108.
187 Péteri, o.c., 1984, p. 44.
188 Gyula Hevesi (1890–1970), who later would become close to Varga, graduated at 
the Polytechnical University in Budapest. In 1908 he joined the Galilei Kor. He 
founded with József Kelen and Ármin Helfgott the National Association of Engi-
neers (Alkalmazott Mérnökök Országos Szövetsége. – AMOSZ; the association pub-
lished Szocialista Mérnökök Lapja, located at Andrássy út 29). See obituary articles 
in Acta Oeconomica, 1970, Vol. 5, No. 12, pp. 133-134; Népszabadság, 25 and 26 
February 1970, and 3 March 1970.
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the utilization of the production capacity in accordance with social needs. 
He even laid down the targets for centralized raw material management, 
concentration of production and specialization. From the angle of produc-
tion organization, Hevesi’s ideas came near to Varga’s reform proposals. 
The Land Reform Bill of February 16, 1919, increasing the class of 
smallholders was of considerable importance for the Re vo lu tion’s surviv-
al. Communists and many Socialists criticized nonethe less this bill that 
could serve the cause of the coun ter re volution by creating ineffi ciently 
producing small farms. The Socialists main tai ned that not all the land 
should be parceled out to the landless peasants. In February 1919, how-
ever, landless peasants had al rea dy expropriated large estates and formed 
collective farms in the komitat (county) of Somogy189 that was known for 
its radical leanings.190 A Socialist directorate took over the gestion of the 
komitat.191 Immediately, protests arose from some moderate Socialist lea-
ders against this left-wing coup backed by party secretary and syndical-
ist Jenô Hamburger and the team of Népszava. This signifi ed that a fac-
tion of the MSZDP acted as an internal opposition to the government at 
a moment an increasing number of workers clamored for radical reforms. 
Finally, the government still dominated by the moderate social demo-
crats, decided to destroy the annoying MKP and to organize par lia men-
tary elections.
On February 20, 1919, a crowd of unemployed workers pro cee ded to 
the editorial offi ce building of Népszava at Conti Street. It was assumed 
that their aim was to destroy the MSZDP building. A similar well-planned 
incident on the previous day had resulted in the destruction of Pesti Hír-
lap. In front of the Népszava offi ce building shooting broke out between 
the crowd and the police and the voluntary people’s guard. Several po-
licemen were killed. Minister Böhm demanded action against the insti-
gators. Garami, according to Böhm’s account, was rather reluctant to ag-
ree, since he believed that the MKP should not be persecuted for its poli-
189 Somogy lies in southwestern Hungary. 
190 About 400,000 ha were transformed into cooperative associations of agricultural 
workers. Karl-Heinz Gräfe, ‘Von der Asternrevolution zur Räterepublik. Ungarn 
1918/19’, in Utopie kreativ, 2004, No. 168, p. 892.
191 Károly Mészáros, Az ôszirózsás forradalom és a tanácsköztársaság parasztpolitikája 1918–
1919 (Különös fi gyelemmel Somogyra), Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1966.
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tical views. Károly Dietz, the police chief of Budapest, used this op por-
 tunity to urge for energetic action. He took fi les on the Communists to 
the offi ces of Prime Minister Berinkey who then put the case to the cab-
inet. Forty-three leading Communists were arrested during the night of 
February 20-21, 1919 (26 on February 27, 1919 and further six by March 
3, 1919). Kunfi  and Böhm insisted that the MSZDP should carry out a 
successful anti-communist campaign only if the masses were convinced 
that the Party was fi ghting right-wing reactionaries as well as Commu-
nists. Already on February 21, 1919, the MSZDP staged a mass demon-
stration in front of Parliament. The turnout was so impressive that Jenô 
Varga remarked to Garami: ‘One has to admit that the Communists 
have no followers in Budapest.’192 
4. The Councils Republic 
At that moment, the pro-Entente stand of the bourgeois parties had not 
yet resulted in a favourable peace agreement. Meanwhile, the Red Army 
was making progress in Ukraine, which enhanced the Communists’ pres-
tige. The announced parliamentary elections created a nervous kind of 
rivalry in the ailing coalition government. While criticizing the ‘red rev-
olutionaries’193, the Socialist Left pushed for faster and more reforms in 
order to outpace the MKP in radicalism. The Károlyi Party, weakened 
by a recently formed bloc of landowners and traditionalists, lost its right 
wing to the Conservatives. The small, but intellectually infl uent, Radical 
Party with its strong pro-Entente leanings wanted to abstain from the 
parliamentary elections now scheduled for April 1919. Finally, the MSZDP 
was the last and most important political force that was still sustaining 
the shaky coalition government. Meanwhile, the shaky coalition govern-
ment could not meet the urgent demands of the urban masses and the 
many refugees having settled down in Budapest. By the middle of De-
cember 1918, some 1.2 million soldiers had been demobilized, but many 
192 See Ernô Garami, Forrongó Magyarország, Leipzig–Vienna: Pegasus, 1922, p. 103; 
also quoted by Ferenc Tibor Zsuppán, ‘The early activities of the Hungarian Com-
 munist Party 1918–19’, in The Slavonic and East European Review, 1965, Vol. 43, 
No. 101, pp. 329-330.
193 Népszava, 13 March 1919.
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of them were living in Budapest waiting for a welfare benefi t. The coal 
crisis entailed far-reaching consequences for industrial production, trans-
portation and domestic heating. Shortages of raw materials persisted. 
The 1918 harvest was the poorest ever recorded, while many food stocks 
still remained in the seceding areas. Draconic measures were taken. In 
February 1919, the lard ration was reduced to 100 grams per week. Meat-
less days were introduced. In March 1919, the quantity of food served in 
restaurants was restricted. Consumption of alcohol was prohibited.194 
4.1 Varga People’s Commissar
The leaders of the MSZDP feared that they could be rejected into oppo-
sition after the planned parliamentary elections. Their major problem 
was the peasantry now occupying and parceling out big estates. Accord-
ing to Tibor Hajdú and Zsuzsa L. Nagy, the Socialist leaders ‘were also 
certain that land distribution would further weaken the already mini-
mal socialist infl uence in the villages. Therefore, Varga and his friends 
began to advocate the establishment of agricultural cooperatives as an al-
ternative to economically unsound land distribution.’195 A second prob-
lem was growing Communist infl uence after the abortive “coup” of Feb-
ruary 20, 1919. From now on, the MKP gained also support from the 
organized workers who had been hitherto immune for Bolshevik propa-
ganda.196 The Socialist leftwingers reacted by radicalizing and consid-
ering an alliance with the MKP. 
The famous Vix197 note, handed over to President Károlyi on March 
20, 1919, demanding the retreat of all Hungarian forces between the 
Tisza River and the mountains on the eastern edge of the Hungarian 
plains, signifi ed the end of the government. At his cabinet meeting on 
194 Franz Rákos, Revolutionäre Gerichtsbarkeit, Vienna: Verlag der Arbeiter-Buchhand-
lung, 1920, p. 22.
195 Hajdú and Nagy, o.c., 1990, p. 302.
196 Ladislaus Rudas, Abenteurer- und Liquidatorentum. Die Politik Béla Kuns und die Krise 
der K. P. U., Vienna: Verlag “Vörös Újság”, 1922, p. 35.
197 Lieutenant-Colonel Fernand Vix was head of a French military mission in Buda-
pest. Ferenc Tibor Zsuppán, ‘The Hungarian Soviet Republic and the British Mi-
li tary Representatives, April-June 1919’, in The Slavonic and East European Review, 
1969, Vol. 47, pp. 198-218.
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March 20, 1919, President Károlyi, still having the support from the pro-
minent politicians of the bourgeois parties, argued that an all-Socialist 
government could salvage the situation. Only the MSZDP as the strong-
est party could solicit the sympathy of foreign governments. According 
to Károlyi’s judgement the entire Hungarian bourgeoisie would gladly 
back such an all-Socialist government wholly devoted to the defense of 
the nation. He proposed to stay on as President of an all-Socialist govern-
ment. The Socialists accepted this proposal.198 Then, the government 
decided to reject the Vix note and handed over all powers to the Social-
ists, ‘leaving to them the glorious obligation of conducting a war of na-
tional defense’.199
On March 21, 1919, President Károlyi appointed Zsigmond Kunfi  Prime 
Minister. The MSZDP leadership convened that morning in presence of 
Landler, Pogány and Jenô Varga. Only three voices, all three from the 
right wing, were raised in opposition to assuming full power and the at-
tendant search for compromise with the MKP. Manó Buchinger wanted 
the coalition to continue in power, but Garami and Peidl doubted that the 
bourgeois ministers could be enlisted for this enterprise. Finally, Land ler, 
Weltner, Pogány, Kunfi  and József Haubrich were sent to Béla Kun (who 
was still kept in jail) to discuss a compromise on the formation of an all-
Socialist government including the Communists.200 Then, Socialists and 
Communists conferred about the composition of a new government. Ga-
rami and Weltner refused to serve. Cabinet members had to be chosen 
from the Socialist centrists and the radical wing. Landler was made Min-
ister of the Interior, Kunfi  Minister of Education, Varga Minister of Fi-
nance, Pogány Minister of War, and Böhm Minister for Socialization. 
198 Böhm endorsed Károlyi’s view. Kunfi  urged that the Allies be put on notice that 
if they persisted in their ultimatum, the coalition would resign in favour of an all-
Socialist government. Garami thought that a coalition government was no longer 
viable and that the outcome should be the formation of an all-Socialist cabinet.
199 Hajdú and Nagy, o.c., 1990, p. 303.
200 Mayer, o.c., 1967, pp. 550-551; Wilhelm Böhm, Im Kreuzfeuer zweier Revolutionen, 
Munich: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1924, pp. 273-277; Béla Szántó, Klassenkämpfe 
und die Diktatur des Proletariats in Ungarn, Vienna: Neue Erde, with a preface by 
Karl Radek, 1920, pp. 53-55; Peter Pastor, Hungary Between Wilson and Lenin: The 
Hungarian Revolution of 1918–1919 and the Big Three, New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1976, p. 141.
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There was a general agreement that Kun would receive the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. But the Communists objected to the Károlyi-Böhm coup. 
They demanded that Károlyi resign, that the new government be known 
as a Soviet Republic, that the ministers be called People’s Commissars, 
and that the government be called the Council of Peoples’ Commissars. 
The principal Communist leaders joined the government as (deputy) 
commissars.201 That day the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council of Budapest 
proclaimed the dictatorship of the proletariat, with the mason Sándor 
Garbai as the Councils Republic’s formal president, but with Kun as its 
strongman. The Council applauded the announced fusion of the two 
Marxist parties. The second phase of the revolution brought the Buda-
pest Jewish intellectual middle class to power in alliance with the indus-
trial workers of Csepel. Some 30 of the 48 people’s commissars of the 
Hungarian Soviet Republic were “ethnic” Jews. Later Manó Buchinger 
would qualify these events as a ‘foolish act’.202
Jenô Varga obtained the portfolio of Finance with the Communist 
Béla Székely as Secretary of State at his department.203 For only a fort-
night, Varga would remain in charge of the portfolio of Finance. Though 
201 Michael Károlyi, Memoirs of Michael Karolyi. Faith Without Illusion, New York: E. P. 
Dutton & Co., 1957, pp. 154-155.
202 ‘Der Schritt – die Einigung mit den Kommunisten auf Grund ihres vollständigen 
Programms – wurde vorgenommen, ohne daß man auch nur mit halbem Herzen 
dabei gewesen wäre. Da die Demarche nur einige Stunden Bedenkzeit übrig ließ, 
wurde alles überstürzt, ohne gründliche Debatte und ohne daß man den Beschluß, 
bei dem es sich um so vieles handelte, den rechtmäßigen Organizationen vorgelegt 
hätte. So kam es zur Diktatur des Proletariats.’ Emmanuel Buchinger, ‘Das warnen-
de Beispiel Ungarns’, in Der Kampf, Vol. 12, No. 20, 16 August 1919, p. 38.
203 Ministers and secretaries of state were: Béla Kun and Dr. Péter Ágoston (Foreign 
Affairs), Jenô Landler and Béla Vágo (Home Affairs), Dr. József Pogány, Tibor 
Sza muely and Béla Vágó (War), Dr. Zoltán Ronai and Stéfan Ladai (Justice), Vil-
mos Böhm, Gyula Hevesi and Antal Dovcsak (Socialization), Mór Edélyi and Bé la 
Illés (Welfare), Deszô Bokány and Ernô Fiedler (Labour), Dr. Jenô Varga and Bé la 
Székely (Finance), Dr. Zsigmond Kunfi  and Dr. György Lukács (Education), Má-
tyás Rákosi, and József Haubrich (Commerce), Zsigmond Csizmadia, Károly Ván-
tus, Jenô Hamburger, and György Nyistor (College for Agriculture), Deszô Biró 
and Ernô Seidler (Police and Militia), Sándor Vincze, Mór Preusz and Deszô Die-
nes (Budapest), Oszkár Szabó and Henryk Klamár (Ruthenian and German au-
tonomous districts).
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his book On Money (A pénz) had received a good press204 and his econom-
ic expertise was uncontested, his administrative experience was none-
theless limited to a year’s service at the food-supply department of the 
Budapest municipality.205 In addition, a huge war debt and a growing 
spending defi cit after years of mismanagement were strangulating gov-
ernmental fi nances. Varga’s predecessor, the Radical Pál Szende, had 
failed to introduce a so badly needed comprehensive tax reform. Mean-
while, expenditures topped to more than 4 billion korona, while actual 
tax receipts did not exceed some 1.20 billion korona. Within fi ve months 
the value of the korona had dropped by half.206 
By April 3, 1919, Varga was appointed People’s Commissar for Pro-
duction and President of the Presidium of the Economic Council. Why 
Varga was removed from the Ministry of Finance to the Economic Coun-
cil is unknown. The problems Varga had to tackle were, nonetheless, im-
mense now that commercial links with the major capitalist countries were 
interrupted. After four years of war economy, Hungary’s economic situ-
204 According to National Bank inspector Max Faragó, Varga’s publications were of 
little scientifi c value. He depicts Béla Székely as ‘an empty-headed young person 
having worked at a bank offi ce’. Bank governor Gyula Lengyel is described as a 
former teacher and ‘a fanatic communist with cruel leanings, but a hard worker 
gifted with practical knowledge’. Max Farago, ‘De socialisatie der banken’, in Karl 
Huszar (ed.), De dictatuur van het proletariaat in Hongarije. Authentieke beschrijving 
van het bolschewistisch schrikbewind, met medewerking van vakspecialisten samengesteld 
door Karl Huszar, oud-minister-president van Hongarije. Voor Nederland bewerkt en 
met toelichtingen voorzien door Mr. H. Schaapveld, Roermond: J. J. Romen & Zonen 
[s.d.], p. 103; on the problem of printing new money, see Max Farago, Die Noten-
presse der Revolution. Erinnerungen aus den letzten Jahren der österreichischen Bank, 
Vienna: Selbstverlag, 1930.
205 In September 1917, Varga had been appointed (together with Béla Somogyi, 
translator of Bebel’s book on the women question’s book) to the Budapest food-
supply administration. András Várnai, ‘Varga Jenô pályakezdése’, in István Her-
mann (ed.), A magyar fi lozófi ai gondolkodás a századelôn, Budapest, Kossuth, 1977, 
pp. 251-252.
206 Infl ation was not so high because the public had hoarded the old banknotes of 
the Monarchy. The peasants wanted to be paid in old banknotes, not in freshly 
printed revolutionary banknotes. Infl ation obliged the Socialist-Communist gov-
ernment to grant another 20 percent cut in rents and a 40 percent boost in in-
dustrial wages.
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ation had become as disastrous as predicted in his book A pénz. Pro-
found political, social and economic reforms were undertaken when es-
tablishing the dictatorship of the proletariat. The old criminal law re-
pressing homosexuality and adultery was reformed.207 Several feminist 
demands were met. In addition, the councils should not only be legisla-
tive, but also executive and judicial organs as well. All offi cial functions 
had to become elective and their remuneration should not exceed that 
of a skilled worker. Higher pay could be granted only to specialists. More 
important was the expropriation decree of all estates and lands not cul-
tivated by the owner and his family. Free distribution of land to the pea-
sants was halted. Though the formation of cooperative farms was con-
sidered as a “short-term solution”, its principle was not attacked.208 Na-
tionalization measures of banks, bank deposits, industry and transport 
sector were completed by a state monopoly of foreign trade and whole-
sale commerce.209
4.2 Socialization 
Varga’s nationalization program departed from the guiding idea that 
planning and large-scale production would overcome capitalist anarchy 
and install a socialist economic regime. The implementation of a comp-
re hensive system of socialization would follow. Socialization of land and 
industry was thought as a guarantee to ensure the continuity of production 
and food supply. Obviously, Varga’s concept of the proletarian mission was 
largely determined by an optimistic believe in the possibility of over co-
ming any fi nancial, industrial and humanitarian problems.210 At the Re-
207 Ibidem, p. 21.
208 In a speech to the Council of Revolutionary Workers and Soldiers of Budapest on 
May 24, 1919, Kun pretended that ‘cooperative farming was the Councils’ Re-
public proud’ and that this method of farming ‘contradicted all anti-Socialist and 
anti-Marxist rumours’ about a peasantry opposing socialization of farming. Franz 
Rákos, o. c., 1920, p. 65.
209 The united party’s program had been prepared by Varga, Gyula Hevesi and Jó-
zsef Kelen.
210 After the fall of the Councils’ Republic, Manó Buchinger reported that Varga was 
still believing that the proletariat was willing to suffer any kind of hardship. ‘Wenn 
zu begin der Diktatur einer der Volkskommissäre, der Genosse Varga, in der ‘Ar-
beiter-Zeitung’ meinte, daß das Proletariat die unumgänglich notwendigen Ent-
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vo lutionary Governing Council’s meeting of March 22, 1919, Varga pro-
posed socialization of enterprises employing more than 15 workers in 
order to prevent small capitalists and artisans from hiding their capital.211 
His proposal was, however, postponed until March 25, 1919. Then, Vil-
mos Böhm put forward an amendment that would socialize works using 
power engines and employing 20 or more workers. The overall low limit 
of 20 workers for companies to be socialized was more radical than that 
chosen for “war communism” in Russia.212 This low limit of 20 workers 
had been set because of Hungary’s higher level of capitalist development 
and better organizational traditions of the workers. The foundation for 
the socialization of large estates, industries, mines, banks, and transport 
companies occupying more than 20 persons, was laid down (Decree No. 
IX of March 26, 1919). The decision of limiting socialization at the low 
level of 20 employees was, however, only taken after a long debate, du-
ring which the Russian experience was cited; there socialization had been 
limited to large companies. The socialization process was ‘more thoroughly 
and energetically carried out in Hungary than in Russia’, Varga would 
later boast, but ‘its organization was more centralized, bureaucratic’,213 
and with less workers’ participation. 
At a meeting of the Revolutionary Governing Council on March 27, 
1919, Varga estimated that about 1,600 companies could be socialized. 
214 Meanwhile, Varga’s position was considerably reinforced: Decree No. 
XII authorized the commissar for fi nancial affairs to take under his aegis 
all fi nancial institutions suitable for socialization, while Decree No. XXV 
of March 30, 1919, contained similar instructions with regard to foreign-
behrungen leichter dulden werde, wenn es sähe, daß auch die Bourgeoisie nicht 
mehr in Gaus und Braus lebt lebt…’. Buchinger, o.c., 1919, p. 536.
211 Péteri, o.c., 1984, p. 57.
212 The Russian nationalization decree of June 28, 1918, provided for varying de-
grees of expropriation. When delegates at the National Assembly of Councils crit-
icized Hungary’s expropriation policy, Varga referred to Russia where modern 
industry was more concentrated. Péteri, o.c., 1984, p. 57.
213 Eugen Varga, Die wirtschaftspolitischen Probleme der proletarischen Diktatur, 2nd edi-
tion, Hamburg: Carl Hoym Nachf. Louis Cahnbley, 1921, p. 65; Gratz, o.c., 1935, 
pp. 107-108.
214 Péteri, o.c., 1984, p. 69.
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owned insurance companies. The foreign-owned industrial companies 
received nominees appointed by a fi nancial commissar at their board 
of directors as well; they were obliged to continue production. No legal 
changes in the statutes of the enterprises were, however, introduced. At 
that meeting, Böhm and Varga argued against the nationalization of the 
insurance companies and the invalidation of the loans taken up by the 
previous governments. Then, Kun attacked Varga personally: ‘the task 
of the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be the collection of data. 
The annulment of the war loan is equally as important as socialization 
and the land reform. […] We’ll make a complete break, and that will show 
what for foundations we have’.215 When referring to that incident, Varga 
would recall that the radicalism of expropriation policy in the foreign-
owned fi nancial and insurance companies had been tamed by consid-
erations of foreign policy. As he put it, the revolutionary government had 
simply ‘refrained from formal nationalization’!216 
On April 2, 1919, all wholesale and retail shops were nationalized (De-
cree No. XXXI). Other decrees socializing all “chimney-sweeping-busi-
nesses”, power stations, gasworks, tenement houses, cleaning services, 
consumer cooperatives, etc. would follow. On April 8, 1919, at the meet-
ing of the Revolutionary Governing Council, Varga expressed, however, 
his disapproval that the concrete decisions on socialization were being 
postponed. These delays were caused by the absence of an effi ciently 
working administrative body empowered to carry them out. As Mátyás 
Rákosi remarked, the decree on the socialization of wholesale compa-
nies of which he was in charge, had been issued without his knowledge. 
He considered the Commissariat for Socialization loosely constituted. ‘On 
the question of trading companies, Varga replied, there is discord with-
in the commissariat itself. Rákosi wants to grab everything, while Erdé-
lyi and I do not consider that everything must be done at once. The point 
is that the proletariat should obtain [what they need]’.217 Varga suggest-
ed that production councils be formed with trade-union participation. 
His suggestion met with approval of the other commissars, especially of 
215 Quoted in Péteri, o.c, 1984, p. 60.
216 Ibidem, p. 66.
217 Ibidem, p. 60.
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József Kelen and Gyula Hevesi.218 According to Varga wages should be 
fi xed centrally.219 Finally, it was agreed that small-scale industry should 
not be socialized. 
‘Productivists’ like Varga or Zoltán Rónai were aware of the concrete 
conditions of Hungary’s industrial structure and the technical problem 
of running small industries through state agencies. Hence, the direction 
of production and the use and allocation of supplies should be organ-
ized in function of political reality.220 The aim of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat was to increase production. Though socialization of small-
scale industries would not result in increased production, the Revolution-
ary Governing Council decreed nonetheless that small-scale industry en-
gaged in several sectors like in the repair and maintenance of housing 
be socialized!221 Soon the major part of the small-scale sector was drawn 
into the state sector as the artisans met increased diffi culties in obtain-
ing the materials and the fi nance they needed for their production. Small 
workshops were spontaneously concentrated into big factories making 
the same type of products. Varga criticized this tendency in vain.222 Béla 
Székely, a Commissar dealing with the fi nancial sector, and Varga ob-
jected together to the socialization of ‘manicure shops’223 and the ‘bar-
218 János Kende, ‘The organizing role of the trade unions in the economic and mili-
ta ry fi elds during the Hungarian Republic of Councils (March 1919 – July 1919)’, 
in E. Kabos and A. Zsilák (eds), Studies on the History of the Trade-Union Movement, 
Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1977, pp. 76-77.
219 Ibidem, p. 78.
220 Péteri, o.c., 1984, p. 61.
221 The fi nancial bodies of the Councils´ Republic considered as socialized those fac-
tories where production commissars had been appointed. After an audit and fi -
nancial takeover had been carried out, the Center for Financial Institutions should 
fi nance the socialized factories. By May 1919, production commissars had been 
delegated to 1,073 fi rms.
222 Varga: ‘I think the most important task is to organise the big factories well, and 
until that has been done I think any radical reforms in small-scale industry should 
be neglected.’ Quoted in Péteri, o.c., 1984, p. 64; Vörös Újság, 10 April 1919; A ma-
gyar tanácsköztárság 1919. március 21. – 1919. augusztus 1., Vol. 1, Budapest, Kos-
suth Könyv Kiadó, 1959, pp. 180-181.
223 Péteri, o.c, 1984, p. 73.
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ber shops’224. Zoltán Rónai suggested that it should be decreed that every 
commissariat review its own socialized concerns ‘with the view to decid-
ing which ones to retain’.225 His colleague Samu Lengyel thought it nec-
essary to consider, when organizing sectoral centers of industry, that cer-
tain already socialized companies should return to the private sector.226 
All these troubles inspired Varga to publish on May 3, 1919, in Szociális 
Termelés (Social Production), an article in which he stressed that the ‘fi rst 
task of social production, once the factories have been taken over by the 
proletarian state, is to see what exactly has been taken over.’227
Varga’s call for production rationalization became a central issue. Ag-
riculture and industry had to cover the most basic essentials of survival. 
Usable stocks for production had to be utilized with the utmost circum-
spection and economy. The shortage of resources demanded economy 
and selectivity in supplying industries and factories that varied in effi -
ciency, and in certain areas of industry that could lead to rising unem-
ployment228 and ‘the downfall of the whole thing’.229 The Revolutionary 
Governing Council linked the obligation to work to employing jobless 
workers in other sectors or factories or trades, to calling them up into 
the Red Army or to mobilizing them for public works. The latter plan 
was connected with the idea of forced central management of labor and 
224 Ten years later Varga would give the following anecdote: ‘During the dictator-
ship in Hungary a delegation of barbers came to me in the People’s Commissar-
iat and said to me: ‘There are big barber shops in Budapest employing 20, 30 
and 50 workers. You must nationalize these immediately.’ I said to them, rightly, 
I think: ‘Go to the devil. Do what you like. We have other things to worry about 
besides nationalizing barber shops.’ And in the next number of the organ of the 
Barbers’ Trade Union strongly worded articles were published containing per-
sonal attacks upon me and stating that my family were engaged in the barbers’ 
business and that is why I refused to nationalize barber shops.’ International Press 
Correspondence, 1928, Vol. 8, No. 66, p. 1188.
225 Ibidem.
226 Quoted in ibidem, p. 73.
227 Varga in Szociális Termelés, 3.5.1919, p. 1.
228 The opinion prevailed that in a period of transition higher unemployment would 
be unavoidable. Rónai admitted: ‘I should prefer to see unemployment than to 
see materials wasted’. Quoted in Péteri, o.c., 1984, p. 85. 
229 This was Kelen speaking at the meeting of the Governing Council of April 8, 1919. 
Quoted in Péteri, o.c., 1984, p. 86.
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unemployment benefi ts.230 Because the unemployment problem could 
not be evaded any more,231 Varga reported on the imminent launching 
of a housing program in Budapest and a railway construction project by 
the Railway Construction Offi ce. At the April 12, 1919, meeting of the 
Revolutionary Governing Council, he argued that it was entirely due to 
‘the problem of materials that work had not started.’232 
4.3 Managing a centrally planned economy
With the trade unions remaining a voluntary body the revolutionary 
government had to accommodate to their independent role. Howsoever, 
stricter coordination of economic and social policy had become an ur-
gent matter. Therefore Varga pressed for incorporating the unions into 
a functional relationship with the Party and the Revolutionary Governing 
Council. Already at the April 2, 1919, meeting of the Revolutionary Go-
verning Council, Varga defended the idea of having the unions participate 
in economic policy making. The setting up of the National Economic 
Council was discussed on April 8, 1919, at a meeting of the Revolutionary 
Governing Council. Kun and Varga wanted a Council serving as a central 
economic directory. At the May 10, 1919, meeting of the Revolutionary Go-
verning Council, Gyula Lengyel (Commissar of Finance) proposed to in-
clude the workers’ representatives into the National Economic Council. 
Fianally, Lengyel and Varga received the task of drawing up a detailed 
230 Péter Ágoston took issue with those who intended to raise unemployment bene-
fi ts. Like Sándor Garbai, he saw the solution in public works (roads, housing). Pé-
teri, o. c., 1984, p. 86. Other commissars opinioned that (higher) unemployment 
benefi ts could endanger recruiting for the Red Army. Varga himself asked the trade 
union leaders to discover ‘the number of unemployed after the mobilization. Then 
the Governing Council should decide accordingly whether to continue or cease 
paying unemployment and coal benefi ts’. Quoted in ibidem, p. 87. 
231 On April 12, 1919, Bokányi warned the Governing Council against a demonstra-
tion by the unemployed and the disabled persons. The unemployed movement 
constituted a somewhat independent forum headed by the Executive Committee 
of the Combined Unemployed in Hungary. The movement’s demands were strong-
ly tainted by ‘egalitarian’ ideas. The movement claimed the right to work. People 
unable to fi nd a job should be placed in the same category as the employed and 
be awarded 80 percent of their salaries. Ibidem, pp. 90-91.
232 Ibidem, p. 87.
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plan. In the decree on the establishment of the Economic Council pub-
lished on May 20, 1919, it was decided that the National Economic Co-
uncil’s task was the ‘direction of production and the distribution of goods, 
the issuing and executing of decrees concerning the economy, and the 
technical and fi nancial supervision of production and of those organs in 
charge of distribution.’233 Varga was appointed its president. 
On June 2, 1919, Varga outlined the structure of the National Eco-
nomic Council in his opening speech. He said that the decisive role be-
longed to the trade unions. The fi rst session of the steering committee 
discussed wages, work performance and unemployment insurance. Var-
ga argued for a permanent body to oversee wages. Controversies arose 
about setting minimum work norms and establishing work discipline. 
Var ga noted that nominal wages had increased, but that production had 
declined. According to Varga, during the fi rst phase of the revolution 
production, decline was inevitable because of the termination of capital-
ist methods of work discipline in the factories and disturbances due to 
military activities. Varga urged for more work discipline, but János Van-
czák of the infl uential Union of Iron and Metal Workers opposed him 
with the argument that the union’s role was not to enforce discipline and 
minimum production goals. Dezsô Bokányi argued that the unions had 
to be responsible and therefore defend the revolution.234 Finally, an ag-
ree ment was reached on minimum production norms and on the prin-
ciple that the unions would assist the plant workers’ councils and the pro-
duction supervisors in this endeavor.
The third item on the agenda was a reform of state assistance to the 
unemployed. Varga informed the National Economic Council’s steering 
committee that on May 31, 1919, 46,974 persons were unemployed, and 
that benefi ts, excluding coal benefi ts235, were costing the budget 5 mil-
lion koronas a week.236 Making the labor market working was a prob-
lem. Assistance to the unemployed between the ages of 18 and 45 was 
only granted if they could certify they were unfi t for military service. Fi-
233 Quoted in Kende, o.c., 1977, pp. 84-85.
234 Ibidem, p. 86.
235 As a form of assistance to the unemployed, many plants paid ‘coal benefi ts’. Pé-
teri, o.c., 1984, p. 87-88 and 90-91.
236 Ibidem, p. 89.
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nally, it was agreed that the eligible unemployed should sign up for the 
army and that manpower should be transferred to those sectors suffer-
ing from shortages. On advice of Varga, a governmental agency dealing 
with these problems would be set up. Commenting on what had going 
on, Varga wrote in Népszava of June 3, 1919, about union participation in 
the National Economic Council. He argued that the Revolutionary Go-
verning Council ‘had defi nitely erred in not establishing this organiza-
tion earlier because already at the fi rst meeting it had become obvious 
just how many good pointers could be gained, concerning the organiza-
tion of production and in general about the conduct of the economic af-
fairs of the nation, from the leaders of the trade unions, the experienced 
combatants of the Hungarian proletarian movement’.237
Notwithstanding the unions had been assigned responsibilities in di-
recting the economy, their activities were by no means restricted or con-
fi ned to limited activities. The union of the construction workers with its 
rich tradition of revolutionary syndicalism initiated the foundation of a 
Directorate for Construction.238 Gyula Hevesi wanted to have the unions 
on his side in order to manage factories, to control the production su-
pervisory bodies and, especially, to carry out the delicate task of main-
taining labour discipline.239 At that time, Varga optimistically wrote in 
a pamphlet on Workers’ Management that ‘the role of the trade unions, as 
a factor of directing the economy, was only in an embryonic stage’.240 How-
ever, the steering committee of the National Economic Council had de-
cided that labour discipline become in principle a unions’ matter. But 
no concrete measures were taken with regard to this important item. Af-
ter consultation of the trade unions, the National Economic Council was, 
according to the June 4, 1919, Decree No. XXVII N.T., nonetheless, in a 
position to declare that workers throughout certain trades or at certain 
workplaces could not be granted unemployment benefi ts. This decree 
had to drive the jobless workers into the Red Army and into vacancies in 
other trades. However, it did not contain measures for a centralized al-
237 Quoted in Kende, o.c., 1977, p. 87.
238 Ibidem, p. 88.
239 Ibidem, pp. 88-89.
240 Varga in Munkásigazgatás. A munkástanácsok és a szakszervezetek termelési bizottságai-
nak feladatairól, Budapest, A Közoktatásügyi Népbiztosság Kiadása, 1919, p. 16. 
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location of the labor force. On July 2, 1919, a Decree issued by the Na-
tional Economic Council forbade this time the payment of unemploy-
ment benefi ts to any male or female worker capable of work. 
Hidden unemployment was another major problem. Plants were out 
of operation due to the lack of coal or raw materials. The number of shifts 
where no work was done increased considerably. Meanwhile, jobless work-
ers remained on their companies’ payrolls.241 The workers’ councils were 
ready to dismiss these workers for military service, but most of them could 
stay with a full salary doing cleaning or maintenance work. “War com-
munism” required nonetheless a mobilization of all resources to ensure 
manufacturing of military equipment. In an article published in the June 
3, 1919 issue of Népszava, Varga pleaded for a central allocation system 
in order to avoid growing shortages of raw materials.242 On Varga’s and 
Hevesi’s proposal to the Revolutionary Governing Council of May 17, 
1919, decisions were made to meet any demands of war and to limit the 
waste of materials. Therefore, the War Commissariat was invited to take 
part in the work of the Presidium of the National Economic Council, 
which had been set up a few weeks earlier.243 The socialization debate in 
the Revolutionary Governing Council had meanwhile revealed that the 
socialist members of government were better prepared than the commu-
nists for their governmental tasks. From the third week on it was the so-
cialists’ view that would prevail in domestic politics. Kun’s ignorance of 
economic planning problems was only compensated by his missionary 
zeal.244 At the socialists’ demands, three Revolutionary Governing Co un-
241 ‘The majority of the unemployed, both workers and clerical staff, remained on 
their companies’ payroll, drawing full salaries. Such a situation could not avoid 
having extremely demoralizing effects.’ Varga, o.c., 1921, p. 62.
242 Varga, ’Á proletárállam anyaggazdálkodása’ , in Népszava, 13 April 1919.
243 A Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt Központi Bizottságának Párttörténeti Intézete, 
A magyar munkásmozgalom történetének válogatott dokumentumai. A magyar tanácsköztár-
saság 1919. március 21. – 1919. augusztus 1. First Volume, 1919. március 21. – 1919. 
június 11., Budapest, Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1959, pp. 503-505.
244 During his trial in 1935, Mátyás Rákosi disclaimed responsibility for having issu-
ed this sweeping nationalization decree and he named Hevesi as its author. Ru-
dolf L. Tökés, Béla Kun and the Hungarian Soviet Republic. The Origins and Role of 
the Communist Party of Hungary in the Revolutions of 1918–1919, New York and Lon-
don: Praeger, 1967, p. 157.
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cil commissions245 were set up to rectify the initial mistakes. Meanwhile, 
the real wielders of power in the Revolutionary Governing Council, i.e. 
Kun, Landler, Böhm, Kunfi , and the heads of the economic commissa-
riats, were too preoccupied with daily decision-making problems at the 
ma ny Party and councils meetings to lead the unifi ed party of socialists 
and communists.
In addition, the liquidation of both parties and the constitution of a 
new party was still an important issue. The Socialist right wing, including 
Garami, Sándor Propper, Manó Buchinger, and Gyula Peidl, had already 
broken with the MSZDP. Though the Centrists had accepted the commu-
nist platform, they refused to accept communist identity. Hence, a false 
sense of party unity was created by recently acquired governmental 
power. In addition, Kun enticed the Socialist Left by his impulsive be-
havior and revolutionary rhetoric. The Communists, forming by no means 
a solid group, were nonetheless weakened by factionalist rivalries con-
stantly undermining Kun’s authority. Finally, Kun had excluded these 
radical elements from sensitive positions, but, on the other hand, he tol-
erated the activities of a “terrorist group” (the “Lenin Boys”). Kun’s drive 
for full control of the united party was, however, doomed to failure. The 
Communists represented only a vociferous, but powerless minority in the 
district councils, the factories and the trade unions where they melted 
into the established socialist structures. The central party secretariat con-
ducted party affairs. Of the eleven secretaries in charge of the seven de-
partments, there were only two communists. The considerable commu-
nist contingent at the summit of the party structure and the extent of 
communist control over propaganda and agitation was ‘a most conclusive 
indication of their inferior position in the Hungarian Socialist Party’.246 
After two months of struggle, Kun was forced to conclude that his par-
ty was still the old trade-union dominated MSZDP having absorbed his 
small MKP. The Communists constituted a tiny minority in the govern-
245 Political Committee: Garbai (chairman), Kun, Fiedler, Landler, Böhm; Milita-
ry Committee: Böhm (chairman), Kun, Szántó, Fiedler, Haubrich; Economic 
Committee: Garbai (chairman), Hamburger, Lengyel, Erdélyi, Bokányi, Szántó, 
Varga.
246 Tökés, o.c., 1967, p. 167.
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ing bodies of the Budapest Council of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies 
created after the elections for local councils on April 7, 1919. The Buda-
pest Council wielded powers that often surpassed those of the Revolu-
tionary Governing Council. There was never a doubt that the ultimate 
source of authority was not laid in the Revolutionary Government Co-
uncil, but in the Budapest Council where the infl uence of the Budapest 
trade-union leaders and syndicalist shop stewards was felt. Any Commu-
nist proposal – unless consented to by Jakab Weltner, the head of the 
Committee of Eighty- was, however, invariable defeated by a solid social-
ist majority.247 This also demonstrated the precarious nature of Commu-
nist infl uence on the unionized workers having remained loyal to their 
union offi cials. 
Hopes for a Russian military intervention on behalf of the Hungarian 
revolutionary regime and Lenin’s backing constituted Kun’s greatest as-
set.248 In his letter of May 27, 1919, to the Hungarian workers, Lenin ar-
gued that the ‘form of transition to the dictatorship of the proletariat in 
Hungary is altogether different from that in Russia: the voluntary resig-
nation of the bourgeois government, and the instantaneous restoration 
of the unity of the working class, the unity of Socialism on a Communist 
program’.249 Lenin refrained from criticizing the realization of party uni-
ty at any price. He preferred stressing the necessity of winning the fol-
lowing of the peasantry and of all petty-bourgeois strata in general.250 
Though Lenin hailed the Hungarian workers setting the world ‘a better 
example than even Soviet Russia by having been able to unite at once all 
Socialists on the platform of a genuine proletarian dictatorship’,251 he 
explicitly warned for a possible party split and its consequence for the 
Revolution. ‘Be fi rm. If vacillation should manifest itself among the So-
cialists who yesterday gave their adherence to you, to the dictatorship of 
the proletariat, or among the petty bourgeoisie, suppress it ruthless.’252
247 Tökés, o.c., 1967, p. 161.
248 Borsányi, o.c., 1993, p. 139.
249 V. I. Lenin, Marx, Engels, Marxism, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 
1947, p. 402.
250 Ibidem, p. 403.
251 Ibidem, p. 404.
252 Ibidem, p. 405.
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Already in June 1919 the revolutionary regime had to meet quasi-un-
surmountable internal and external problems. On June 7, 1919, Kun gave 
a speech to the Budapest Central Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council at the 
city theatre to defend his domestic and foreign policy.253 He warned his 
audience for the danger of a counterrevolution and he stressed the ne-
cessity of reinforcing the army. He criticized the railroad workers for hav-
ing launched a strike against the dictatorship of the proletariat. Though 
the population’s living conditions had deteriorated and people had to 
eat corn bread, the food problem was on its way to be solved. Infl ation 
was largely repressed.254
The most important pending question, however, was party unity.255 
When on June 12, 1919, the fi rst congress256 of the united party met in 
the Parliament building, the overwhelming majority of its 327 delegates 
represented the socialist current. Kun talked about the new party pro-
gram. He expressed great satisfaction with regard to the problem of land 
reform. ‘Social production is no longer a utopia among us’, he claimed. 
He considered farmers collectives as a short-lived transition towards 
large-scale agricultural production.257 At the end of his presentation, he 
urged the delegates to adopt the name “Communist Party” in order to 
exploit the name’s revolutionary attractiveness. However, Kunfi  called 
for retaining the party’s new name adopted on March 21, 1919 (Hungar-
ian Socialist Party), while Weltner pressed for a compromise solution (So-
cialist-Communist Party of Hungary258). Kunfi  rejected the use of terror 
in the revolution and coercion in the name of Lenin against the major-
ity of the workers. He dismissed Kun’s arguments on the party’s name: 
253 Kun, o.c., 1977, pp. 68-79.
254 Mária H. Kohut (ed.), Források Budapest történetéhez 1873–1919, Budapest: Buda-
pest Fôváros Levéltára Kiadványai, 1971, pp. 463-465; also in Budapesti Közpon-
ti Forradalmi Munkás- és Katonatanács jegyzôkönyvei, Budapest, 1920, pp. 170-171; 
MMTVD, A magyar munkásmozgalom történetének válogatott dokumentumai, Vol. VI/A, 
Budapest, 1959, pp. 712-714.
255 Rudas, o.c., 1922, pp. 64-81.
256 Report of the debates in A magyar tanácsköztársaság 1919. március 21. – 1919. au-
gusztus 1., Budapest, 1960, pp. 10-48. 
257 Borsányi, o.c., 1993, p. 178.
258 Szocialista-Kommunista Munkások Magyarországi Pártja.
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the name “Communist” would be an imitation of the Bolshevik exam-
ple.259 One of the ironies of the debate was that although the socialist 
majority rejected Kun’s proposal on the name of the party, the congress 
adopted without debate an essentially communist program.260 The elec-
tion of a party executive was the last item on the agenda. With the ex-
ception of Kun, the Communists failed to have their candidates directly 
elected. They announced that they would abandon the party unless the 
originally proposed slate was restored.261 Finally, the Communist candi-
dates were elected, but the incident proved that the party was only uni-
fi ed in name. Socialists and Communists still formed two distinct cur-
rents cherishing their own identity and ideology and having totally dif-
ferent concepts concerning the nature of the newly established regime.
Meanwhile, the agrarian question was still poisoning the country’s do-
mestic affairs. Though in December 1918, the rural proletariat (season-
al harvesters and landless peasants) had voted down at a national con-
ference the communist draft resolution demanding the immediate land 
nationalization, the Communists and Socialists refused satisfying the de-
mands of the peasants craving for land. Decree XXXVIII on the social-
ization of land, promulgated on April 4, 1919, called for the immediate 
nationalization of big estates larger than 100 cadastral yokes (57.55 hec-
tares) and instituted their collective or co-operative cultivation by the 
agrarian workers.262 Only those who undertook to perform at least 120 
workdays a year could be members. Peasants laboring their own small 
259 Eleven communists and seven socialists, among them Kun, László Rudas, Ferenc 
Rákos, István Biermann, József Rabinovits, Gyula Alpári, Mátyás Rákosi, Deszô 
Bokányi, György Lukács, and Tibor Szamuely, took part in the debate that fol-
lowed the Kun-Kunfi  duel.
260 A host of party militants took the fl oor. Among them were: Sándor Gárbai, Ernô 
Pór, István Farkas, Domján Strengár, Nikola Gramovszki, László Rudas, József Ra-
bi novics, Sámuel Csapó, Zsigmond Kunfi , Zoltán Rónai, Deszô Bokányi, Tibor Sza-
muely, Gyula Vojtczki, Kálmán Wallisch, Gyula Alpári, Gyula Batitz, István Bier-
mann, István Farkas, Sándor Kellner.
261 According to Borsányi, Kun said things from which one could conclude that he 
was prepared to arrest the Socialist leaders. Therefore, Böhm would have the 
right wing to submit. Borsányi, o.c., 1993, p. 180.
262 János Botos, Mit kell tudni az 1918–1919-es magyarországi forradalmakról?, Buda-
pest, Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1978, p. 104.
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plots could remain owners of their land. To the agricultural laborer, it 
seemed that nothing had changed. He still had to work for the same em-
ployer, because former – and often disliked – agrarian managers and en-
trepreneurs were kept in function.263 Jenô Landler realized the fallacy of 
this agrarian policy and therefore he pressed Kun to distribute the land 
among Red Army veterans.264 
During the nine-day National Congress of Councils,265 which opened 
on June 14, 1919, at the Parliament building in Budapest, the last impor-
tant power struggle between the peasantry and the urban working class 
was fought. The Congress elected a 150 members strong Federal Cen-
tral Executive Committee, discussed the new constitution and heard the 
reports of several commissars.266 The debates on the economic situation 
(Jenô Varga),267 fi nances (Gyula Lengyel),268 agriculture (Jenô Ham bur-
ger),269 foreign policy (Kun),270 military affairs (Böhm), and food sup-
plies (Mór Erdélyi) were interrupted by exclamations and anti-Semitic 
263 That sometimes the wrong men were chosen was evident. In the third week of 
the dictatorship, Sándor Csizmadia had been relieved of all his duties and placed 
under house arrest for excesses committed while being intoxicated. Frank Eckelt, 
‘The internal policies of the Hungarian Soviet Republic’, in Iván Völgyes (ed.), 
Hungary in Revolution, 1918–19. Nine Essays, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1971, p. 85.
264 Tökés, o.c., 1967, p. 187.
265 On April 7, 1919, local councils were elected throughout the country. Balloting 
was on a single list. These councils were to elect the National Congress of Coun-
cils, the supreme legislative organ of the Republic.
266 The revolutionary government was recomposed. Szántó became Commissar at 
Defense, Ágoston received Justice, Pogány Education, Antal Guth Welfare and 
Böhm became commander in chief of the Army, while Haubrich commanded the 
Budapest Army and Rákosi the Red Guards. Jenô Varga, Ferenc Bajáki (Econo-
my), György Nyiesztor (Agriculture) and Gyula Lengyel (Finance and Governor 
of the National Bank) presided over the 80 members of the Supreme Economic 
Council. 
267 A Magyar Tanácsköztársaság 1919. március 21. – 1919. augusztus 1., Budapest, 1960, 
pp. 94-105.
268 Ibidem, pp. 105-118. 
269 Ibidem, pp. 120-131.
270 Ibidem, pp. 146-156 and 173-175; also Kun, o.c., 1977, pp. 101-122.
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jeers.271 About 70 delegates with an agrarian or provincial background 
occupying the fl oor obliged the presiding body of the National Congress 
to impose closure on the stormy economic debate and a time limit of ten 
minutes on every speech, except for the people’s commissars. The target 
of these attacks coming from the agrarian delegates was the newly cre-
ated bureaucracy and its system of political and production commissars. 
According to the peasant delegates, the latter were inexperienced urban 
intellectuals, wearing city clothes, collecting food for their relatives in 
Bu dapest, issuing contradictory orders, living well and doing nothing. 
These provincial delegates defended the idea of an autonomously pro-
ducing agrarian society against the commissars’ bureaucratic nepotism 
and attacked the Councils’ Commissars with exclamations of crude anti-
Semitism. That most commissars were intellectuals and (former) Jews of 
middle-class background corroborated the prevailing thesis of an overall 
anti-agrarian and anti-revolutionary complot.272 Jenô Varga’s speech273 
was interrupted by shouts of ‘get out the Jews’.274 Finally, Béla Kun inter-
vened: ‘A Jew as I am, I am not embarrassed to raise these issues. My fa-
ther was a Jew but I am no longer one, for I became a Socialist and a 
Communist. But many others who were born in the Christian religion 
remained what they were: Christian Socialists.’275 
271 Andrew C. Janos, ‘The agrarian opposition at the National Congress of Coun-
cils’, in Andrew C. Janos and William B. Slottman (eds), Revolution in Perspective. 
Essays on the Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919, Berkeley, Los Angeles and Lon-
don: University of California Press, 1971, p. 90.
272 Delegate Sándor Iványi thought that these Jews, for reasons of economic inter-
ests, were ‘natural’ counterrevolutionaries.
273 Also in Jenô Varga, ‘Varga Jenô beszámolója a gazdasági helyzetrôl a Tanácsok 
Országos Gyûlésén 1919. június 16-án’, in Közgazdasági Szemle, 1969, Vol. 16, No. 
3, pp. 336-348.
274 ‘Dobják ki a zsidókat’, A Magyar Tanácsköztársaság, 1960, o.c., p. 100. M. Gábor 
wrote in Kommunistische Internationale (Nov/Dec. 1919, p. 240) that during the Na-
tional Congress of Soviets the majority of the speeches ‘were so counter-revolu-
tionary and anti-Semitic, that it was impossible to publish the reports of the ses-
sions’. Quoted in Istvan Deak, ‘Budapest and the Hungarian Revolution of 1918–
1919’, in The Slavonic and East European Review, 1968, Vol. 46, No. 106, p. 140.
275 Janos, o.c., 1971, p. 97.
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At the session of 16 June 1919, Varga’s report276 to the Congress of 
Councils gave a rather true picture of a general and rapid decline in la-
bor performance and productivity. After socialization, labor productiv-
ity had declined less in agriculture and more sharply in a great number 
of industries. In coal mining, total output had dropped with 10-38 per-
cent compared with the beginning of the year. But productivity per mine-
worker had declined by over 50 percent in comparison with peacetime 
output. The engineering industry reported a decline of 30 percent at the 
Láng factory, 75 percent at the Friedrich’s Elevator factory in Mátyás-
föld, 25 percent at the Röck factory, and 50 percent at the Wörner facto-
ry.277 The only exceptions to this downward trend in labor productivity 
were the already highly automated process industries (chemical industry 
and fl our mills).278 
Varga reported on all growing diffi culties the government had met 
du ring the previous months in the socialized big factories. According to 
Varga, experience had proven that a good proletarian was not always a 
good director and that without good management it would be impossible 
to direct a coalmine or to maintain labor discipline. He castigated those 
incompetent workers occupied with discussing and smoking at length at 
the management board of their factory. Hence, he criticized the work-
shop committees of workers’ control for having broken down labor dis-
cipline. ‘After having eliminated 20,000 to 30,000 capitalists, Varga said, 
we had to create a new bureaucracy capable of replacing them in the or-
ganization of the production process. But this new bureaucracy is not 
functioning satisfactorily. There are too many incompetent and too many 
young people working who are lacking either demanded experience or 
political judgment; there are also gangs of cunning adventurers who from 
one day to another changed their political mind, who are calling them-
selves Communists and who are taking advantage of the situation.’279 
Varga’s remarks at the Congress of Councils did not increase his pop-
ularity among the members of the new bureaucracy. Still calling himself 
276 Varga, o.c., 1969, pp. 336-348; A Magyar, o.c., 1960, pp. 94-105.
277 Péteri, o.c., 1984, p. 92; Varga in A Magyar, o.c., 1960, pp. 101-102.
278 A Magyar, o.c., 1960, pp. 100-101.
279 A Magyar, o.c., 1960, pp. 100-101.
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a “Socialist”280, Varga attacked the recently introduced system of hourly 
wages paid in industry. He called for an immediate return to the former 
system of piece-wages in order to increase labor productivity.281 He crit-
icized behavior and mentality of many workers in the socialized facto-
ries. ‘In the factories and workshops the workers keep looking over their 
shoulders to see whether there is enough coal, whether there are enough 
raw materials, and they are preoccupied with the single thought that “if 
we throw ourselves into the work, within three days there won’t be any 
coal left or there won’t be any raw materials left, and then we’ll be unem-
ployed” and one is inescapably led to the conclusion – No, I won’t say 
consciously but because they involuntarily slow down their work – that 
the fresh will to work is paralyzed.’282 
The picture the other commissars drew was even more dramatic as 
Varga’s analysis. An experienced labor leader like Commissar Gyula Len-
gyel (Finances) declared that rationalization of the production organi-
zation met resistances on behalf of the workers.283 The same workers 
preferred being paid for doing nothing while in other factories vacan-
cies could not be fulfi lled. Collieries were looking for mineworkers while 
idle quarrymen were earning a salary that was higher than that of the 
miners. In the offi ces, clerks were hiding themselves behind their desks 
in such a way that nobody could fi gure out what they were really doing. 
Hamburger (Agriculture) blamed it on the peasantry refusing to feed the 
cities. Peasants were withholding grain and selling their produce on the 
black market or preferred feeding their pigs with the milk destined to 
the children. Labor discipline of the agricultural workers was as bad as 
that of the factory workers.284 
280 Varga: ‘Az a rafi nált kereskedô ott elkezd nekik beszélni, adja proletárt, a szocia-
listát…’ Then, somebody interrupted him: ‘A kommunistát!’. Ibidem, p. 104.
281 János Vanczák of the Iron and Metal Workers rejected this return to pay-by-
achievement at the fi rst meeting of the steering committee of the National Eco-
nomic Council. He argued that the only method to increase productivity was 
through education of the workers and by providing them with a decent livelihood, 
not by so-called scientifi c methods of work (Taylorism). Kende, o.c., 1977, p. 91.
282 Péteri, o.c., 1984, pp. 97-98.
283 Gyula Lengyel, ‘A falu és a város gazdasági érdekközössége’, in Közgazdasági Szem-
le, 16, 3, 1969, pp. 349-362; A Magyar, o.c., 1960, pp. 105-118.
284 A Magyar, o. c., 1960, pp. 105-118.
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4.4 The final breakdown
Moral, social, economic and political problems announced the fall of the 
Councils’ Republic. Now that the peasantry refused to feed the city of 
Budapest, the divide between the urban working classes and the pea-
santry was, after all, total and. Reactionary forces rallied by the catholic 
clergy and angry peasants plotted in order to annihilate the Councils’ 
Republic. While charges of a “Jewish conspiracy” having usurped state 
power fell on fertile soil, the Government saw the counterrevolution mark-
ing points. A coup planned for June 24, 1919, was nonetheless easily de-
feat ed. Its psychological impact was nonetheless important. When re-
signing from the Revolutionary Governing Council, several socialist 
lea ders (Kunfi , Böhm, and Erdélyi) were already convinced of the irre-
mediable decline of the regime. 
In an effort to boost the disastrously plummeting industrial produc-
tion, the National Economic Council, headed by Varga, re-instituted the 
recently abolished piece rates and incentive wages in all enterprises.285 
Varga also launched a campaign for socialist work competition that called 
for a seven-day working week without overtime pay. The restructured 
Re volutionary Governing Council, now exclusively including Kun’s com-
munist center and the Socialist Left, launched a barter program for wheat, 
which helped little to relieve the food shortages in Budapest. At this time 
the communist extreme left reappeared on the political scene. In an at-
tempt to save the dictatorship of the proletariat, the extreme leftists at-
tacked the vestiges of bourgeois reformism in the party and in the com-
munist-controlled commissariat of public education, while others wanted 
an immediate purge of the party apparatus. Their man was Tibor Sza- 
285 This was in accordance with Lenin’s views. Lenin: ‘We must organize in Russia 
the study and teaching of the Taylor system and systematically try it out and 
adapt it to our own ends. At the same time, in working to raise the productivity 
of labor, we must take into account the specifi c features of the transition period 
from capitalism to socialism (…).’ Lenin, ‘The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet 
Government’, in Pravda, April 28, 1918, No. 83 and Izvestia VtsIK, No. 85, here 
quoted according to the text of the pamphlet: V. I. Lenin, The Immediate Task of 
the Soviet Government 2nd ed., Moscow, 1918, in Lenin’s Collected Works, 4th Eng-
lish Edition, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972, Vol. 27, pp. 235-277.
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muely, ‘a man of action, detesting compromises’,286 who reorganized with 
Otto Korvin287 the “Lenin Boys”288 now terrorizing the bourgeoisie.289 
By the middle of July 1919 it had become clear that the war against 
the Romanian intervention forces was defi nitely lost. In a speech on July 
15, 1919, given at the Central Executive Committee, Kun openly admit-
ted that the dictatorship of the proletariat was in a profound crisis.290 
From now on, the survival of Kun’s regime hinged on a hypothetical So-
viet Russian intervention. Increasing desertions from the regiments were 
indicative of the workers’ mood. At the Danubius plant only 27 workers 
voted in favor of the continuation of the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
Party leaders started referring to those workers who disagreed with them 
as the lumpenproletariat or dodgers. This was the reason why the issue of 
“law and order” became the focus of discussion.291 
Domestic economic decline engendered corruption.292 In an often-
cited article published on July 15, 1919, in Népszava, Varga painted a de-
moralizing picture of the rapidly deteriorating situation of public mo-
rality: 
‘Sadly one must confess that this loose moral attitude we fi nd in every 
strata of society: the proletariat take as much advantage of their offi cial 
power as the educated men; the former Communist as well as the former 
Social Democrat; the old as well as the new generation, the soldiers no 
286 ‘Er war der Mann der Tat, der die Taktik der Kompromisse verabscheute. Sein 
kaltes sarkastisches Wesen verhüllte ein glühendes Temperament.’ (‘He was a man 
of action detesting compromises. His cold sarcastic nature hid a burning temper-
ament’). Rákos, o.c., 1920, p. 39.
287 Ottó Korvin was ideologically infl uenced by Ervin Szabó’s syndicalist ideology. 
He was active in the Gutenberg-Otthon club of journalists, in the Galilei Kör and 
the Society of Social Sciences. With Hevesi he belonged to the group that had pre-
pared the attempt on Tisza’s life. The group around Korvin gathered in Hotel 
London near the Western Station. Lengyel, o.c., 1959.
288 The gang was offi cially disbanded in late April 1919.
289 Rákos, o.c., 1920, p. 40.
290 Kun, Népszava, 16.7.1919; translated in Béla Kun, La République hongroise des con-
seils. Discours et articles choisis, Budapest: Éditions Corvina, 1962, pp. 218-222.
291 Borsányi, o.c., 1993, pp. 191-192.
292 Anton Lehár, Erinnerungen. Gegenrevolution und Restaurationsversuche in Ungarn 
1918–1921, Herausgegeben von Peter Broucek, Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 
1973.
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less than the civilians. Conditions in the countryside are worse than in 
the capital. Trustees sent to the rural areas occupy themselves with hoard-
ing of foodstuffs; the village executive committees issue orders against 
food deliveries. Today they declare the old [blue] money non-negotiable, 
tomorrow, the same authority demands payment in old money. The Red 
Guards, instead of strictly enforcing all orders, in many places partici-
pate in transgressions, themselves. The biggest worry of the offi ce work-
ers is how to fi nd a new swindle to get into a higher pay category. The ma-
jority of the physicians are contributing to the sacking of the proletarian 
state in a most bastardly fashion, by declaring each offi ce worker who 
comes to them, ill, and sending him to a spa for an eight week cure. In 
the public distribution of food the abuses are daily. The food supplies 
are robbed on their way to the capital […]. While the decent and capable 
bourgeois keep themselves apart and refuse to participate in production 
and organization, the scum of this class is busily active in “comrading” 
everyone, loudly screaming [about] their loyalty and stealing everyone 
blind […]. This situation is desperate and the decent man is incapable of 
producing anything due to the constant fear that no matter whom he 
entrusts with something, the result is always bribery and corruption.’293
The not yet mentioned military crisis had become extremely acute at 
the end of July 1919. Now that the Russian Red Army in Ukraine could 
not make contact with the Hungarian forces, the Rumanian army pushed 
by the French was free to cross the Tisza River. After the failure of the 
international solidarity strike of July 21, 1919, the last hope of outside 
aid had disappeared. Kun, nonetheless, wrote a dramatic appeal to the 
world proletariat. He gave an interview to a reporter of the British Daily 
News in which he put the problem in his own way ‘The problem is not 
whether a Communist Hungary can survive in the midst of capitalist Eu-
rope, but rather whether capitalist Europe can survive in the face of Com-
munist Russia and Hungary.’294 Of course, nobody was impressed by this 
demagogical appeal. In Vienna, negotiations with the Entente were con-
ducted by Böhm, but without results. Hoping that he could stay in power 
for some more weeks, Kun did not yet prepare for working underground 
293 Varga, ‘A korrupció’, in Népszava, 15 July 1919, p. 1, translated in Eckelt, o.c., 
1971, p. 87.
294 Borsányi, o.c., 1993, p. 198.
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or are making a compromise with the Social Democrats inside and out-
side his government. 
On July 29, 1919, the Rumanian army crossed the Tisza and marched 
on Budapest. The following day, Kun, accompanied by Korvin, met the 
Hungarian envoys Böhm, Weltner, and Peyer at Királhida to fi nd out 
what the Entente expected of him. Kun rejected the idea that the gov-
ernment resign and hand over power to a reformed Social Democratic 
government.295 The following day and night he deliberated with his army 
and party chiefs. Socialists and Communists were divided on the pro-
posal of ending the combat. Kun argued nonetheless for continuation of 
the war. Vágó, Szamuely, Hamburger, Pogány and Landler supported this 
proposal, but the other Commissars opposed it. By then, the position of 
the Council of the Unions was also known: the unions had voted 43 to 
3296 for surrender and the abolition of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
After the organized working class had broken with the dictatorship 
of the proletariat, the Revolutionary Governing Council convened in the 
morning of August 1, 1919. The bad news arrived that the Hungarian 
Red Army had been defeated by the Romanian intervention forces. After 
a short military briefi ng, Kun proposed nonetheless to continue the war. 
Only Szamuely supported Kun’s proposal. Several Commissars like Lás-
zló Rudas,297 Gyula Lengyel, and Jenô Varga were subject to discourage-
ment.298 Haubrich’s intervention against continuation of the war was, 
however, decisive. Then, the Revolutionary Council Government decid-
ed to hand over power to a so-called caretaker trade-union government. 
On the same day in the afternoon, this decision was submitted to the 
plenary session of the Budapest Council of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Depu-
ties. When entering the conference hall, Kun was loudly acclaimed. Ob-
viously, his personal reputation was still intact when he delivered his fare-
well speech. Kun concluded that the proletariat of Hungary had not be-
trayed its leaders but itself, and that the dictatorship of the proletariat 
295 Tökés, o.c., 1967, p. 195.
296 Landler of the Railroad Workers’ Union, Ferenc Bajáki of the Metal Workers’ 
Union, and Garbai of the Construction Workers’ Union.
297 Rudas is hiding his discouragement in his memoirs in which he attacks Kun and 
Pogány after the fall of the Councils’ Republic. Rudas, o.c., 1922.
298 Borsányi, o.c., 1993, p. 202.
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had been defeated economically, militarily, and politically. Kun: ‘If there 
had been a class-conscious revolutionary proletariat, then the dictator-
ship of the proletariat would not have fallen in this way. […] I would have 
liked to see the proletariat fi ghting on the barricades […] declaring that 
it would rather die than abandon its rule. Then I thought: are we to man 
the barricades ourselves without the masses? […] This proletariat needs 
the most inhumane and cruel dictatorship of the bourgeoisie to become 
revolutionary.’299 
After his speech, Kun left the conference hall and hurried to organize 
his departure to Vienna. Envoy Weltner traveled back to Vienna to bring 
to conclusion the negotiations of refugee rights conducted by Böhm. Why 
did Kun choose for exile? The audience had applauded him prolonged-
ly. The appointed “trade-union” government was mainly formed out of 
the ranks of his fellow commissars. Obviously, he had taken this decision 
in a mood of discouragement. Landler, Pogány, and Hamburger decid-
ed to accompany him. Several leading Socialists, like Böhm, Kunfi , Var-
ga, and Rónai left because they feared reprisals from the counter-revo-
lutionary forces.300 Bokányi, Lukács, Kelen, and Korvin preferred stay-
ing in Hungary. Tibor Szamuely, was not allowed to enter Austria.301 
In the late hours of the evening of August 1, 1919, two special trains 
with the commissars and their families left Budapest for Vienna. On Au-
gust, 2, 1919, Böhm on behalf of the Hungarian delegation and Theo-
dor Ippen302 on the Austrian side signed an agreement mentioning the 
following names of persons allowed to cross the border: Kun, Landler, 
Pór, Vágó, Pogány, Rákosi, Madarász, Hirossik, Varga, Lengyel, ‘and their 
followers’.303 
In Budapest, a Government of trade-union functionaries headed by 
Gyula Peidl took power. This government would rapidly shift to the right 
299 In translation in Tökés, o.c., 1967, pp. 203-204; Borsányi, o.c., 1993, pp. 202-203.
300 According to Vilmos Böhm, these party intellectuals had been the leaders of the 
inner-party opposition. Böhm, o.c., 1924, p. 240.
301 He would commit suicide at the frontier. Later on, Henrik Ungar would argue in 
his pamphlet that Kun had given up Szamuely. Henrik Ungar, Die magyarische 
Pest in Moskau, Leipzig, Zürich and Vienna: Veritas-Verlag, 1921, p. 33. 
302 Theodor A. Ippen (1861–1935) was a diplomat and historian. 
303 Borsányi, o.c., p. 205.
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by dissociating itself from the policy of the Republic of Councils and by 
liquidating its achievements. The former Parliament was restored and a 
so-called People’s Republic installed. On August 3, 1919, the Rumanian 
troops marched into the capital. On August 5, 1919, the Peace Confer-
ence resolved to send an offi cial military mission to Budapest supervis-
ing the execution of the armistice agreement. On the same day, the Ru-
manians issued an ultimatum, dictating new terms of armistice by the 
right of the victor. On August 6, 1919, a group of counterrevolutionary 
offi cers headed by István Friedrich made a pro-Habsburg coup forcing 
the Peidl Government to resign. Admiral Horthy having his headquar-
ters at Siófok refused to recognize the Friedrich Government. With his 
army of about 25,000 soldiers, Horthy began to cut a swath of terror and 
murder in the occupied patches of the country.304 On November 14, 
1919, the Rumanian troops evacuated Budapest. On November 16, 1919, 
Horthy marched into Budapest. On November 22, 1919, Károly Huszár 
formed a Cabinet of Concentration. According to the international ag-
reements, elections were to be held, but this time in an atmosphere of 
terror.
5. Analyzing all past experiences
The Communist refugees were not welcome in crisis-ridden Vienna. 
Fearing diplomatic problems, the Austrian Government arrested the 
arriving Communist commissars. Their money was confi scated.305 After 
strongly worded protests, they were interned at the castle of Karlstein,306 
where the Austrian government used to concentrate all refugees affi li-
ated to Bolshevism. Later on, their wives were relegated to Drosend-
304 Within a few days Horthy’s men killed at least 5,000 Jews and Communists. Near-
ly 70,000 others were thrown into concentration camps. Peter A. Toma and Ivan 
Völgyes, Politics in Hungary, San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1977, 
p. 13.
305 Árpád Szélpál (1897–1987) writes that they arrived ‘their pockets almost empty’. 
Árpád Szélpál, Les 133 jours de Bela Kun, Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1959, 
p. 257.
306 During the Great War Karlstein had served as a concentration camp for foreign 
citizens.
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orf.307 At Karlstein, the inmates suffered from the cold, the poor hygie-
nic conditions, and isolation. They concluded that they were the prison-
ers of an international imperialist counterrevolution. In February 1920, 
the prisoners were transferred to Steinhof, a psychiatric hospital in a Vi-
enna suburb.308 Varga was released and reunited with his wife.309 Kun 
was interned in another psychiatric hospital, this time at Stockerau.310 
On 1 April 1920, the newly founded MKP announced that Kun, Lewien, 
Pór, Béla Vágó, M. Rákosi and B. Haller had ended a 103-days (sic) hun-
ger strike after Chancellor Karl Renner had promised to release them. 
Kun, Lewien and Pór would, nonetheless, remain interned.311
5.1 Hungarian sectarianism in Vienna
When visiting the noisy circles of Viennese psychoanalysts and psycholo-
gists, Varga met Sigmund Freud312 at the Berggasse, 19313. He contacted 
307 Among them was Anna Axelrod. She was Tobias Axelrod’s wife, who had been ac-
tive in the Councils Republic of Munich. The following Hungarian Communists 
had been interned at Karlstein: Béla Kun, Jenô Landler, Jenô Hamburger, Béla 
Vágó, Jenô Varga, Gyula Lengyel, László Rudas, József Pogány and family, Ernô 
Pór, Ernô Seidler, M. Rákosi, Ferenc Rákos, Béla Rudas, Béla Szántó, Bélané 
Szántó, József Lengyel, Emil Madarász, Jolán Kelen, Emilné Horti, Borbála Lan-
tos (Rippert), Varjas Sándorné, and children, Markovicsné and two children, Jo-
lán Hevesi, Sándor Klein, Weiler, Schlézinger, Julius Brilowsky, Weiszbrot. Var-
ga’s wife is not mentioned. Ágnes Szabó and Ervin Pamlényi (ed.), A határban a 
halál kaszál… Fejezetek Prónau Pál feljegyzéseibôl, Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 
1963, p. 141.
308 ‘Am Steinhof ’, today known as the Otto Wagner Hospital, would become in 1938 
an extermination center for mentally ill and ‘degenerated’ persons. ‘Der lange 
Schatten der NS-Medizin. Das Steinhof-Projekt am DÖW’, in Mitteilungen. Vien-
na: DÖW. Dokumentationsarchiv des österreischen Widerstandes, 156, April 2002, 
pp. 1-2. http://www.doew.at/aktuell/mitt/mitt_archiv/156.pdf 
309 They moved to the Titlgasse 13, situated in the 13th district of Vienna. Their son 
András (Bandi), accompanied by his grandmother, would arrive later on. 
310 Borsányi, o.c., 1993, p. 212. 
311 Die Kommunistische Internationale, 1920–1921, Vol. 2, No. 12, pp. 290-291.
312 On October 5, 1920, Varga wrote from Moscow to his wife in Vienna that he was 
still in touch with Alfed Adler. Letter in Varga’s fi les, Party Archives, Budapest, 
783 f 1.ô. e., letter number 51.
313 See C. Toegel, ‘Jenoe Varga, Psychoanalyse, Raeterepublik und Stalinismus’, Vor-
trag gehalten am 23.1.1999, auf dem 12. Symposium zur Geschichte der Psycho-
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celebrity and social reformer Alfred Adler 314 who was lecturing on indi-
vidual psychology for a working-class public. Adler, however, condemned 
Bolshevism as a form of dangerous “social poison”. Varga paid much more 
attention to foreign Communists commenting on world events. In May 
1920, Alfred Rosmer315 visited him when traveling to Moscow. Rosmer 
had a rather favorable impression of him: ‘Eugene Varga […] had some 
knowledge of French affairs; and he questioned me, among other things, 
about Francis Delaisi and his book Democracy and the Financiers.316 Delai-
si argued that the true masters of France were not the ‘democratic’ rul-
ers; they were the ‘fi nanciers’, a small number of men to be found on the 
boards of directors of all the big fi rms – an anticipation of the theme of 
the “200 families” which was to be taken up later at the time of the Pop-
ular Front.’317 In 1949, when already working for the American services, 
analyse in Tübingen, typoscript (Private Archive of Mária E. Varga, Moscow). 
Tögel pretends that Varga had been in 1918–1919 a member of the Hungarian 
Psychoanalytical Society; see Christfried Tögel, ‘The Hungarian Soviet Republic and 
the development of psychoanalysis in the Soviet Union’, in Psychoanalysis and His-
tory, 2001, 3, pp. 193-203. There exists a letter from Freud to Ferenczi dated Feb-
ruary 4, 1920, that Varga would visit him next Friday, which indicates that Varga 
had been released earlier than February 7, 1920. It is possible that Varga had got 
acquainted with Freud via Sándor Ferenczi. On January 25, 1923, Freud wrote to 
Ferenczi that he had received a letter from Varga who at that moment was work-
ing at the Soviet embassy in Berlin. Sigmund Freud and Sándor Ferenczi Corres-
pon dance 1920–1933. Les années douloureuses, Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 2000, pp. 108-
109. www.boehlau.at/main/addons/samples/3-205-99. 
314 Adler met with friends at Die Tabakspfeife. Mirjana Stančiç, Manès Sperber. Leben 
und Werk, Frankfurt and Basel: Stroemfeld/Nexus, pp. 88-91.
315 Alfred Rosmer [André Griot] (1877–1964) was originally an anarchist and then a 
syndicalist. After the First World War he became a leading fi gure of the French 
Communist Party (PCF) from which he was expelled in 1924. Rosmer became 
Varga’s translator when staying in Moscow.
316 Known as Francis Delaisi, François-Almire Delaisi (1873–1947) was a French jour-
nalist who started his career at Gustave Hervé’s La Guerre sociale and at La Vie 
ouvrière of the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT). His book La démocratie et 
les fi nanciers was published by Hervé’s publishing house La Guerre sociale in 1910. 
Varga reviewed this book for Huszadik Század (1912, Vol. 26, pp. 814-819).
317 Alfred Rosmer, Moscow under Lenin, New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 
1971, p. 25.
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Ruth Fischer318 would remember Varga very well. ‘I saw him for the fi rst 
time in Vienna at the Tittelgasse (sic), where he had fl ed after the col-
lapse of the Hungarian Councils’ Republic. With unshakable optimism 
and many witty details he gave me an account on the stupidies Béla Khun 
(sic) had committed in the fi eld of economic policy. We, the young ones, 
liked him very much, but as a Communist he was in our view not mili-
tant enough.’319
Meanwhile, the Hungarian Communists became enmeshed in factio-
nal struggles.320 Kun’s “Russian faction” was at odds with the Landler and 
Lukács faction. The latter’s stature had grown at the expense of Kun’s.321 
In his search for the causes of the disaster, Kun focused on the weak-
nesses of the MKP. In his essay From Revolution to Revolution,322 Kun ar-
gued that the MSZDP had invited the Communists over to share power 
at a moment the MKP was far from a powerful and united party.323 The 
MKP’s cardinal sin had been to share power with reformists, who had di-
luted the Party’s ideological purity, beclouded class consciousness, and 
ultimately had served the interests of the class enemy.324 The main rea-
son for the fall of the dictatorship of the proletariat had been due to a 
reformist tendency in the Party and an anti-revolutionary current in the 
workers’ movement. The lesson to be learnt was that in the future an un-
relenting, merciless and sharp struggle against the Social Democrats and 
318 Ruth Fischer (1895–1961) [Elfriede Eisler] participated in the foundation of the 
Austrian Communist Party. In 1919, she went to Berlin where she joined the 
KPD. She is the daughter of the Austrian philosopher Rudolf Eisler and Hanns 
and Gerhart Eisler’s sister. On August 1, 1919, Gerhart Eisler accompanied Varga 
with the other Hungarian commissars to Vienna.
319 Ruth Fischer, ‘Tito contra Stalin. Gegenwartsprobleme der Komintern-Strategie’, 
in Der Monat, 1949, Vol. 1, No. 7, p. 46.
320 Ágnes Szabó, ‘Politikai, elméleti kérdések a magyar kommunista emigrációban 
(1919–1920)’, in Történelmi Szemle, 1966, Vol. 9, No. 3-4, pp. 368-396.
321 Lukács had a notable contempt and scorn for Kun, ‘feelings magnifi ed by their 
disagreements over policies’. Kadarkay, o.c., 1991, p. 255.
322 Béla Kun, Van revolutie tot revolutie, Amsterdam: Broschurenhandel der Commu-
nistische Partij (translation: R. Manuel), 1921.
323 This was also Béla Szántó’s opinion in Die Kommunistische Internationale, 1920, Vol. 
1, pp. 3579-3582.
324 Bennett Kovrig, Communism in Hungary. From Kun to Kádár, Stanford: Hoover In-
stitution Press. 1979, p. 77.
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the union bureaucracy should be carried out. Kun attacked the so-called 
left-wingers in the MSZDP for their harmful role played during the Co-
uncils’ Republic. The dictatorship of the proletariat had been the result 
of the cowardice of the reformists, not of the revolutionary initiatives of 
the Communists. Hence, Kun hoped that White Terror would heal the 
workers from their democratic illusions and also from social democracy. 
Left-wing tendencies exercising a considerable infl uence on the Com-
intern threatened to cut off Moscow from the European working mass-
es.325 The recently established branch offi ces of the Comintern in West-
ern Europe – Berlin, Amsterdam, and Vienna – were badly coordi-
nated.326 Vienna had enough fi nancial resources to publish the journal 
Kom munismus that in the course of 1920 appealed to the left-wing Com-
munists in Europe. The tiny Austrian Communist Party was represent-
ed in its pages by Gerhart Eisler (the managing editor), Karl Frank, Paul 
Friedländer, Franz Koritschoner327; Hungary by Béla Kun, Lukács, Var-
ga, Béla Szántó, and J. Révai; the Communist Youth International by Wil-
li Münzenberg and Richard Schüller; the Italian Left by Amadeo Bor di-
ga; the Dutch by Anton Pannekoek; the German Left by Paul Frölich and 
Arkadi Maslow.328
By 1920 Lenin was already mounting a harsh campaign against the 
“leftist” current in the Communist International. After having read Kun’s 
pamphlet From Revolution to Revolution , Lenin was not very pleased by 
325 Fernando Claudin, The Communist Movement. From Comintern to Cominform, Har-
mondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975, pp. 56-59
326 Philippe Bourrinet, The Dutch and German Communist Left. A Contribution to the His-
tory of the Revolutionary Movement 1990–1950, London: International Communist 
Current, 2001, pp. 135-166.
327 Koritschoner was Rudolf Hilferding’s nephew.
328 In this period, Vienna had become an important center of communist activities. 
In the autumn of 1920, Moscow established in Vienna a branch of Rosta (later on 
TASS) in order to aliment Soviet propaganda in Polish, French and German. Sev-
eral Hungarian Communists were employed by this news agency. Among them 
was Alexander Rádo, who was at that time studying at the University of Vienna. 
Lucien Laurat, ‘Le parti communiste autrichien’, in Jacques Freymond (ed.), Cont-
ributions à l’histoire du Comintern, Genève: Librairie Droz, pp. 67-96, 1965, p. 84. 
On Rádo, see Louis Thomas, ‘Alexander Rado’. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-
for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/docs/v12i3a05p_0001.htm
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its ‘complete lack of facts’ and its verbalism. Lenin thought that the jour-
nal Kommunismus329 of the Communist International330 contained arti-
cles affected by the indubitable symptoms of that ‘infantile disorder’ he 
disliked so much. Though Lenin could agree with Kun’s critique of So-
cial Democracy, he completely disagreed with Kun’s ultra-leftism. Taking 
stock of the lessons of the Hungarian Republic of Councils, Lenin’s pam-
phlet Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder of Communism, written 
in preparation for the Comintern’s Second Congress, was clearly meant 
as an open attack on the ‘doctrinaires of the revolution’331, especially the 
Hungarian leftists. In this pamphlet he criticized Kun for having missed 
‘that which is the most essential in Marxism, which is Marxism’s living 
soul – the concrete analysis of a concrete situation’. In addition, he at-
tacked Lukács for his verbalism332 and Kun for rejecting the parliamen-
tary road to power333 or cooperation with Hungarian centrists like Kunfi  
and Böhm who had constituted in Vienna a new “centrist” party with close 
links to the Austrian Social Democratic Party.
All the time, the situation of the Hungarian political refugees would 
remain very precarious. When fl ocking in, they were concentrated at the 
camp of Grinzig, while others were sharing rooms in Vienna. Political 
refugees arriving almost daily, had to be supported and screened. Pov-
329 Journal for the countries of South-Eastern Europe (in German). See Kommunis-
mus, Vol. 1, No. 1-2 (February 1, 1920) to No. 18 (May 8, 1920).
330 Written on 12 June, 1920. V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Moscow: Foreign Languag-
es Publishing House, 1965, Vol. 31, pp. 165-167.
331 Marcel Liebman, Le léninisme sous Lénine, Vol 1. La conquête du pouvoir, Vol. 2. 
L’épreuve du pouvoir, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1973, Vol. 2, p. 85.
332 Lenin: ‘G. L.’s article is very Leftwing, and very poor. Its Marxism is purely ver-
bal; its distinction between ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ tactics is artifi cial; it gives 
no concrete analysis of precise and defi nite historical situations; it takes no ac-
count of what is most essential (the need to take over and to learn to take over, 
all fi elds of work and all institutions in which the bourgeoisie exerts its infl uence 
over the masses, etc.).’ Lenin, o.c., 1965, Vol. 31, pp. 165-167.
333 Lenin: ‘No. 6 (March 4, 1920) contains an article by Comrade G. L., entitled ‘On 
the Question of Parliamentarianism’, which the editors designate as controver-
sial, and from which Comrade B. K., the author of an article entitled ‘On the 
Question of the Parliamentary Boycott’ (No. 18, May 8, 1920), directly dissoci-
ates himself (fortunately), i.e., declares that he is in disagreement with it.’ Lenin, 
o.c., 1965, 31, pp. 165-167.
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erty was everywhere.334 Who received some assistance was primarily a 
matter of informal contacts. A complicating factor was the presence of 
whole families. Cold, hungry, impoverished, refugees had forgotten the 
taste of meat entirely. Heating materials were unobtainable. The govern-
ment tightly rationed all necessities. Even milk was hard to come by. Sau-
erkraut was supposed to take the place of potatoes. Refugees met at Euge-
nia Schwartzwald’s home in Vienna’s center where soup was distribut-
ed.335 Many refugees were in a poor health condition. Their children 
had to go to school or to be sent on holiday to the villages or even abroad. 
There was no Red Cross help. Educated refugees escaped from the cold 
by spending many hours in the libraries or in the coffee houses. Money 
collected among wealthy sympathizers or transmitted through various 
channels from Moscow kept the MKP afl oat and a limited number of its 
militants alive. However, the Hungarian and other refugees were still able 
to hold the streets of Vienna. On the First of May in 1920, the tradition-
al demonstration was ‘very impressive’ with its contingents of Italians, 
Hungarians and Balkan peoples. ‘The Hungarians were there in great 
number, and despite their defeat gave an impression of strength. They 
sang the International very rhythmically, as a marching song, quite differ-
ent from the usual rather drawling chant’.336 The defeated Kapp Putsch 
in Germany and the counter-attacks of the Red Army driving the Polish 
troops far back to the west gave the Hungarians hope. Soon the Horthy 
regime, they believed, would crumble down under the joint efforts of the 
German proletariat and the Russian red cavalry. Kun expected, vainly, 
much from the repatriation of radicalized Hungarian war prisoners to 
the successor states. Meanwhile, he was able to surround himself with a 
faction of able ‘people who had (…) lost their footing in exile’337, like Bé la 
334 Alfred Rosmer: ’There was deep poverty everywhere, poverty which it was pain-
ful to look at. From the moment we got to the hotel, the ragged linen, the state of 
physical exhaustion that the staff were in, revealed it. In the shop windows there 
were nothing but empty boxes lying here and there.’ Rosmer, o.c., 1971, p. 25.
335 György Dalós, ‘The fi delity of equals: Ilona Duczynska and Karl Polanyi’, in Kari 
Polanyi-Levitt (ed.), The Life and Work of Karl Polanyi, Montreal and New York: 
Black Rose Books, 1990, pp. 38-42.
336 Rosmer, o.c., 1971, p. 26. 
337 Borsányi, o.c., 1993, p. 222.
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Vágó, Ernô Pór, or Ferenc Rákos. Apart from this group of confi dents, 
Mátyás Rákosi, László Rudas,338 and Varga backed Kun’s policy, but they 
were so careful for keeping some functional and political distance to their 
party leader. For instance, Rákosi did not incur any obligations, while Ru-
das maintained his independent judgment, as did Varga who was aware 
of the ‘dangers of life in exile’.339 
Many Communists staying in Austria were not blind for the real situa-
tion in their home country, or for the fact that Kun’s leadership had failed 
to organize resistance to the Horthy dictatorship restoring the tradition-
al values, institutions, and authorities of the monarchical regime.340 Some 
of them warned Kun for his unlimited optimism.341 The Vienna-based 
ultra-leftist faction surrounding Ernô Bettelheim342 and Elek Bolgár even 
blamed Kun for alleged fi nancial embezzlements.343 
5.2 Economic Problems of the Proletartian Dictatorship
Varga joined the newly founded MKP when being interned at Karlstein. 
All the time, Varga kept there a low profi le defending the Bolshevik Rev-
olution without attacking his fellow ex-Commissars.344 There, he started 
writing a more or less “scientifi c” study on the economic policy he had 
worked out during the Republic of Councils. This booklet, Economic Prob-
lems of the Proletarian Dictatorship (Die wirtschaftspolitischen Probleme der pro-
338 Rudas would change his mind. Rudas, o.c., 1922.
339 Ibidem. 
340 The secret ballot was not reestablished until 1939. Ivan Volgyes, Hungary. A Na-
tion of Contradictions, Boulder: Westview Press, 1977, p. 3.
341 In December 1920, Landler and Hirossik, backed by Lukács, Szántó, and Rudas, 
would urge Kun to place under their direction the most dedicated activists. But 
Kun, supported by a faction of Moscow radicals (among them were Endre Rud-
nyánszky, József Pogány, Mátyás Rákosi, Ernô Pór, László Rudas, Béla Vágó, Fe-
renc Rákos, and Varga) continued to advocate for the establishment of a home-
based party.
342 Bettelheim wrote a pamphlet defending his views against those of Kun. Ernst Bet-
telheim, Zur Krise der Kommunistischen Partei Ungarns. Internationale organisatori-
sche Mißstände, Vienna: Selbstverlag, 1922.
343 Kovrig, o.c., 1979, p. 83.
344 Kun and Béla Szántó published their own view on the events. See Szántó, Klas-
senkämpfe, o.c., 1920, and Kun, o.c., 1921.
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le tarischen Diktatur), remains until today an important comprehensive 
analysis of the 133 days of the dictatorship of the proletariat.345 Though 
Varga is entirely in line with Kun’s views on the rise and fall of the Co-
uncils’ Republic, his book is more than a personal account of a leading 
participant.346 Breaking with Kautsky347, who trusted on the iron law of 
capitalist development, Varga analyzes the dictatorship of the proletariat 
as a dynamic outcome of the war.348 Notwithstanding Varga still believes 
in the ‘progress of the world revolution’349, his analysis of the immediate 
causes of the fall of the Republic of Councils is rather pessimistic and 
tainted by fatalism. He ends his pamphlet with the warning that many 
readers will put his book disenchanted aside. But on the other hand, he 
also warns his readers for drawing premature conclusions because ‘the 
proletarian revolution needs stubborn and hardy combatants who are able 
to foresee any diffi culty’.350 
Varga’s analysis gives a sharp insight in the problems the regime was 
struggling with and the objective and subjective causes having led to its 
downfall. 
First of all, there were the adverse circumstances having led to the 
well-known catastrophe. In Hungary, the repressive state apparatus of 
the ruling oligarchy had been dissolved after four years of war leaving 
an economically devastated country cut off of its external resources. Ac-
345 Eugen Varga, Die wirtschaftspolitischen Probleme der proletarischen Diktatur, 2nd edi-
tion, Hamburg: Carl Hoym Nachf. Louis Cahnbley, 1921. (First edition, Vienna: 
Neue Erde, 1920.) This book was also published in Hungarian translation in Mos-
cow. Parts of this book were published elsewhere in the form of an article (in In-
ternacionale, 1920, pp. 22-31), or as a chapter on the agrarian question (Die Agrar-
frage in der ungarischen proletarischen Revolution, Reichenberg: Volksbuchhandlung 
Runge & Co., 1920. (A Russian translation followed.) A chapter on labour discip-
line was published separately as ‘Das Problem der Arbeitsdisziplin und der Ar-
beitsintensität’, in Almanach des Verlages der Kommunistischen Internationale, Ham-
burg: Verlag der Kommunistischen Internationale, 1921, pp. 166-174.
346 Varga expressed his thanks to Béla Kun and Gyula Lengyel. Varga, Wirtschaftsprob-
leme, o.c., 1921, p. 9
347 Tikos, o.c., 1965, p. 26-27.
348 Varga, Wirtschaftsprobleme, o.c., 1921, pp. 10-11
349 Ibidem, p. 7.
350 Ibidem, p. 136.
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cording to Varga, the dictatorship of the proletariat did not occur at the 
time and the place where the material preconditions for building a so-
cialist society were available. Secondly, the Hungarian workers had not 
been suffi ciently prepared for their revolutionary tasks. The ‘egoistic psy-
che’351, that is so typical for capitalism, was still guiding the workers’ at-
titudes and behavior. It would have required a whole generation to make 
it disappear. Expropriation of capital was but one factor or stage in this 
process. For the time being, the proletariat was more interested in indi-
vidual consumption than in developing a sound economic infrastructure 
that could fulfi ll society’s needs.352 
As an administrator in charge of revolutionary affairs, Varga provides 
his readers with an ample description of how revolutionary control had 
been implemented and fi nally had broken down. Proletarian indiscipline 
was, according to Varga, one of the causes of the disappearance of the 
Councils’ Republic marking also the proletariat’s ruling incapacity. He 
explains that the international crisis of capitalism had weakened the he-
gemonic capacities of the ruling classes and increased the proletariat’s 
willingness of breaking with capitalism. Notwithstanding the ruling class-
es had called on the sacrifi ces of the masses to save the Fatherland, prole-
tarian self-consciousness was low. Meanwhile, the working class had called 
for a higher material and moral standard of living the bourgeoisie was 
unwilling to concede. The economic breakdown at the end of the war 
had led to wide-scale poverty. The war had, nonetheless, demonstrated 
that a centrally planned economy was possible, not utopian,353 and that 
capitalist anarchy was not the only available economic model. Because 
capitalism could not meet the demands of the working classes, it had lost 
any support of the masses.
351 Ibidem, p. 8.
352 Varga was not the only one having been struck by this politically incorrect phe-
nomenon. ‘A real passion for purchasing has broken out in Budapest’, Karl Po-
lányi told his audience at the Agitators’ Training School on April 28, 1919. ‘The 
duty of the proletarian today is to refrain from making purchases. You should 
only buy what you absolutely need, because if you can do without the object you 
have bought you have certainly deprived somebody who may need it more’, he 
added. Quoted in Péteri, o.c., 1984, p. 80.
353 Varga, o.c., 1921, p. 14.
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Varga argues that capitalism is unable to make profi ts anymore and, 
subsequently, to expand production. This will mean the end of capital 
accumulation. ‘Without profi ts, no accumulation; without accumulation, 
no possibility to extract surplus; without surplus, no possibility to increase 
the living standard of the workers’.354 This appreciation was determined 
by Varga’s concept that stagnant capitalism would increase social tensi-
ons and thus provoke a revolutionary assault on the capitalist system. Ac-
cording to Varga, four factors determined labor’s economic yield [Ergie-
bigheit]: (1) labor rationality; (2) labor productivity; (3) labor intensity; (4) 
and the relationship between productive and nonproductive individuals 
in society.
In Varga’s analysis355 of Communist labor relations, labor rationality 
stands for the general educational level of the workforce and the latter’s 
employability with regard to new industrial standards and a more sophis-
ticated technology.356 By applying an absolute prohibition of alcohol con-
sumption, by reforming the educational system and by introducing a cul-
ture of “free speech”, output can be raised. In addition, technological 
progress, i.e. an increase of constant capital in combination with special-
ization and cooperation, will raise labor productivity as well. In a capi-
talist system, labor productivity is however lagging behind because of the 
repressive environment, the unwillingness of the workers to apply inno-
vations and cartels and trusts keeping less-productive factories in opera-
tion. Anarchy of production leads to periodical crises and depressions, 
while idle production capacity reduces social labor productivity further-
more. Due to the prevalent schooling system most talents of the work-
ing-class youth are wasted, which in turn causes additional productivity 
losses. Important gains in productivity can be reached by concentrating 
354 Ibidem, pp. 17-18.
355 In his pamphlet Varga used some newspaper articles he wrote in Budapest when 
being in offi ce. Varga extensively quotes Lenin’s pamphlet on the tasks of the So-
viet Government (translated into German and published in 1919 by A. Hoffmann 
in Berlin and by Neue Erde in Vienna; there exist also a Swiss edition published 
in 1918 by Promachos-Verlag in Bern). 
356 Ibidem, pp. 20-21.
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production in the best-performing production units, by applying indus-
trial standards and norms, and by sharing patents.357 
Also qualitative aspects, such as product quality, wastages, and a cor-
rect use of instruments increasing productivity, are studied. In capital-
ism, Taylorism and piece-wage workers are compelling workers to higher 
labor intensity, Varga recalls.358 According to Varga, Taylorism has inten-
sifi ed the exploitation process, but its introduction in a socialist econo-
my can be extremely valuable. Finally, average labor productivity359 will 
increase after elimination of all non-productive laborers, rentiers, bour-
geois women, and domestic servants.360 With Lenin361, Varga believes that 
as long as workers’ consciousness is insuffi ciently developed, piece-wage 
may increase labor productivity. With Lenin362, he considers Taylorist “sci-
357 Ibidem, p. 21.
358 Frederick W. Taylor pointed out that production costs could decrease by apply-
ing ‘scientifi c’ time and motion studies of the work involved. In the fi rst years of 
the 20the century many factories came to organize production processes along 
the line set out by Taylor and other reformers. 
359 Increasing productivity was the key to economic progress as European labor lea-
ders believed when visiting modern American factories. The progress of ‘Ameri-
can methods of production’ made that the American worker were producing ‘two 
or three times as much as the British worker’. Henry De Man, The Remaking of a 
Mind. A Soldier’s Thoughts on War and Reconstruction, New York: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1919, p. 259.
360 Because of a widespread reorganization of the production process in the facto-
ries during the First World War, Taylorism had become a central theme in many a 
debate among Leftist trade-union militants. 
361 Already in 1918 Lenin defended the reintroduction of piece-work. The Central 
Committee of the Metalworkers’ Union was one of the fi rst to carry out Lenin’s 
instructions on raising labor productivity by introducing a system of piece-work 
and bonuses. See Lenin, ‘The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government’, in 
Pravda, April 28, 1918, No. 83 and Izvestia VTsIK No.85; Published according to 
the text of the pamphlet: N. Lenin, The Immediate Task of the Soviet Government 2nd 
ed., Moscow, 1918 in Lenin’s Collected Works, o.c, 1972, Volume 27, pp. 235-277.
362 Lenin: ‘We must raise the question of piece-work and apply and test it in practice; 
we must raise the question of applying much of what is scientifi c and progressive 
in the Taylor system; we must make wages correspond to the total amount of goods 
turned out, or to the amount of work done by the railways, the water transport 
system, etc., etc.’ Ibidem.
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entifi c management” as being indispensable for employing unskilled work-
ers in new factories.363 A centrally organized management system should 
exercise control over day-to-day management. Varga also refers to the 
frivolous treatment of state property or the appropriation of bourgeois 
property by the workers, which refl ects a capitalist egotistical attitude and 
represents a tendency, he thinks, that was – at least in part – due to the 
fact that during the war moral awareness had been undermined in com-
bination with a widespread lack of clarity concerning socialist property 
relations. Proletarians administering the confi scated factories were only 
too prone to belief that ‘these factories were their own property,’ and not 
of the ‘whole of society’.364 Many workers were sub titulo of exercising con-
trolling tasks occupying offi ces and ‘multiplying the number of non-pro-
ductive offi ce workers’.365 
Although productivity is higher in the proletarian state than in capi-
talism, Varga argues, in the beginning of the dictatorship of the prole-
tariat total output, and thus the standard of living of the urban workers, 
will decrease. Expropriation of the bourgeoisie will not provide the pro-
letariat with much more additional consumption goods unless the whole 
productive infrastructure is reformed. This will take a more or less long 
period of time. Expropriation of the landed aristocracy will increase the 
living standard of the peasantry, but at the same time reduce the amount 
of foodstuffs the peasantry is willing to sell on the market. In his book, 
Varga ascertains that under the dictatorship of the proletariat a large 
part of the agricultural workers had supported the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. Because of the sequels of the world war and destructions 
caused by the revolution the workers had, however, to renounce at any 
time an amelioration of their living conditions. Varga blames the Hun-
garian proletariat for its refusal to accept a lower standard of living in 
exchange for a consolidation of proletarian hegemony. ‘Building social-
ism means that each class-conscious worker is not only willing to strug-
gle, but also to accept all sorts of hardships,’ he proudly concludes.366
363 Varga, Wirtschaftsprobleme, o.c., 1921, p. 27.
364 Varga, Wirtschaftsprobleme, o.c., p. 43.
365 Ibidem, p. 47.
366 Ibidem, p. 33.
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Varga admits that the revolutionary regime never had been in a posi-
tion of taking the necessary and most radical measures against the bour-
geoisie.367 Public debt had not been cancelled and foreign capital not ex-
propriated. Varga rejects, however, Kautsky’s assertions that one should 
wait before taking over all commands from the bourgeoisie. After hav-
ing a lot of commercial and non-productive functions abolished, a cen-
trally planned economy would be able to produce more effi ciently for 
social demand at fi xed prices under a new kind of a performing non-bu-
reaucratic regime of labor discipline. In order to hold the bourgeoisie ex-
perts in check, political commissars defending the common interests of 
the proletariat in the factories and elected workers’ councils would es-
tablish labor discipline and better working conditions. Varga concedes 
that the elected workers’ councils had, however, increased the number of 
unproductive workers in the factories. They could also be blamed for 
their laxity in matters of working discipline and wages.368 According to 
Varga, a complete and immediate socialization of the whole economy 
had, nonetheless, given better results in Hungary than in Russia, where 
not all enterprises had been nationalized. Though bourgeois techni-
cians were in a position to sabotage production, complete nationaliza-
tion was, nonetheless, an appropriated method for excluding the bour-
geoisie from the high commands of the economy. Varga’s economic model 
of a centrally planned economy with appointed managers running big 
enterprises required, however, the creation of a huge new bureaucracy 
with many sector ministries and local branches covering the whole ter-
ritory. Meanwhile, all enterprises in Hungary were already under com-
mand of the Supreme Economic Council allocating raw materials and 
machinery, organizing commercial transactions and distribution, and de-
ciding on quantity and quality of all produced goods. The unresolved 
problem was how to decentralize the economy in order to bolster local 
initiatives fulfi lling the needs of the population.
When running the centrally planned economy, Varga had been con-
fronted with several cases of mismangement. Therefore, he criticizes the 
367 Ibidem, pp. 43-51.
368 Varga’s chapter on labor discipline was published separately in Almanach des Ver-
lages der Kommunistische Internationale of 1921. 
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fact that the recently formed local economic councils369 used to debate 
on all centrally taken decisions. These councils were hindering an ade-
quate labor distribution system for they defended particular interests being 
in confl ict with the general interest. Therefore, Varga pleads for concen-
tration of production on a few industrial locations where workers could 
be housed. Meanwhile, the workers opposed any form of geographical 
concentration or restructuring. Varga blames workers’ enterprise chau-
vinism, their laziness and their vicious behavior as well. In order to com-
bat squandering of public goods, fi nancial controllers were visiting the 
nationalized factories. Though their role was not without any importance 
– they organized distribution of raw materials in cooperation with the 
factory commissars and the commodity administrations –, Varga blames 
the factory directors for their bureaucratic style of management and their 
raw material hoarding. Meanwhile, the central commodity administra-
tions were not receiving adequate information about the factories’ real 
shortages and the presence of idle workers. Varga advocates therefore 
the introduction of a personal identifi cation card to collect adequate in-
formation about the workers’ employability and their general health and 
work conditions.
Although the working classes had temporarily failed to take over power 
in other European countries in a period the Red Army was defeating the 
intervention forces in Russia, Varga believed nonetheless in the coming 
proletarian world revolution.370 A shortage of civil servants combined with 
trade-union conservatism had, however, much contributed to the down-
fall of the Republic of Councils. In Kun’s rhetoric style, Varga blames, 
once more, in his book the workers for their low level of class-conscious-
ness, their cowardice and their many other vices actually rooted in capi-
talism. Instead of a ‘good organized Communist Party in the country, 
which could have enlightened the working class about the sense and the 
tasks of the economic change’,371 a complex bureaucratic organization 
369 The local economic councils had been established on the basis of a decree issued 
on June 15, 1919, but they were disbanded a month later and replaced by the re-
spective subordinate offi ces of the National Economic Council.
370 In his foreword, he still believes ‘in the forward march of the Revolution (…) be-
cause capitalism is incapable of providing the proletariat with a better standard 
of living’. Varga, Wirtschaftsprobleme, o.c., 1921, p. 7.
371 Ibidem, p. 74.
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had come into being. In his book, Varga pays much attention to the role 
of the class nature of this expanding socialist bureaucracy.372 All privi-
leges the bureaucrats had enjoyed in capitalism were suppressed in order 
to enhance class solidarity between civil servants and manual workers. 
Many low-paid teachers, technicians, postmen, and railroad workers – 
who were all natural allies of the working class –, had remained on their 
post under the dictatorship of the proletariat. As the young intelligentsia 
had chosen in majority the side of the Councils’ Republic, the payment 
of higher salaries to the hard-needed specialists had not been necessary. 
The alliance of workers and intellectuals had thus been a living reality!
About a quarter of Varga’s book is devoted to the agrarian policy.373 
Varga writes that ‘the most diffi cult problem of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat is the agrarian question […] because the urban population is 
depending for its food provision on the peasantry. Therefore, a policy 
not putting a break on production, but, instead, furthering it, should be 
chosen.’374 The problem, however, was how to realize this ambitious rev-
olutionary plan. Varga pleads here for a policy that, ‘at least’375, should 
win over the agrarian proletariat and the village poor (i.e. small peas-
ants not employing wage workers) for the dictatorship of the proletariat 
while, at the same time, neutralizing the majority of the middle-peas-
ants. This policy should be intended to secure the cities with a continu-
ous fl ow of foodstuffs. This opportunistic statement had to convince the 
readers of the primacy of food production and the necessity ‘of saving 
continuity of production’376 in combination with revolutionary changes 
in rural property relations. On the one hand, Varga could agree on the 
principle of a complete socialization of all landed property, but, on the 
other hand, he stressed the fact that the soil was also ‘a natural means of 
existence’ (Naturalgrundlage der Existenz).377 Above all things, Varga feared 
a situation in which land-hungry peasants would keep in check the pro-
letariat. 
372 Ibidem, pp. 74-84.
373 Ibidem, pp. 84-118.
374 Ibidem, p. 84
375 Ibidem, p. 84.
376 Ibidem, p. 84.
377 Ibidem, p. 85.
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An objective criterion for expropriation was not available. In Hunga-
ry, everything depended on the distribution of landed property and the 
type of class composition based on it. Where big estates were dominat-
ing agriculture and the landless peasants and agricultural workers were 
numerous, the dictatorship of the proletariat should therefore decree a 
complete socialization of the soil. Where small property was evenly dis-
tributed and dominating, proletarian hegemony could meet much more 
diffi culties when pushing for a socialized agriculture. According to Var-
ga, expropriation of all big and middle estates (plus 100 yokes or 57 ha) 
and all farming implements without fi nancial compensation had been 
the right decision. About 50 percent of the soil, with 35 to 40 percent of 
arable land, had been passed to the agrarian proletariat without having 
been parceled out or self-appropriated by the landless peasants.378 The 
former managers or landowners had often stayed in offi ce. In the past, 
the landowners had prevented any socialist agitation in the villages, which 
could explain why the majority of the illiterate agricultural workers did 
not go over to Communism. Only a minority of them had been touched 
by the revolution or mobilized in the Red Army.379 After nationalization, 
all big estates had been federated into regional production cooperatives 
and directed by a central production cooperative depending on the farm-
ing section of the Natonal Economic Council. This administrative struc-
ture was not only chosen ‘because of the social backwardness of the ag-
ricultural workers’,380 but also in order to defeat their high wage de-
mands and a relaxation of labor discipline. Because of mutual distrust, 
the revolutionaries had failed to mobilize the agrarian masses in de-
fense of the Councils’ Republic.381 Some improvised expedients, such as 
the creation of dairy farms near railway stations or gardens at the out-
skirts of town, were invented in order to feed Budapest. Jobless workers 
in the luxury industry, members of the former ruling class and redun-
378 Varga mentions that in Russia most of the estates had not been expropriated, but 
parcelled out and the rich peasants had appropriated all tools. He cites Lenin 
who had warned for this danger. Ibidem, pp. 86-87.
379 Ibidem, p. 88.
380 Ibidem, p. 88.
381 In a footnote, Varga concedes that distributing small plots of land (up to 1 ha) to 
the rural poor would have appeased their land hunger and attached them to the 
fate of the revolution. Ibidem, p. 89.
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dant civil servants were ‘assiduously and cheerfully’ (sic!) working as mar-
ket-gardeners in ‘a productive, healthy environment’.382 
Varga’s core problem can be summarized in one question: ‘What has to 
be done with the peasants?’383 In his Agrarian Question, Kautsky had given 
a rather simplistic answer to this question by admitting that all peasants 
would recognize one day once and for all the advantages of the big agrar-
ian enterprises and thus give up their small plots.384 In his commentary 
on Kautsky’s prediction, Varga forgets to mention that his former teacher 
had rejected cooperative forms of ownership in agriculture as an astute 
move to defend the private interests of the landowners and the bourgeoi-
sie. Instead, Varga prefers referring to the fact that the mir, as a primitive 
form of communism, had already prepared the Russian peasants for co-
operative ownership of land and agricultural implements. According to 
Var ga, private property of land had, meanwhile, corrupted the Hungarian 
peasant’s mind and had made of a return to a situation of agrarian self-suf-
fi ciency a real threat. Varga’s political solution was the organization of a 
pro letarian power structure for the extortion of the agrarian surplus by 
means of taxation in kind and the imposition of collective farming. Keep-
ing counter-revolutionary peasantry in check would only be possible by cre-
ating a class-conscious agrarian proletariat and by withdrawing the village 
poor from the ideological and economic infl uence of the rich peasantry.385
Though missing an analysis of the “revolutionary potentiality” and the 
concrete living and working conditions of the peasantry, Varga’s book 
contributed nonetheless to the ensuing debate on agrarian reforms.386 
382 Ibidem, p. 90.
383 Ibidem, p. 91.
384 Ibidem, p. 91.
385 Varga, Wirtschaftsprobleme, o.c., 1921, pp. 92-93.
386 Three years later Varga published a more sophisticated view on the Hungarian 
Revolution. Then, he admits that the revolution had come too early. The strug-
gle against the labor bureaucracy was not fi nished and ‘the revolutionary devel-
opment in the surrounding countries was insuffi ciently expanded’ to permit a 
proletarian revolution. Even with the help of a good organized and disciplined 
Communist Party, the revolution would have failed in a small and landlocked 
country like Hungary. Eugen Varga, ‘Die ungarische Räterepublik’, in Jahrbuch 
für Wirtschaft, Politik und Arbeiterbewegung, Hamburg: C. Hoym Nachf., 1922–23, 
pp. 1013-1021.
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A quote from Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire in Barga’s book reveals, how-
ever, Varga’s fundamental enmity to the peasantry: 
‘Each individual peasant family is almost self-suffi cient; it directly pro-
duces the greater part of its own consumption and therefore obtains its 
means of life more through exchange with nature than through inter-
course with society. The smallholding, another peasant, and the family 
next door, another smallholding, another peasant, and another family. 
A bunch of these makes up a village, and a bunch of villages makes up a 
department. Thus the great mass of the French nation is formed by the 
simple addition of isomorphous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack 
form a sack of potatoes.’387
Though Varga still believes in an alliance of the proletariat with the 
poor peasantry, he does not incorporate the latter as a decisive factor 
into the ongoing revolutionary process. Obviously, infl uenced by Kaut-
sky’s “fatalism”388, he sees the peasantry as an obstacle to the introduc-
tion of a socialist regime based on an overall nationalization of indus-
tries, trades and agriculture. Kautsky had already argued that the less 
the peasant produces for his own need, the more he produces for the 
market; the more he is obliged to rely upon his money income, the greater 
will become his interest in high prices for his produce. ‘This becomes his 
dominating interest after feudalism has been abolished. […] it brings 
him into opposition to the non-agricultural and town population, above 
all, to the workers, who must spend a larger portion of their incomes upon 
food than the middle-classes, and consequently have the greatest inter-
est in lowering the prices of the necessaries of life’.389 In these matters, 
Kautsky’s infl uence on Varga was still far-reaching. 
In his famous pamphlet on the Dictatorship of the Proletariat Kautsky’s 
remarks that in agriculture ‘to allow property in the means of production, 
and private production itself to continue, and then regularly to confi s-
cate the surplus, leads to the ruin of production’.390 Kautsky argues fur-
387 Varga, Wirtschaftsprobleme, o.c., 1921, pp. 93-94. 
388 Though not mentioning him, Varga blames Kautsky for the latter’s Marxist ‘fa-
talism’: ’The evolutionist explanation of Marx’s theory leads to a passive, fatalist 
ideology (…)’. Varga, Wirtschaftsprobleme, o.c., 1921, p. 136.
389 Kautsky, o.c., 1971, p. 117.
390 Karl Kautsky, The Dictatorship of the Proletariat, Ann Arbor: The University of Mi-
chigan Press, 1964, p. 112,
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thermore that a general rise of the social standard of the peasantry can-
not be accomplished by any method of land partitioning. ‘It can only be 
achieved when higher productive forms prevail, which require a general 
improvement in the education of the agricultural population, and a larg-
er supply of cattle, implements, machinery, and artifi cial manure to be 
at their disposal, all of which conditions can only be introduced with dif-
fi culty and patience where small agriculture is the rule.’391 Later, Kautsky 
would denounce the Bolshevik’s illusion that the poor peasant is think-
ing of giving up the principle of private property or that he is seeking to 
improve his lot by collective production. In all countries, the peasant has 
become the strongest defender of private property and, therefore, he is 
‘fostered and pampered by the ruling classes as their most trustworthy 
defender’, but his interest in the revolution ‘dwindles so soon as his new 
private property is secured’.392 Kautsky’s answer to the problem of a pos-
sible alliance393 between urban workers and peasantry is nonetheless rath-
er realistic.394 First of all, he rejects Marx arguing in his Civil War in France, 
that in the coming proletarian revolution the peasants will march with 
the proletariat. Second, he trusts on the ineluctable growth of the wage-
earners class after full penetration of capitalism in agriculture. ‘The vic-
tory of the proletariat depends upon the extension of wage labor in the 
country, which is a protracted process, a process which is slowly accom-
plished by the increase of large-scale agriculture, but more quickly pro-
moted by the removal of industries to the country. At the same time, the 
proletarian victory depends upon the town and industrial population in-
creasing more rapidly than the country and agricultural population’.395 
In the mean time, Varga had remained Hilferding’s epigon when dis-
coursing on a national economy functioning as an integrated fi rm. For 
having been cut off from Russia all the time, only a few Bolshevik sources 
391 Ibidem, pp. 113-114.
392 Ibidem, p. 117.
393 Moira Donald, Marxism and Revolution. Karl Kautsky and the Russian Marxists 1900–
1924, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993, pp. 232-246.
394 Also Radical Pál Szende would point to a tactical alliance with the peasantry. Pál 
Szende, ‘Die Krise der mitteleuropäischen Revolution. Ein massenpsychologi-
scher Versuch’, in Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 1921, Vol. 47, No. 
2, pp. 337-375.
395 Kautsky, o.c., 1971, p. 119.
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are quoted in Varga’s book.396 Utopian thoughts about the role of mo ney in 
a socialist society are striking. Varga believes that in a socialized economy 
money would disappear as all payments among fi rms and consumers were 
based on simple accounting operations or payments in kind (housing, food, 
education, heating, holidays) and peasants were taxed in kind.397 ‘After 
having expropriated big enterprises the proletarian state takes over the 
tasks of real accumulation and the development of productive forces’.398
Finally, Varga’s rosy picture of a perfect communist society is sharply 
contrasting with the concrete economic and fi nancial situation in the time 
of the Councils’ Republic. International payments had come to a halt af-
ter the take-over. Peasants’ resistance had wrecked forced circulation of 
new banknotes printed by the Revolutionary Councils’ Government.399 
In his book Varga argues nonetheless that international payments should 
be executed, at least in the fi rst phase of a revolution, by liquidating the 
gold reserves and the country’s foreign possessions, or by auctioning all 
confi scated antiques and jewelry.400
396 He quotes from Russische Korrespondenz, January 1920; Die Rote Fahne (Berlin); Hans 
Berliner, Der bolschewistische Staat, Berlin: Lichtstrahlen, 1919; Dr. Max Hirschberg, 
Bolschewismus. Eine kritische Untersuchung, Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1919; Karl 
Renner, Marxismus, Krieg und Internationale, Stuttgart: Internationale Bibliothek; 
Le nin, Die nächsten Auftgaben der Sowjet-Macht, Berlin: A. Hoffmann, 1919; L. Trots-
ky, Arbeit, Disziplin und Ordnung, Berlin: Verlag Gesellschaft und Erziehung, 1919.
397 Varga, Wirtschaftsprobleme, o.c., 1921, pp. 113-129. These ideas are also contained 
in his book A pénz, published in 1918. In Soviet Russia, N. Bukharin and E. Pre-
obrashensky wrote in their ABC of Communism that there would be no money at 
all in the Soviet Republic. It would, however, only subsist in the transition period 
from capitalism to socialism. Bukharin and Preobrashensky, o.c., 1969, p. 389. 
Bernard Chavance, Le capital socialiste. Histoire critique de l’économie politique du so-
cialisme (1917–1954), Paris: Grenoble, 1980, pp. 144-146.
398 Varga, Wirtschaftsprobleme, o.c., 1921, p. 124.
399 Varga, Wirtschaftsprobleme, o.c., 1921, pp. 96-108.
400 That Varga omits to comment on the problem of international trade and inter-
national payments is not so surprisingly. In those hectic days of the Republic of 
Councils, it was hardly possibly to have money transferred to other countries. Pay-
ments to foreign claimants had been cancelled and foreign accounts had been 
frozen. The Ministry of Finance invested much energy in answering to the claims 
of all prejudiced bankers, traders and entrepreneurs. Anarchy prepared the ground 
for large-scale smuggling and fraud. Magyar Országos Levéltár (MOL), micro-
fi lms L5, 5746-5750 and L 9, 5750-5763.
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6. Conclusions
Varga was by no means a revolutionary having developed an autono-
mous activity in the Hungarian labor movement and during the Revolu-
tion. As a tractable and even a docile MSZDP member, he was nonethe-
less very critical to the party leaders compromising with the bourgeois 
reformers, instead of mobilizing the masses against the landlords and 
the bourgeoisie. All the time, Varga preferred staying within the main-
stream labor movement. 
Varga’s radicalism developed in the aftermath of the First World War 
when the old regime had been swept away. Without hesitating, Varga start-
ed advocating in favor of a full nationalization of all industrial, commer-
cial and agrarian businesses and the establishment of the dictatorship of 
the proletariat. As a People’s Commissar, Varga moved, however, closer 
to the Communists in whom he saw a natural ally against the counter-
revolutionary forces. 
As a policy maker, Varga can be defi ned as a technocrat interested in 
implementing industrial and social reforms in close collaboration with 
the traditionally much better organized trade unions. Varga’s model of 
a centrally planned economy was largely inspired by the already existing 
system of “war capitalism” and completed by elements borrowed from 
Hilferding’s Financial Capital. 
During and after de Councils’ Revolution, Varga would remain very 
critical to Kun’s revolutionary voluntarism or claims articulated by the 
Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils. Varga’s “productivism” was inspired by 
the acute problem of feeding the cities and reestablishing productivity 
in industry. In the mean time, Varga was focusing on setting higher pro-
duction goals in all sectors by introducing Taylorism. He worked out a top-
down system of central economic planning and income policy in order 
to boost production and productivity in all sectors of the economy. His 
project failed as the workers resisted his reforms and the peasants re-
fused to sell their produce to the cities. Though the breakdown of the 
Hungarian economy was also due to external circumstances, domestic 
economic and social problems were contributing much to the Councils’ 
Republic downfall. 
